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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation analysiert drei unterschiedliche Perspektiven von Fusionen und Übernah-
men (im Englischen: mergers and acquisitions (M&A)), die in der internationalen Finanz-
dienstleistungsindustrie vollzogen wurden. Hierbei werden die verschiedenen Auswirkungen 
solcher Transaktionen auf die Wertgenerierung von Anteilseignern und der operativen Effi-
zienz der beteiligten Unternehmen untersucht. Um die jeweilige Perspektive darzustellen, 
wurden drei voneinander unabhängige Studien verfasst, welche Unternehmen der internatio-
nalen Finanzdienstleistungsbranche als Untersuchungsgegenstände heranziehen. 
Die erste Studie analysiert den geographischen Aspekt von grenzüberschreitenden 
M&A-Transaktionen. Hierbei werden Anteilserwerbe an notierten und nicht notierten Banken 
aus Entwicklungsländern durch internationale Banken aus Industrienationen mit solchen Ak-
quisitionen verglichen, welche sich ausschließlich zwischen Banken aus Industrieländern 
ereigneten. Darüberhinaus untersucht die Studie besondere Ausprägungen solcher Akquisitio-
nen sowie ökonomische und regulatorische Besonderheiten in den jeweiligen Zielländern, 
welche möglicherweise einen wesentlichen Einfluss auf den Erfolg der jeweiligen Übernahme 
haben. Übereinstimmend mit US amerikanischen und europäischen Erkenntnissen bewirken 
internationale M&A-Aktivitäten eine Wertgenerierung für Anteilseigner der Zielbank, wo-
hingegen Aktionäre der Käuferbank einer Wertvernichtung ausgesetzt sind. Dieser Umstand 
symbolisiert somit einen Werttransfer von Industriestaaten zu Entwicklungsländern. Darüber-
hinaus zeigen die für Bieterbanken und fusionierte Unternehmen (im Englischen: combined 
entities) durchgeführten Regressionsanalysen, dass abnormale Renditen durch die internatio-
nale M&A-Erfahrung von Bieterbanken positiv beeinflusst werden. Bei Zielbanken hingegen 
wirken sich die Profitabilität der Zielbank sowie das regulatorische und ökonomische Umfeld 
positiv auf abnormale Renditen aus. 
Der zweite Blickwinkel bewertet den Einfluss von M&A-Transaktionen auf Finanz-
dienstleistungsunternehmen durch zwei Gruppen von institutionellen Finanzinvestoren: 
Staatsfonds und Private Equity Fonds. Die Studie versucht zu beantworten, wie sich Zielun-
ternehmen von Staats- und Private Equity Fonds voneinander unterscheiden, ob beide Inves-
toren eine gleichbedeutend starke, aktive Rolle in ihren Zielunternehmen übernehmen, welche 
die kurzfristigen positiven, abnormalen Renditen erklären könnte und wie Wettbewerbsunter-
nehmen der Zielunternehmen wertmäßig auf die Investitionen von Staats- und Private Equity 
Fonds reagieren. Hierzu wurde eine umfangreiche Stichprobe von Zielunternehmen von 
Staats- und Private Equity Fonds verglichen. Obwohl sich zwei Jahre nach der Akquisition 
keine Verbesserung der operativen Effizienz bei den Zielunternehmen eingestellt hat, bestäti-
gen spezielle Charakteristiken der kurzfristigen Werteffekte die Fähigkeit von aktiven Mana-
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gement-Monitoring durch Staats- und Private Equity Fonds. Die Analyse der dauerhaften 
Kursentwicklung zeigt jedoch, dass die langfristigen, abnormalen Renditen für beide institu-
tionellen Investorengruppen keine signifikanten Werte aufweisen. Wettbewerbsunternehmen 
der Zielunternehmen von Staats- und Private Equity Fonds zeigen positive beziehungsweise 
negative Kurzfristrenditen, welche jedoch bei langfristiger Betrachtung negative Werte auf-
zeigen. Zusammenfassend sprechen einige Anzeichen dafür, dass Staatsfondmanager die glei-
che Strategie des Anteilseigner-Aktivismus verfolgen, wie sie bei Managern von Private 
Equity Fonds angenommen wird. 
Der dritte Betrachtungswinkel bewertet das Timing von M&A-Transaktionen inner-
halb der Finanzdienstleistungsindustrie. In diesem Zusammenhang werden Transaktionen der 
Hochkonjunkturphase mit jenen verglichen, die in der jüngst vergangenen Finanzkrise stattge-
funden haben. Die Studie untersucht die kurzfristige Wertgenerierung für Anteilseigner der 
kaufenden Banken sowie die Werteffekte dieser Transaktionen für Bankanteilseigner von 
Wettbewerbsbanken. Da die amerikanische Universalbank JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) 
aufgrund ihrer ausgezeichneten, wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit als Krisengewinner iden-
tifiziert wurde, werden ihre Kurzfirstrenditen mit den Renditen von anderen Universalbanken 
verglichen. Die Ergebnisse der Studie bestätigen teilweise die abgeleiteten Hypothesen, dass 
eine erfolgreiche Bank wie JPM die Möglichkeit besitzt während einer Wirtschaftskrise, 
Wertgenerierung für ihre Anteilseigner durch M&A-Aktivitäten zu bewirken. 
 
Abstract 
This thesis analyzes three different perspectives of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the 
international financial services industry and examines the respective impacts on shareholder 
wealth creation and operating performance caused by these transactions. As a result, three 
independent studies are performed adducting financial services industry companies as objects 
of investigation. 
The first perspective analyze the geographical impact on cross-border M&A deals 
comparing ownership stakes acquisitions initiated by international banks from industrialized 
countries targeting (non-) listed banks in emerging market economies (EME) with those in-
ternational acquisitions exclusively between industrialized countries. Moreover, the study 
examines, which M&A characteristics and/or economic and institutional features influence 
the success of cross-border M&A. Consistent with previous US and European evidence, 
cross-border M&A create value to target bank shareholders whereas returns to acquiring bank 
shareholders conjecture value destruction symbolizing a value transfer from industrialized 
countries to EME. The regression analyses for bidders and combined entities confirm espe-
cially the importance of bidder experience in such M&A transactions as a significant determi-
nant of abnormal returns. Results for targets emphasize the impacts of targets’ profitability 
and the institutional and economic environment. 
The second perspective accounts for the impact of M&A deals to the financial ser-
vices industry companies in conjunction with particular kinds of institutional investors, sove-
reign wealth funds (SWF) and private equity funds. The study tries to answer the questions 
how do SWF and private equity fund target firms differ from each other, whether both are 
playing an equally active role at their targets explaining short-term positive abnormal returns, 
and how do rivals in the financial services industry react on investments initiated by SWF and 
private equity funds. By comparing an extensive dataset of SWF and private equity targets, 
the institutional investors prove some potential of active monitoring although improvement in 
firms’ operating performance two years after the engagement is not detectable. Moreover, 
characteristics of positive short-term valuation effects support the active monitoring potential 
of SWF and private equity funds. Analyzing the long-term stock performance, however, the 
results indicate that the long-lasting abnormal return drift to both target portfolios is not dif-
ferent from zero. Finally, the rivals of SWF and private equity funds show positive and nega-
tive short-term valuation effects, respectively, which are turning both into positive market 
reactions in the long run. Summarizing the above given arguments, some evidence is indenti-
fied that SWF managers want to pursue an activism strategy as private equity fund managers 
do. 
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The third perspective evaluates the role of timing at M&A transactions in the finan-
cial services industry in the context of a boom phase and the most recent financial crisis. The 
study examines short-term value generation to bank shareholders and value implications on 
bank shareholders according to rival banks’ M&A acquisitions considering in both cases 
whether transactions are undertaken prior to or during the latest financial crisis. Since JPMor-
gan Chase & Co. is (JPM) is identified as crisis winner measured by its excellent financial 
performance during crisis, JPM’s short-term returns are compared with the results of other US 
full service banks. The tested hypotheses at least partially confirm that a well-performing 
bank like JPM is able to benefit from the crisis creating value to its shareholders through 
M&A activity. 
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Definition and Objectives 
The financial services industry is one of the most significant industries worldwide. It consti-
tutes the foundation upon which all other economic functions and industries are built and rely 
on by providing the underlying mechanisms that remove nation’s wealth out from under its 
figurative mattresses and allocate it nationwide to create growth. Moreover, financial services 
are the engine of wealth generation for firms and countries by pooling the factors of produc-
tivity, labor, and capital in markets that bridge the gap of risk between buyers and sellers. The 
most important strategic contribution of this industry is capital allocation. Efficient financial 
markets allocate capital to industries and companies that are assumed to use that capital to 
maximize risk-adjusted return, thereby maximizing national wealth. In the last decades, this 
industry experienced numerous changes on the economic as well as on the structural level: 
Reorganization and consolidation amplified the concentration within this industry significant-
ly. Internationalization strategies have been on top of management attention as financial insti-
tutions are obliged to be networked worldwide in order to be competitive supported by finan-
cial and market-based reforms resulting in fewer restrictions on foreign ownership.  
For many industry participants, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) become a common 
strategic response to these trends inducing a truly global competition. Consequently, the num-
ber of existing banks, for instance, has been continuously decreasing: In the Euro area1 the 
number of banks dropped from approximately 8,640 in 1997 to 6,130 in 2007 (European Cen-
tral Bank (2004) and (2008)). Initiators of those transactions believe that gains can be accrued 
through scale and scope economies, cost reduction, increased market power, and reduced 
earning volatility (Llewellyn (1999)). From the target view, international M&A transactions 
offer several potential benefits as well as including access to technology and lower costs of 
capital. Not only in the academic world, cross-border M&A deals and the corresponding 
wealth effects on shareholders are discussed extensively with positive effects to targets and 
negative or insignificant effects to bidders (e.g., Beitel & Schiereck (2001); Hawawini & 
Swary (1990); Houston & Ryngaert (1994); Madura & Wiant (1994); Siems (1996); Tourani-
Rad & Beek (1999)). 
Moreover, the ownership structure of financial services companies is shaped by the 
emergence of institutional investors like pension, mutual, and buyout funds assumed to moni-
                                                 
1  Countries participating in the Euro area: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Portugal, Slovenia (since 2007), and Spain. 
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tor the management of financial services firms effectively in general. In line with this argu-
mentation a number of studies analyzes the function of institutional investors assumed having 
positive impact on shareholder value creation through efficient monitoring and shareholder 
activism (Barclay & Holderness (1991); Holderness & Sheehan (1985); Shleifer & Vishny 
(1986)). They find that stock purchases of large shareholders are typically followed by ab-
normal stock price appreciations and also increased management turnover due to active in-
volvement in target firms’ business. 
Despite of its rapid development on the whole and the appearance of various finan-
cial institutions, investors and products, the latest financial crisis originated by the burst of the 
US residential real estate bubble also detects serious weaknesses of the financial services in-
dustry causing bankruptcy of several major financial institutions and the strongest world eco-
nomic crisis after the Great Depression. The most prominent victim linked to this crisis, for 
instance, is up to now the investment bank Lehman Brothers. 
Taking into consideration the multifariousness of this industry, the aim of this thesis 
is to analyze shareholder wealth creation and operating performance of M&A activity in the 
international financial services industry from three different perspectives. The first perspec-
tive accounts for the geographical aspect at M&A transactions. The second factor analyzes the 
impact of M&A deals to financial services industry companies in conjunction with particular 
kinds of institutional investors. The third perspective examines the role of timing at M&A 
transactions. Consequently, these perspectives serve as the basis for the upcoming empirical 
analysis: 
1. First of all, this thesis empirically analyzes the short-term wealth creation potential of 
M&A in the international banking industry accounting for the geographical aspects 
by comparing cross-border M&A activities of Western banks targeting banks in 
emerging market economies (EME) with international M&A activities between 
banks located invariably in industrialized countries. In addition to arriving at an 
overall judgment on the short-term wealth creation, diverse variables assumed having 
a decisive impact on M&A success are analyzed. Therefore, a combination of differ-
ent methodological approaches including short-term event and accounting study me-
thodologies is applied on a respective data sample. 
2. Evaluating the short- and long-term wealth creation potential of M&A activities in 
the international financial services industry initiated by institutional investors, the in-
vestments of these blockholders are compared. As both groups of analyzed institu-
tional investors, sovereign wealth and private equity funds, are assumed to conduct 
active monitoring at their targets, possible changes in operating performance are in-
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vestigated. In order to give an overall evaluation of active monitoring potential, dif-
ferent determinants are studied providing an indication of active blockholder moni-
toring. With the aim of achieving a full picture of value creation through M&A 
transactions, short- and long-term implications on respective rival firms of target 
companies are analyzed. For that reason, a variation of several methodologies com-
prising short- and long-term event and accounting study methodological approaches 
is employed on base samples of institutional investor investments as well as of re-
spective intra-industry rival companies. 
3. With regard to analyze the role of timing on short-term shareholder wealth creation 
at M&A transactions within the financial services industry, this thesis evaluates 
M&A deals conducted by major US universal banks before and during the most re-
cent financial crisis. As one specific bank is identified as one of the crisis winners, 
the study mainly compares its shareholder wealth creation with the one to rivals 
banks as well as the operating performance of the sample. Therefore, this case study 
applies a combination of different methodological approaches including short-term 
event and accounting study methodologies. 
1.2 Course of Analysis 
This chapter defines and explains the overall objectives of this thesis and sets the course of 
analysis of the following elaborations. Chapter 2 presents a number of research foundations 
including a definition of the financial services industry, mergers and acquisitions, and differ-
ent research methodologies and approaches applied. In this context, it provides an overview 
of the general structure and the rapid development of the international financial services in-
dustry. Thereby, the chapter intends to create an understanding of the competitive pressures 
affecting the financial services industry. Moreover, the various described methodological ap-
proaches provide a description of measuring and evaluating short- and long-term shareholder 
wealth creation of M&A activities in the financial services industry. 
Chapters 3 to 5 each represents a self-contained empirical study addressing different 
research questions related to the overall topic. In sum, they compose the main empirical ana-
lyses of this thesis and are developed in subsequent order. Chapter 3 examines the geographi-
cal aspect of horizontal mergers and acquisitions in the global banking industry analyzing 
short-term valuation effects on the capital market performance of acquiring banks from indu-
strialized countries and target banks from EME. It tries to answer the question whether the 
announcement effects of cross-border M&A in emerging market economies differ from the 
ones occurring in industrialized countries. Moreover, after evaluating the geographic aspect in 
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cross-border M&A deals, the chapter presents M&A characteristics and/or economic and in-
stitutional features assumed having an influence on the success of international M&A deals. 
For this purpose, a global sample of 163 takeover announcements between 1994 and 2007 is 
identified with bidding banks from industrialized economies and targets bank from emerging 
market economies. By applying the market model in event-time, short-term valuation effects 
to target and acquiring bank shareholders are detected. After this, Chapter 3 analyzes a num-
ber of determining variables for the short-term capital market performance for bidders, targets 
and combined entities and test for their significance using a cross-section regression model.  
Chapter 4 assesses the short- and long-term stock price impacts of large blockholder 
investments by sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and private equity funds on listed financial 
services industry companies reflecting the second analyzed aspect. By creating an overall 
view on the accounting figures, it answers to the question of how target firms of state and 
private equity funds differ from each other. Besides, this chapter addresses questions whether 
both institutional investors are playing an active role at their targets sustaining positive short-
term returns in the long-run and what the potential determinants for the observed short-term 
value affects are. Moreover, Chapter 4 analyzes the short- and long-term market reactions of 
non-targeted rivals from the same industry according to the investments of SWF and private 
equity funds. Therefore, the significant positive announcement returns determined by preced-
ing research are at first updated and validated against a global sample of 46 state fund and 68 
private equity fund investments between 1990 and 2009. Then, this chapter challenges the 
short-term announcement returns against the long-term abnormal returns of the respective 
targets. By applying the market model in event-time, a comprehensive perspective on the 
post-merger capital market performance is created revealing whether targets are able to sus-
tain their positive short-term abnormal returns proofing active monitoring of sovereign wealth 
and private equity funds. After this, Chapter 4 analyzes a number of determining variables for 
the short-term capital market performance and test for their significance using a cross-
sectional regression model. Finally, the short- and long-term valuation effects of intra-
industry rivals are analyzed demonstrating the impact on sovereign wealth and private equity 
fund investments on the financial services industry as a whole.  
The third and final aspect of this thesis is analyzed in Chapter 5. It examines the role 
of timing at M&A transactions in the financial services industry in the context of a boom 
phase and financial crisis taking JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) as an example case. The main 
questions addressed include whether the short-term valuation effects prior to and during fi-
nancial crisis differ significantly from each other, and whether an assumed crisis winner expe-
riences significant positive short-term announcement returns compared to its rivals. For this 
purpose, a sample of 72 bank mergers and acquisitions, in which US universal banks acquired 
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ownership stakes in other financial institutions, is identified. Using again the market model in 
event-time, Chapter 5 assesses the short-term post-merger wealth effects of transactions on 
JPM capital market performance and on respective bank peers before and during the recent 
financial crisis and vice versa. Moreover, the chapter focuses on comparing JPM operating 
performance with the respective ones of other US full service banks.  
Chapter 6 consolidates the main findings from the three empirical studies and high-
lights the peculiarities. The study concludes with an outlook and presents potential areas for 
further academic research. 
This thesis is relevant for researchers in the fields of banking, insurance, investment, 
and corporate finance as different aspects of wealth creation in the financial services industry 
are addressed in the course of work. Practitioners are given the opportunity to identify value-
maximizing strategies for future mergers and acquisitions and key success factors for poten-
tial M&A activities are outlined. 
 
 
 
 2 Research Foundations 
The following section gives a short overview of the research foundations which are connected 
to the main elements of this thesis: the financial services industry, mergers and acquisitions, 
and the measurement of M&A success. In addition by providing fundamental definition, this 
chapter also is determined to give a basic understanding about the currently competitive situa-
tion with in the financial services industry. Moreover, it presents methodologies and research 
approaches to measure and evaluate short- and long-term wealth creation through M&A 
transactions. 
2.1 Financial Services Industry 
2.1.1 Definition and Scope 
The financial services industry comprises in the broadest sense all services which are linked 
to financial transactions. Hence, this industry includes a wide range of organizations that deal 
with the management of money. Among these organizations are banks, credit institutions, 
credit card companies, insurance companies, consumer finance companies, stock brokerages, 
investment funds, real estate companies, and some government sponsored enterprises (Winter, 
Mosena, & Roberts (2009)). 
Moreover, the term “financial services” is a rather recent expression and became 
more common in the US partly as a consequence of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also known 
as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, which enabled commercial banks, in-
vestment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies at that time to merge (e.g., Neale, 
Drake, & Clark (2008)). One of the most prominent cases according to this act is the conglo-
merate Citigroup (Citi), which offered combined services of banking, securities and insurance 
to its customers originated through the merger of Citi (a commercial bank holding company) 
and Travelers Group (an insurance company) in 1998. This combination, announced in 1993 
and finalized in 1994, violated the law unless the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed to 
legalize this merger and other mergers of this kind on a permanent basis (Johnston & Madura 
(2005)). 
Industry participants comprise lenders and investors, borrowers and issuers. In order 
to guarantee that financial capital is directed toward desired purposes, participants interact in 
financial markets for securities, bonds, futures and options, employing financial intermedia-
ries such as retail and investment banks, credit unions, investment brokers and dealers, or in-
surance companies, as well as “financial utilities” that provide payment, clearing, and settle-
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ment procedures. With globalization, it becomes easier to participate in foreign financial insti-
tutions in order to gain access to or operate in international markets, to hedge currency risk, or 
to look for alternative regulatory environments (Bitz (1995)). 
Ideally, transactions that occur in the financial realm must be sufficiently transparent 
to guarantee participants mutual benefits. In order to maintain trust and confidence in the fi-
nancial services industry, supervision of the system is critical (Mwenda & Fleming (2001)). 
Within the private sector, the financial services industry includes credit and debt rating firms, 
auditing and accounting firms, and industry associations looking out for the interests of indus-
try sub-sectors.2 In the public sector, the industry relies upon the nation’s central bank for 
monetary policy and banking oversight, as well as upon the department of the treasury and 
federal commissions regulating the financial markets and those who participate in them (e.g., 
the exchange supervisory authority in the US). 
Since the focus of the following doctoral thesis lies in analyzing three different pers-
pectives of M&A transactions in the international financial services industry, it applies this 
broad assortment of companies containing the most important advantage: The results of the 
three subsequent studies are comparable to other composed empirical studies on M&A trans-
actions and their impact on shareholder wealth creation. Nonetheless, this thesis does not ac-
count for all financial services companies. Insurance and real estate companies are excluded 
as their business models are not comparable to banks and credit institutions making profit 
with lending and investing money, or stock brokerages which buy and sell shares and other 
securities, for instance. 
2.1.2 Current Trends and Challenges 
This section explains the trends and challenges impacting the financial services industry dur-
ing the last decades. Its intention is to create an understanding for the competitive pressure 
and problems financial services firms have to cope with.  
The financial services industry has experienced significant changes over the past two 
decades. It discovered that M&A activities are needed to be undertaken for strategically sound 
reasons. Changes in technology and information availability are causing alterations within the 
marketplace. Some sectors of this industry are being pushed toward commoditization. The 
quick ability of consumers to compare prices on products such as mortgages and insurance is 
making it more difficult for firms to compete based on differentiation. Price competition is 
                                                 
2  Respective companies for rating services are, for instance, Moody’s Investor Service or Standard & Poor’s 
and for auditing and accounting services, e.g. Deloitte or PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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becoming more and more important and firms are being forced to cut costs in order to remain 
competitive. The introduction of electronic communication networks in form of automated 
stock trading networks had also an impact on competition. Traditional exchanges have been 
forced to shift operational methodologies. In order to remain competitive, firms must preserve 
connectivity, increase availability of systems, and increase the degree of security provided 
(Claessens, Glaessner, & Klingebiel (2000); Llewellyn (1999)). 
In addition, the deregulation of restrictions on banks’ ability to expand geographical-
ly was relaxed in the past. With a series of removals of restrictions on intrastate and interstate 
banking in the US, for instance, concluding the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994, interstate branching was permitted in almost all states.3 The removal 
of these constraints allowed some previously prohibited M&A to occur. Besides geographical 
deregulation, relaxation of what are banks allowed to do has also encouraged product diversi-
fication (Berger, DeYoung, Genay, & Udell (2000)). 
The fast preceding globalization which is mainly influenced by the openness of pre-
vious socialist market economies, deregulation of geographic restrictions, and the harmoniza-
tion of regulatory and supervisory environments transform individual national economies to 
one characterized by an interconnected web of regional economies. Particularly in the banking 
sector, globalization is becoming the new differentiator. The competitive advantage for global 
firms such as Citi, HSBC, JPM, and Deutsche Bank is that they can balance portfolio risk by 
taking advantage of business shifts occurring in local markets and shifting investments accor-
dingly (Berger et al. (2000)). In order to best represent their customers, banks must have a 
global capability or they risk missing important opportunities of making investments globally. 
Another examples are western banks continuing to position themselves in China’s market-
place in order to take advantage of this emerging market. Without advances in Information 
Technology (IT), this global shift would be impossible. The communication of data with great 
speed and the confidence that it is secure is a necessity in the global marketplace. 
Nevertheless, the recent financial crisis reveals the extensive weaknesses of this glo-
balized industry causing deep depressions in many economics around the globe: the collapse 
of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments and downturns in 
stock markets around the world. The origin of that crisis is attributed to the collapse of a glob-
al housing bubble, which peaked in the US in 2006, caused the values of securities tied to real 
estate pricing to plummet thereafter, damaging financial institutions globally. Questions re-
garding bank solvency, declines in credit availability, and damaged investor confidence had 
an impact on global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during late 2008 and 
                                                 
3  Berger, Kashyap, & Scalise (1995) provide year-by-year details on the changes in state laws. 
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early 2009. Economies worldwide slowed during this period as credit availability tightened 
and international trade declined. Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed 
to accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that gov-
ernments did not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st century financial markets 
(Rakshit (2008); Whalen (2008)). Governments and central banks responded with unprece-
dented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion, and institutional bailout. 
2.2 Mergers and Acquisitions 
In the financial literature, the expression “Mergers and Acquisitions” has developed into a 
widely-used collective term representing all corporate transactions in which ownership of one 
company is transferred from one hand to another (Weston, Chung, & Siu (1998)). These 
transactions can either occur between companies of the same industry (horizontal M&A), or 
between companies having a buyer-seller relationship (vertical M&A), or between companies 
which are neither competitors nor having a buyer-seller relationship (conglomerated M&A). 
In the latter case, a firm or financial investor purchases stakes in a company with whose no 
industry relatedness exists at all (Gaughan (2002)).  
Moreover, the buyer side often influences the amount of shares acquired: either a 
purchase of minority stakes of the target firm takes place or a change of corporate control 
occurs when the acquirer purchases more than 50% of target’s outstanding voting rights or 
private equity. Jensen & Ruback (1983) describe the resulting market of majority transactions 
as a “market for corporate control”, where managers and management teams are actively 
competing for their right to control corporate resources. Independent of purchasing minority 
or majority, M&A transactions might have an impact on corporate disposals, corporate expan-
sions as well as on structural changes in corporate control, corporate ownership or governance 
of a firm (Copeland, Weston, & Shastri (2004)). As the purpose of this thesis is to measure 
and to evaluate shareholder wealth effects of M&A in the international financial services in-
dustry from different perspective, this study focuses on transactions with change of corporate 
control and the impact of blockholders purchasing minority stakes in a financial services firm. 
Mergers and acquisitions with change of corporate control can be differentiated by 
the future legal status of the target and the degree of codetermination on the target side. In a 
merger, the management boards of bidder and target consent to combine the firms and jointly 
prepare a respective proposal to shareholders. After shareholders’ agreement, the legal entity 
of one merging firm ceases to exist and becomes integrated in the other one. In a corporate 
acquisition, on the contrary, the legal status of the target usually remains unaltered. A corpo-
rate acquisition is carried out either as a share deal, in which the bidder directly talks to the 
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shareholders of the target to tender their shares, or as an asset deal, in which one company 
purchases the assets of another. While a tender offer generally evades the management of the 
target, no formal agreement of target's shareholders is needed. In an asset deal, on the other 
hand, shareholders of the acquired company have to formally approve the acquisition. Once 
the assets are transferred, the target firm can finally be liquidated (Damodaran (2004)). 
Transactions incorporating minority stake purchases are different from the ones with 
change of corporate control. They take place through the respective stock market on which the 
target company is listed and where its shares are traded on a daily basis. As no change of cor-
porate control occurs, consequently, target firms still exist after such transactions. Above all, 
bidders of minority shares are often from other industries such as pension funds, mutual 
funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, or private equity funds. 
These so-called institutional blockholders are not focusing on merging with or liquidating the 
target, they are rather interested in diversifying their portfolios attaining the highest returns on 
investments for their own shareholders and customers (Del Guercio & Tkac (2002)). 
For the purpose of this thesis, both kinds of transactions, majority and minority, are 
examined. Therefore, Study 1 and Study 3 incorporate transactions where the acquirer gains 
more than 50% of the outstanding shares of private equity. These transactions represent the 
most comprehensive form of mergers and acquisitions and are expected to have the most pro-
found impact measurable in form of respective capital market reactions (Antràs (2003)). 
Study 2, on the other hand, focuses on blockholder investments and their influence of targets’ 
share price if acquirers only purchase minority stakes. 
2.3 Measuring and Evaluating the Success of Mergers and Acquisitions 
2.3.1 Short-Term Methodology 
The event study methodology usually serves as the means for measuring short-term M&A 
success. It determines to what extent gains and losses of stock market returns occurring due to 
event information to stockholders are defined as abnormal returns, i.e. different from what is 
expected (Brown & Warner (1980)). New information should lead to an abnormal stock reac-
tion at the time when the new information becomes public. Therefore, the speed and the mag-
nitude of stock reactions are means to process information at stock markets. A systematic 
over- or under-reaction of returns allows rejecting the assumption that stocks represent all 
information and new information is absorbed by the market instantly. Hence, this approach 
builds on and, at the same time, challenges the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which 
12 2  Research Foundations 
 
assumes new information to be incorporated promptly and correctly into return information 
(Bruner (2002); Fama (1970); Fama (1976)).  
One common approach to detect expected returns lies in the two-factor capital asset 
pricing model, a market model assessing expected returns on the basis of a market portfolio 
and a risk premium (Black (1972); Lintner (1965); Sharpe (1964)). However, since the event 
study methodology in connection with the market model is superior as the more sophisticated 
approaches (Brown & Warner (1980); Dodd & Warner (1983)) and robust against ignoring 
autocorrelation and variance changes in daily data (Brown & Warner (1985)), this thesis uses 
this approach as the principal methodology for measuring short-term valuation effects of 
M&A.4 Applying the standard model, direct comparability to the results of other studies from 
the financial services industry is ensured. 
Additional to the common agreement on the applied methodology, the value creation 
potential in short-term event studies has also developed to a standardized position. Corporate 
control transactions in form of M&A are in most cases connected with significant wealth 
creation for the combined entity. Conversely, this creation is disproportionately allocated  
between the shareholders of the bidder and the target. These observations also hold true for 
the financial services industry. While the returns to targets experience significant positive 
announcement reactions (Houston & Ryngaert (1994)), the returns to bidders are either essen-
tially zero, or even overall negative or, at most, insignificantly positive (Kane (2000); Toyne 
& Tripp (1998)). The described short-term market reactions show the same pattern even if no 
change of corporate control has taken place (Williams & Liao (2008)). 
The market model event study is based upon Equation (2.1), with which returns of 
the stock are determined. 
 
(2.1)    
 B   
   
 

 and 
 represent the returns in period  of stock  and of the market %, respec-
tively.  stands for the zero-mean disturbance term, which is commonly referred to as the 
abnormal return. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)-regression model for each individual 
stock is applied to estimate the intercept  and slope  for each stock  over a respective 
                                                 
4  Other models to calculate short-term abnormal returns are the three factor model by Fama & French (1995) 
and the arbitrage pricing theory by Ross (1976). 
2.3  Measuring and Evaluating the Success of Mergers and Acquisitions 13 
 
estimation period. They are referred to as  and ßD. The doctoral thesis employs different 
estimation periods within the three studies: Study 1 uses an observation period of 100 trading 
days; Study 2 and Study 3 estimate the parameters over a period of 150 and 180 trading days, 
respectively. Expected returns 
 are calculated as follows (Equation (2.2)): 
 
(2.2)    
 B   	
 
 
As the market return 
 within the model generally refers to a market index asso-
ciated with the given securities over time, local indices are determined for each country 
represented in the relevant, applied data samples (Coutts, Mills, & Roberts (1994)). Using 
different indices for each represented country accounts for regional differences in industry-
returns and country-specific risk profiles. Abnormal returns of a stock  in the event window 
are calculated by subtracting the expected stock return 
 from the observed stock return 
 
in the event window described by Equation (2.3): 
 
(2.3)    
 B 
  9  	
; 
After obtaining the abnormal returns, the further analysis requires them to be aggre-
gated over the event window(s) around announcement date. Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) are calculated as defined by Equation (2.4). 
 
(2.4)  
; B ∑ 
  
 
Finally, the 
; are aggregated over the stocks and divided by  stocks to 
yield the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of the group (Equation (2.5)). 
 
(2.5)  
; B 8 ∑ 
;8  
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The event window should be long enough so that all share price reactions related to 
the transaction announcement can be captured. On the other hand, the event window should 
be kept short in order not to include any confounding effects. The selected event window is 
41 days: T = [-20;+20] days in Study 1 and comprises 61 days: T = [-30;+30] days in Study 2 
and 3. The announcement day of a transaction is determined by  = 0 in all three studies. Fig-
ure 2.1 illustrates a summary overview of the event study employed. 
Figure 2.1: Estimation Period and Event Window 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
In order to develop a perspective on total shareholder impact, the combined effect on 
an artificially combined entity is derived following the suggestion by Houston & Ryngaert 
(1994). To calculate the abnormal returns for the combined entity of the target and bidder, the 
researchers weight the abnormal returns of the bidder 
+!, and the abnormal returns of the 
target 
()* by their market capitalizations %& as presented by Equation (2.6): 
 
(2.6)    
,(*)8)!F8 B GHIJKL·NIJKL7GHIOPQ·NIOPQNIJKL7NIOPQ  
 
As market capitalizations for the entire event window, the thesis relies on those ob-
served at the end of the respective estimation period. Thereafter, the abnormal returns for all 
observations are aggregated and averaged to receive CAAR (according to Equations (2.4) and 
(2.5)). 
To test for statistical significance of the short-term returns, this thesis employs four 
test-statistics. The first test is the standard t-test statistic. To test the null hypothesis that the 
CAAR are equal to zero for a sample of  firms, the respective averages are divided by the 
standard deviation across the individual company returns over the square root of the number 
of observations in the sample as described by Equation (2.7). This test-statistic follows the 
Days
0
Announcement Event
t-n tnt-n-1
Estimation Period Whole Event Window
[t1;t2]
t-n-x
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student’s t-distribution for a sample below 30 observations and a normal distribution when 
considering a larger sample (Barber & Lyon (1996)). 
 
(2.7)  B RGGHSTURGHSV/√8 
 With: 
 
X  = Sample CAAR of sample Y 
 -U
XV= Cross-sectional sample standard deviation of CAAR of 
 sample Y 
     = Amount of stocks/firms in sample 
The second employs the suggestions by Dodd & Warner (1983) examining the statis-
tical significance of the mean standardized cumulative abnormal returns between any two 
dates. This test statistic is more accurate as the first one as it is adjusted to reflect cross-
sectional independence (Brown & Warner (1985); Dodd & Warner (1983)). Hence, abnormal 
returns are less frequently disclosed supporting the EMH and leading to more reliable find-
ings. It  follows a normal distribution. Equation (2.8) describes the corresponding test-statistic 
z. Equation (2.8a) presents the respective standardization procedure as testing significance 
requires that for each stock , the abnormal return 
 for each of the days in the event win-
dow is standardized by the square root of its estimated variance to form a standardized ab-
normal return 
 and an average standardized abnormal return for each day 
 
(Brown & Warner (1985); Patell (1976)). Afterwards, Z, tests whether the average cumula-
tive standardized abnormal return over the interval  to  is equal to zero. 
 
(2.8)  Z, B √8[\7 · ∑ 
  
 
(2.8a)  
 B GH]I̂  ]I^  and 
 B 8 ∑ GH]I̂  ]I^8!_ ; with 
   ̂   B ̂ · `1  (  UHaI\Ha$$$$$V∑ UHaK\Ha$$$$$VOKb  
  With: 
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 
 = Standardized abnormal return on stock  on day  
 
 = Average standardized abnormal return on day  
   ̂    = Corrected standard deviation of abnormal return on stock   
   ̂ = Estimated standard deviation of abnormal return on stock  
    = Number of observations during the estimation period  
   
! = Market return for the "#  day of the estimation period 
   
 = Market return for day  of the event period 
   
$$$$ = Average market return over the estimation period 
To test for significance for the combined entity of the target and bidder, the sugges-
tions by Houston & Ryngaert (1994) is applied. Equation (2.8b) presents the necessary ad-
justment to the corrected standard deviation. 
 
(2.8b)   ̂    B cd NIOPQNIOPQ7NIJKLe · ̂()*   d NIJKLNIOPQ7NIJKLe · ̂+!,   2 ·                                        %&g6%&g6%&/"h·%&/"h%&g6%&/"h·'g6/"h·g6i2·/"hi212 
  With: 
  %&()* = Market cap of the target at the end of the estimation period 
  %&+!, = Market cap of the bidder at the end of the estimation period 
  ̂()*
  = Corrected variance of the target for day  of the event period 
  ̂+!,
  = Corrected variance of the bidder for day  of the event period 
  '()*+!, = Correlation coefficient between abnormal returns of the 
       stock of the target and the stock of the bidder during the 
       estimation period 
The third test-statistic is the cross-sectional test as proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci, 
& Poulsen (1991) following the student’s t-distribution for a sample or sub-sample below 30 
observations and a normal distribution when regarding a larger sample. This test statistic z 
proves whether the average abnormal return on a random day of the event period significantly 
differs from zero. Its core idea is to standardize the abnormal returns by the residuals’ va-
riance from the estimation period. The standardization leads to even more precise findings as 
the second test-statistic by Dodd & Warner (1983) as it considers the change in variance 
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(generally an increase) within the event period and confirms the EMH more often with ab-
normal returns equal zero. This test statistic described by Equation (2.9) is an enhancement of 
the test statistic developed by Patell (1976). Equation (2.9a) displays the respective standardi-
zation procedure to standardize abnormal returns following the suggestion of Mikkelson & 
Partch (1988).  
 
(2.9) Z B j ∑ kGH]Ij]b
l jUjmV ∑ nkGH]I\∑ opq]IjjIb r
sIb
 
 
(2.9a)   
 B RGH],ImI̂  ]I^ ; with ̂   B ̂ · l  (t(  ∑ 9HaI\(tUHa$$$$$V;
IIbI∑ UHaK\Ha$$$$$VOKb  
  With: 
 ;  = First day and last day in respective event window 
 
 = Standardized abnormal return on stock  on day  
   ̂    = Corrected standard deviation of abnormal return on stock   
   ̂ = Estimated standard deviation of abnormal return on stock  
    = Number of observations during the estimation period 
   = Number of days in event window     1 
   
! = Market return for the "#  day of the estimation period 
   
 = Market return for day  of the event period 
   
$$$$ = Average market return over the estimation period 
The fourth test-statistic is the skewness-adjusted test-statistic suggested by N. J. 
Johnson (1978). The standard t-test is therefore modified to consider the skewness of distribu-
tion of abnormal returns following a normal distribution. Equation (2.10) describes the t-test. 
Note that u is an estimate of the coefficient of skewness and √ ·  is the conventional t-
statistic.  
 
(2.10) ) B √ · d  v u ·   w8 ue; with 
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  B RGGHSTURGHSV and u B ∑ 9RGH]S\RGGHS;
xj]b 8·TURGHSVx  
 
2.3.2 Long-Term Methodology 
Detection of long-term M&A success is subordinated to a number of theoretical drawbacks 
deriving from analyzing longer periods, the choice of various performance benchmarks, and 
the applied test-statistics. As abnormal returns necessitate measurement against a benchmark, 
a longer time period automatically raises concerns about a possible new listing and rebalanc-
ing bias with the benchmark (Barber & Lyon (1997)). If abnormal performance is verified 
against the overall market, the results may be skewed, auto-correlated or exposed to heteros-
cedasticity. Similar to the short-term methodology, noticeable over-reaction in studies of 
long-term returns contradicts market efficiency (Fama (1998)). 
Buy-and-hold returns (BHR) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) represent 
the most commonly-used methodology in detecting long-term performance in event-time 
(Barber & Lyon (1997); Brav & Gompers (1997); Loughran & Ritter (1995); Lyon, Barber, & 
Tsai (1999)). In order to detect the long-horizon impact of the acquisition of ownership 
claims, the 60-day, 120-day, 240-day, and 480-day BHR are calculated to measure the per-
formance of the respective company portfolio. The raw BHR for each company is estimated 
over T days as described by Equation (2.11), where /0
 is the return of firm  on day  and  it the length of the period of interest. 
 
(2.11)  /0
 B y∏ 91  
;(_ {  1 
 
As described shortly above, BHR are influenced in general by the overall market per-
formance. Consequently, BHAR are derived as the difference between the BHR using the 
daily closing prices and the BHR of the associated Datastream industry index. Equation (2.12) 
shows the calculation of BHAR with 
 as the return of the relevant country-specific Data-
stream industry index on day . 
 
(2.12)  /0
 B y∏ 91  
;(_ {  ∏ U1  
V(_ , 
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The average BHR and BHAR for the total sample are calculated as an equal-
weighted average. Statistical significance is tested using the two parametric tests, the standard 
t-test statistic and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested by N. J. Johnson (1978), as well 
as the non-parametric test, the Wilcoxon signed rank z-score. To test the null hypothesis that 
the mean BHR and BHAR are equal to zero for a sample of  firms, the respective averages 
are divided by the standard deviation across the individual company returns over the square 
root of the number of observations in the sample as described by Equation (2.13). This test-
statistic follows the student’s t-distribution for a sample below 30 observations and a normal 
distribution when considering a larger sample (Barber & Lyon (1996)). 
 
(2.13)   B GH$$$$STUGHSV/√8 
  With: 
 
$$$$X  = Sample mean of BHR or BHAR of sample Y 
 -U
XV  = Cross-sectional sample standard deviation of BHR or 
      BHAR of sample Y 
  = Amount of stocks/firms in sample 
The second parametric test is a modification of the standard t-statistics as already 
mentioned before. Barber & Lyon (1997) discover that long-term raw and abnormal returns 
are positively skewed and that this positive skewness leads to negatively biased t-statistics. 
They prove that skewness has a greater effect on the distribution of the t-statistic than does 
kurtosis and that positive skewness in the distribution, from which observations arise, results 
in the sampling distribution of t being negatively skewed. The bootstrapped skewness-
adjusted t-statistic originally developed by N. J. Johnson (1978) eliminates the skewness bias 
presented by Equation (2.14). 
 
(2.14) ) B √ · d  v u ·   w8 ue; with 
  B GH$$$$STUGHSV and u B ∑ 9GH]S\GH$$$$S;
xj]b8·TUGHSVx  
 With: 
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X = BHR or BHAR of stock  in sample Y 
 
Finally, the Wilcoxon signed rank test examines the symmetry of a distribution 
around their median. This test is the non-parametric equivalent of the paired t-test. In order to 
compute the test, the median of the null hypothesis %234 B  0 has to be deducted from all 
returns (BHR and BHAR). This leads to the scores for 
1  (Equation (2.15)). 
 
(2.15)    
1 B 
  %234 
 
Following this step the values for 
1  are ranked in accordance to their value where 
the highest value corresponds to the highest rank values as presented by Equation (2.16). For 
relatively high , 5 follows the normal distribution. Equation (2.16a) describes the relevant 
test-statistic (Serra (2004)). 
 
(2.16)  5 B ∑ 678_  
 
(2.16a) Z B }\~UkjV[NGHUkjV  
 With: 
 2U8V B  · U  1V/4 and  
   &
U8V B  · U  1V · U2  1V/24 
2.3.3 Continuative Non-Parametric Tests Applied 
In this thesis, two other non-parametric tests are relevant. The first is the mean difference test 
with whom the statistically significant difference between two samples can be checked. The 
test follows a standard statistical approach and is used by several authors (e.g., Beitel (2002); 
Hawawini & Swary (1990); Siems (1996)). This test-statistic follows the student’s t-
distribution, which can be described for observations larger than 30 by the standard normal 
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distribution (N (0;1)). Equation (2.17) describes the t-test, whereas Equation (2.17a) demon-
strates the standard error of the analyzed average portfolio. 
 
(2.17)   B GN$$$$$\GN$$$$$
ljtjtjjm ·djjjj e
 
   With: 
 &$$$$ = Average value of 
 for sample :  
   
; B 8 ∑ 
;8  with   >1,2A or  
   average value of other financial figures 
     = Amount of stocks/firms in sample   >1,2A 
   = Standard error of average portfolio 
 
(2.17a)     B ∑ 9NK]\GN$$$$$;j]bU8\V  
  With: 
  &!  = Value of CAR or other financial figures of stock " in 
       sample  
 
The other non-parametric test is the Wilcoxon rank sum test assessing whether two 
independent samples of observations come from the same distribution and whether they differ 
from each other with regards to their medians. This test is identical to performing an ordinary 
parametric two-sample t-test on the data after ranking over the combined samples. Equation 
(2.18) presents the Wilcoxon rank sum test following the normal distribution for relatively 
high  and . Equation (2.18a) presents the corresponding test-statistic. 
 
(2.18)    588 B ∑ 69:;8_  
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(2.18a) Z B }jj\~9kjj;`NGH9kjj;   
 With: 
 2988; B /2 and  
   &
988; B U    1V/12 
 
2.3.4 Evaluation of Mergers and Acquisitions’ Success 
Most event studies are followed by a regression analysis after abnormal returns and the statis-
tical tests were calculated. The aim of such an analysis is to designate the influence of certain 
determinants such as firm characteristics or the transaction occurred at a specific time or be-
ing cross-border. Regression models are often used in financial analysis in terms of estimating 
and explaining stock returns. For this purpose, linear regression models with cumulative ab-
normal returns as dependents are used (Sefcik & Thompson (1986)). Linear regression mod-
els are able to cope with a great number of different independent variables and might look as 
described by Equation (2.19). 
 
(2.19) 
; B 4  ∑ !8!_ · <!   
 With: 
   4  = Regression intercept (constant) 
   <!   = Independent variable of stock , " = >1, … , A 
   !  = Coefficient for independent variable of stock , " = >1, … , A 
     = Number of independent variables 
  = Residual of regression function for stock  
All conducted regressions are OLS-regressions assuming a linear relationship be-
tween the dependent and the independent variables. This method requires the residuals to be 
independent and normally distributed, to have the same variance (not heteroscedastic), not to 
be correlated and there should not be any linear relationship between the regressors. There-
fore, regressions are controlled for autocorrelation using the Durbin-Watson statistic, multi-
collinearity using variance inflation factors and tolerance for individual variables, heterosce-
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dasticity using the White test. In order to eliminate the effects of outliers and to prevent bi-
ased results, variables are excluded from regressions if their individual value is not within the 
tolerance of the triple standard deviation of the respective sample. 
The regression method enables to integrate qualitative information using the dummy 
variable technique. Dummy variable are binary coded with either 0 or 1. For the above regres-
sion function, the <! would take the value of one, if an assumed certain influence (e.g., deal- 
or firm-specific) factor is present. The more important attribute of dummy variables is that 
they can be used like any metric variable. Hence, it is possible to include nominal scaled in-
formation in regression analysis. This condition is only true for independent, but not for de-
pendent variables. 
2.3.5 Overview on Research Approaches 
Adjacent to presenting the different research methodologies in determining and evaluating the 
success of mergers and acquisitions, the variety of available research approaches also contri-
butes to the complexity of short- and long-term M&A analysis. Bruner (2002) portrays four 
main research approaches for pronouncing a judgment on M&A success and profitability; 
event, accounting, case, and executive studies. Since an assessment of M&A success and 
shareholder wealth creation needs the application of different research approaches, this thesis 
employs different approaches as it claims to provide a comprehensive view on the interna-
tional financial services industry according to the three examined aspects. This section, there-
fore, provides an overview of the most frequently utilized research approaches within the 
field. 
Event studies represent the most commonly applied research approach that domi-
nates the field since the 1970s. Event studies build on share return information and observe 
abnormal returns to shareholder around or after the announcement of a specific deal or event. 
As already presented in the previous section of this chapter, they either analyze short-term or 
long-term M&A success. Abnormal returns are detected by matching up the returns of a bid-
der or target to a benchmark return. Expected returns are determined by the market model in 
short-term event studies or the benchmark returns of matching market index in long-term 
event studies. Moreover, event studies built on EMH and are forward looking assuming that 
stock prices reflect the present value of expected future cash flows to shareholders (Bruner 
(2002)). Even if short-term event studies are assumed to assess future cash flow, they are ex-
posed to danger that some information is not correctly factored into share prices. Moreover, 
they are very sensitive to the event and the estimation periods selected: Abnormal returns are 
usually diminished in larger event-windows, but larger estimation periods are likely biased by 
other events occurred (Eberhart, Maxwell, & Siddique (2004)). The results attained in long-
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term event studies, on the other hand, are often dependent on the applied methodology and 
benchmark chosen. As described earlier, long-term event studies need a comprehensive me-
thodology to overcome inherent statistical biases. 
Accounting studies represent the second research approach commonly applied in as-
sessing shareholder wealth creation through mergers and acquisitions. These studies examine 
reported financial results and answer the question whether acquirers outperform their non-
acquired peers. Since focusing on general balance sheet structure or performance indicators, 
accounting studies are backward-looking and build on accredited published accounting data. 
While published data carries credibility to the reader, a general comparability of financial data 
across various year and reporting standards does not always apply (Bruner (2002)).  
Therefore, case studies as the third complementary approach are performed to over-
come the limitations intrinsic in the two explained research approaches. By focusing on a sin-
gle company conducting transactions or a single transaction, case studies alleviate a more 
detailed analysis of transaction phenomena compared to event or accounting studies. Most of 
the time, case studies pursue a structured approach bringing on new insight from a detailed 
description of real transactions and evaluation of the performance along a number of pre-
defined criteria that can be either quantitative or qualitative in nature (Eisenhardt (1989)). 
Executive surveys reflect the last research approach presented by Bruner (2002). 
From a limited number of executive questionnaires, general conclusions are drawn. Although 
the respective studies are usually based on standardized questionnaires, a similar sampling 
bias applies as present in executive interviews (Kaplan, Mitchell, & Wruck (1997)). This the-
sis, however, desists from employing this last research approach. Instead, the following chap-
ters focus on providing a detailed overview of the shareholder wealth creation through M&A 
in the international financial services industry using a mix of event, accounting and case study 
approaches. 
 
 
 3 Study 1: Cross-Border Bank M&A in Emerging Market Economies 
3.1 Introduction 
The global financial services industry experienced tremendous changes in the past. Due to an 
intensive period of reorganization and consolidation, the concentration of banks in advanced 
economies has amplified significantly. The number of banks in the Euro area,5 for instance, 
fell over the period 1997 to 2007 from approximately 8,640 to 6,130 banks reflecting a reduc-
tion of 29% (European Central Bank (2004) and (2008)). This decrease resulted in a strong 
competition in home markets, which intensified pressure on major international banks to find 
new areas for growth. Therefore, financial institutions often sought for profit opportunities at 
the customer and product level by starting their financial engagements abroad through cross-
border M&A activities. Initiators of those transactions believe that gains can accrue through 
scale and scope economies, cost reduction, increased market power, and reduced earning vo-
latility (Llewellyn (1999)). From the target view, cross-border M&A deals offer several po-
tential benefits as well as including access to technology and lower costs of capital. Conse-
quently, these transactions are regarded as strategic responses to a changing and globalizing 
environment underlined by respective numbers: The deal volume of cross-border M&A in the 
financial services industry augmented to nearly USD 842 bn in 2007 coming from USD 51 bn 
in 1994.6 
Besides strategic considerations, the internationalization of the banking industry has 
also been enforced by financial and market-based reforms in many EME resulting in fewer 
restrictions on foreign ownership. The collapse of the communist regimes in countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (CEE), for example, led to the opening of these markets and offered 
new opportunities for banks from industrialized countries. The liberalization of capital ac-
count and financial deregulation, hence, caused a wave of cross-border bank M&A involving 
acquisitions of ownership stakes at target banks located in EME by large (international) banks 
from industrialized countries. As a result, in a number of countries in CEE and Latin America 
(LatAm), foreign banks now account for a major share of total banking assets. In emerging 
Asia, a similar pattern becomes apparent even if the share of foreign banks is overall much 
lower. 
                                                 
5  Countries participating in the Euro area: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Portugal, Slovenia (since 2007), and Spain. 
6  Figure 3.1 gives an overview on the deal volume evolution of cross-border M&A in the financial services 
industry. 
26 3  Study 1: Cross-Border Bank M&A in Emerging Market Economies 
 
The academic world discusses cross-border bank M&A deals and the corresponding 
wealth effects on shareholders extensively. However, empirical studies predominately ex-
amine the valuation impacts between bidders and targets both located in industrialized coun-
tries. Here, target banks report significantly positive wealth effects (e.g., Beitel & Schiereck 
(2001); Houston & Ryngaert (1994)), whereas the valuation effects for bidding banks, are 
either non-existent or negative (e.g., Madura & Wiant (1994); Siems (1996); Tourani-Rad & 
Beek (1999)). The combined effect of targets and bidders and thus on whether bank M&A 
deals are creating value on a net and aggregate basis is positive in both US and European stu-
dies (Cybo-Ottone & Murgia (2000); Hawawini & Swary (1990)). Since financial markets in 
the US and Europe are highly transparent, a bulk of information about targets is available 
leading to a contest among bidders. As a result, the positive value effects to targets are often 
attributable to the resulting takeover premium necessarily paid by bidders experiencing con-
sequently negative valuation effects due to the market’s perception that the transaction is not 
in the best economic interest of the bank (Pilloff & Santomero (1998)). These wealth effects 
are assumed to be different at transactions occurring in EME as their financial markets are 
less transparent and less developed. However, empirical studies focusing on cross-border 
bank M&A transactions from industrial countries to EME are rather limited. Kiymaz (2004) 
and Waheed & Mathur (1995), for instance, find that acquisitions in developing countries are 
more favorable for bidders than acquisitions in developed countries. Williams & Liao (2008), 
on the contrary, found out that announcements are associated with negative abnormal returns 
for acquirers but positive abnormal returns for target banks. 
The rationale behind this study, hence, is the geographical comparison of shareholder 
wealth creation through cross-border bank M&A transactions. Since information on potential 
targets in EME is difficult to access and therefore, the realistic values of targets are challeng-
ing to estimate correctly, it is assumed that the valuation effects in cross-border M&A deals in 
developing countries are different from the ones in industrialized countries. In particular, the 
following research questions should be answered: (1) Do announcement returns differ be-
tween cross-border M&A occurring only among industrialized countries and cross-border 
M&A initiated by Western banks targeting banks in EME? (2) Which characteristics of bid-
ders, targets, and emerging market countries affect cross-border M&A transactions?, and (3) 
How do these characteristics differ from the ones identified by studies examining internation-
al bank M&A deals between industrialized countries? 
For this purpose, this study identifies 163 M&A transactions with change of corpo-
rate control between 1994 and 2007 involving listed bidder banks from Western Europe and 
North America and (non-) listed target banks from Asia, CEE, and LatAm. By applying the 
event study methodology, the analysis firstly measures the announcement effects of transac-
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tions for bidding banks analyzing stake purchases of listed and non-listed target banks. The 
results indicate that cross-border M&A in EME do not yield significant abnormal returns for 
bidders on average neither negative nor positive similar to previous research results on cross-
border M&A. Some sub-samples of bidder banks, however, presume wealth creation to 
shareholders contradicting previous studies. Afterwards, several value drivers of M&A suc-
cess for bidder banks are tested indicating strong evidence that successful M&A deals are 
primarily dependent on bidder M&A experience, purchase of non-listed, larger target banks, 
and low GDP growth in EME, which are different from the one identified by previous studies. 
In a second step, the data sample is limited to those transactions in which both targets and 
bidders are listed on the stock exchange getting an insight of the influences of public targets 
on the respective bidders. The study discovers significantly positive abnormal returns for tar-
get bank shareholders whereas returns to acquiring bank shareholders and combined entities 
are significantly negative. The results to bidders and targets support the ones of previous ana-
lyses whereas the negative abnormal returns of combined entities do not support the assump-
tion that international bank M&A deals generate wealth on a net and aggregate basis. Running 
regressions of the sub-sample, the returns to bidders are influenced positively by bidder M&A 
experience, larger asset size of targets, less liberalized economies with poor governance. Con-
cerning target banks, the impact of institutional and economic environment as well as target 
bank profitability and smaller asset size are significant determinates of their abnormal returns 
similar to previous empirical results. The returns to combined entities are only affected posi-
tively by bidder M&A experience. 
The study is organized as follows: In the literature section, the study describes poten-
tials for wealth creation in EME with their related risk. Moreover, it presents an overview of 
the previous event studies analyzing bank M&A activities. In section 3.3, the different value 
drivers are defined explaining cross-border M&A success. The next section describes the ap-
plied methodology and explains the data construction of the data sample. In the penultimate 
section, two sets of results are displayed: firstly, the event study results and regression analy-
sis of all 163 transactions and secondly, the event study results and regression analysis of 
listed bidder and listed target banks. The study is summarized in section 3.6.  
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3.2 Literature review  
3.2.1 Wealth Creation in EME through Cross-Border M&A Deals and its Related Risks 
Wealth creation in EME is assumed to be different from value creation in developed countries 
as the respective economies and capital markets present great disparities in the level of their 
development; for example, in EME, economic growth measured by gross domestic product 
(GDP) is in general much higher compared to industrialized countries.7 Hence, transactions in 
which developed market firms target firms in emerging markets are supposed to have specific 
advantages compared to cross-border M&A deals between firms both from developed coun-
tries. Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga (2001), for instance, prove in their study that 
foreign owned banks created through cross-border M&A tend to outperform domestic banks 
whereas, according to Berger et al. (2000), cross-border M&A deals between developed coun-
tries create institutions that cannot compete successfully in their host markets. 
In their work, Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar (2004) highlight bargaining power and infor-
mation asymmetry as advantages for cross-border M&A deals in emerging countries. Bidding 
firms may benefit from having better bargaining power if fewer bidders compete for the tar-
get, the target has liquidity needs or changes in government rules support foreign acquisitions. 
In a period of crises, when beliefs in future earnings are unreasonably rejected, bargaining 
power is even stronger causing elevated gains for the acquirer. Additionally, in emerging 
markets target firms are often uncertain about their true standalone value and subsequently 
undervalue their assets; especially, if there is no functioning capital market at all. The acquir-
ers, however, are often better in evaluating the synergies from the merger and execute only 
those deals, which reflect significant gains for them. This information asymmetry may result 
in underpaying for the stakes in the target firm. Combined with crises, the acquirer realizes 
even higher gains because the beliefs about future payoffs of the target firm collapse being 
replaced by irrational ones.  
Furthermore, acquisitions of targets from the financial service industry in emerging 
markets may offer great opportunities due to the lack of a developed banking system reflect-
ing greater potential for market growth. By comparing, for instance, the ratio of bank assets to 
GDP of CEE countries to the same ratio of Western European countries, the market growth 
potential becomes obvious: In 2002, the ratio of bank assets to GDP in CEE was at 68% whe-
reas for Western Europe, it augmented to 270%. This gap in banking intermediation symbo-
                                                 
7  The GDP growth in the EU 15 countries was at 2.6% for 2007 whereas the respective growth for China was 
at 11.1% (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm.). 
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lizes the strong potential for growth in the financial sector.8 In addition, banks from developed 
countries tend to have competitive advantages over local banks reflected by greater expertise, 
better IT infrastructure and superior managerial and financial resources (Tschoegl (2004)). 
Differences in legal protection and accounting standards may also influence the value 
creation in emerging markets positively compared to developed countries. Bris & Cabolis 
(2008) analyze mergers, in which the bidder wants to buy a 100% stake9, that the greater the 
difference in shareholder protection and accounting standards between the target and bidder 
countries, the higher the premium the acquirer must pay to the existing shareholders of the 
target bank. This higher premium is an outcome from target shareholders’ perception expect-
ing a positive valuation effect from the improvement in shareholder protection occurred 
through the change in nationality. Regardless of this higher premium, the volume of cross-
border M&A is higher the greater the difference in investor protection between the target and 
bidder countries (Rossi & Volpin (2004)). 
In spite of the mentioned advantages, there exists a number of downside risks to face 
if expanding one bank’s business and operations into foreign financial systems in general and 
into emerging financial markets in particular. Firstly, political, legal (regulatory and supervi-
sory), cultural, linguistic, and social differences, which are mostly greater in emerging mar-
kets, reflect efficiency barriers and risks to the operations of the corporation generated 
through cross-border M&A transactions. Hence, some of the gains achieved through cross-
border consolidation are offset. Moreover, these transactions create larger, more complex in-
stitutions that overstrain the management skills resulting in communication and operational 
faults amplified by geographical distance. This risk is even intensified where the courses of 
business diverge significantly between the domestic and foreign operations (Berger, Young, 
& Udell (2001)). Finally, the business environment can be more uncertain in emerging mar-
kets. Several examples are possible: (i) financial systems are illiquid and key financial prod-
ucts used by developed banks to manage their risks are not available, (ii) macroeconomic 
cycles are usually more pronounced, (iii) regulatory structures are often more negligent, and 
(iv) weaker legal framework, particularly in the area of property rights. 
Nevertheless, the analysis assumes that cross-border bank M&A transactions in EME 
provide advantages to bidders resulting in positive, abnormal market reactions as the benefits 
                                                 
8  Data retrieved from Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); CEE countries include Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia plus Turkey. 
9  The target becomes a national of the acquirer’s country when the bidder acquires 100% of the target firm. 
This change in nationality involves a change in investor protection and accounting standards to which the 
target firm must comply. 
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outweigh the risks. Given the fact that these advantages do not prevail in developed econo-
mies, the returns to acquiring banks resulting from M&A deals are negative. 
3.2.2 Status Quo of Empirical Research 
Pronouncing a judgment whether the described benefits of cross-border bank M&A transac-
tions in EME are actually put into effect and therefore, the investments are paid off is com-
plex. Empirical analysis could help measure this question. As the analysis focuses on the val-
ue implications of cross-border bank M&A deals and their respective drivers, the status quo 
of the empirical research is limited to event study representing the only methodology, which 
directly allows determining the impact of these transactions on wealth creation or destruction 
to shareholders. 
Despite of the increasing number of cross-border bank M&A transactions in the past 
reflected by a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.22% (1,115 transactions in 1994 
compared to 3,115 transactions in 2007) and presented by Figure 3.1, the overwhelming ma-
jority of empirical studies concentrates on banking acquisitions within the United States.  
Figure 3.1: Cross-Border M&A Transactions in the Financial Services Industry 
Source: Own illustration; UNCTAD M&A Database (www.stats.unctad.org). 
Most of these studies analyzing the wealth effects of M&A transactions to both the 
target and the bidding banks report significantly positive wealth gains for the target banks 
(e.g., Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, & Nguyen (2000); Hannan & Wolken (1989); Hawawini & 
Swary (1990); Houston & Ryngaert (1994); Hudgins & Seifert (1996)). The wealth effects for 
bidders, however, have generally varied between non-existent and negative (e.g., L. Allen & 
Cebenoyan (1991); Cyree & DeGennaro (2002); Kane (2000); Madura & Wiant (1994); 
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Siems (1996); Subrahmanyam, Rangan, & Rosenstein (1997); Toyne & Tripp (1998)).10 Some 
other studies analyze the effects of cross-border mergers for US banks confirming the find-
ings regarding the wealth creation of domestic bank M&A activity (e.g., Cornett, Hovaki-
mian, Palia, & Tehranian (2003); DeLong (2001)). 
Even though the research on M&A in European banking has been growing consider-
ably in recent years, the number of studies with a European focus on cross-border bank mer-
gers is still limited. Tourani-Rad & Beek (1999), for instance, analyze European bank M&A 
deals observing no significant abnormal returns for bidding bank shareholders while abnormal 
returns for target bank shareholders are significantly positive. However, they do not find a 
significant difference in cross-border activity compared to domestic transactions. Analyzing 
M&A deals involving different firms in the European Union, Campa & Hernando (2004) dis-
cover that bidder and target firms acting in the financial industry receive significantly lower 
abnormal returns at cross-border transactions. They point out that in a regulated industry such 
as the financial services industry mergers generate lower value than M&A announcements in 
unregulated industries. This low value creation in regulated industries becomes significantly 
negative when the mergers involve two firms from different countries. 
Studies focusing on cross-border bank M&A in EME are even less frequently. This 
lack in financial research is surprising, especially bearing in mind the specific, described ad-
vantages for developed country firms targeting firms in emerging markets. Only a few papers 
outline the difference of bidder and target countries and analyze acquisitions in EME as po-
tentials for value creation through cross-border mergers. Waheed & Mathur (1995), for in-
stance, investigate the impact of international expansion on shareholder value of US banks 
showing that announcements of foreign expansions result in significant abnormal returns for 
US bank shareholders. Moreover, they are significantly negative when banks announce ex-
pansion into developed countries and significantly positive when announcements relate to 
risky developing countries. This value creation comes from diversification benefits combined 
with the advantages of lower competition in developing countries compensating for the politi-
cal risk prevailing in emerging countries. Williams & Liao (2008), on the other hand, observe 
that acquisitions of stakes in banks, both minority and majority purchases, demonstrate value 
destruction to shareholders of bidding banks whereas target bank shareholders benefit from 
the transactions. This supports the results of previous M&A deals occurring between devel-
oped countries. Moreover, they identify M&A characteristics and economic features influen-
cing abnormal returns of these transactions. 
                                                 
10  For a comprehensive overview of the large number of empirical studies covering the US market cp. Beitel & 
Schiereck (2001) and Pilloff & Santomero (1998). 
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Given the increased M&A activities in emerging countries, especially regarding the 
financial services and banking industry and the supposed differences between transactions in 
developed countries and deals initiated by industrialized countries targeting emerging coun-
tries, research focusing on this topic is of important interest. Concentrating on transactions 
with change of corporate control and accounting for both listed and non-listed targets, this 
study intends to detect the differences in wealth creation to shareholders between studies ac-
counting only for deals in developed countries and transactions accounting for both developed 
and emerging countries. Finally, different value drivers are investigated which might determi-
nate abnormal returns and success of M&A transactions in EME providing guidance for a 
successful market entry in those regions. 
3.3 Value Drivers Explaining Cross-Border Bank M&A Success in EME 
From prior research, 14 variables with explanatory power are identified that are tested with 
regards to their impact on cross-border M&A success in EME and compared to regression 
results from previous research (e.g., Beitel, Schiereck, & Wahrenburg (2004). These variables 
are classified into five categories presented in the following and summarized by Table 3.1. 
1. Profitability and Cost Efficiency: There are two hypotheses explaining profitabili-
ty and cost efficiency gains which are empirically tested by Akhavein, Berger, & Humphrey 
(1997). The relative efficiency hypothesis declares that acquirers may be able to realize (profit 
and cost) efficiency gains by transferring their superior management skills to the target assets. 
After the transaction, the more efficient acquirer ameliorates the efficiency of the target by 
spreading its superior managerial expertise and policies up to its own level (Berger et al. 
(2000)). The low efficiency hypothesis, on the other hand, states that the management of the 
target takes the merger as a pretense executing extensive restructuring, profitability and cost 
efficiency improvements to increase the profitability of both parts of the combined entity. 
Hence, post-merger improvements are realizable if the transaction involves a poorly perform-
ing target. Both hypotheses are confirmed by findings of several researches. Hawawini & 
Swary (1990) as well as Pilloff & Santomero (1998), for instance, prove the efficiency hypo-
thesis by finding that mergers create more value for bidders and targets when the difference in 
efficiency between the two is larger. According to Houston & Ryngaert (1994) and Madura & 
Wiant (1994), higher efficiency of the target has a negative impact on value creation (low 
efficiency hypothesis). The study expects that low profitability and cost efficiency of the tar-
get and a larger difference in profitability and cost efficiency between bidder and target affect 
the success of transactions significantly compared to previous studies analyzing only bidders 
and targets from industrialized economies. The profitability of the target and the bidder is 
measured using the Return on average Equity (ROAE). As a relative profitability measure, the 
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relation of the target average return on equity to the bidder ROAE is used. Moreover, cost 
efficiency is measured by two variables: the Cost-Income-Ratio (CIR) and the Costs-Assets-
Ratio (CA-Ratio). Comparing the cost structure of the target in relation to the cost structure of 
the bidder the study also accounts for the relative CIR and the relative CA-Ratio. Since all 
these variables only base on accounting figures, it is supposed that target country-specific 
factors outweigh these measures. 
2. Asset Size: As discovered by empirical studies, the asset size of a target in relation 
to the asset size of a bidder has an impact on the M&A success. Although the acquisition of 
smaller targets is less complex, the study expects that the acquisition of larger targets is value 
creating as economies of scale may be significant and the larger the target banks the larger 
possible synergy gains may be. Therefore, acquisitions of targets incorporating sufficient syn-
ergies but are of a manageable size should have a positive impact on value creation. Moreo-
ver, as often inefficient internal structures of targets in EME offer the possibilities of synergy 
realization, it is assumed that even acquisitions of larger targets create values contradicting 
previous studies. Hawawini & Swary (1990), for example, discover that M&A transactions 
are more favorable for bidders if targets are small relative to the bidders. Additionally, they 
prove that smaller bidders tend to be more successful than larger bidders are. Zollo & Lesh-
chinkskii (2000) also find that larger size of the acquirer has a significantly negative impact 
on the acquirer’s M&A success. The relative Asset Size is measured by using the relation of 
the target total assets to the bidder total assets. 
3. Deal-specific Factor: Taking into account the deal-specific factor, the empirical 
analysis examines whether a target bank is listed or non-listed on the stock exchange. In many 
emerging countries, bank shares were not traded publicly as the privatization process concern-
ing firms and banks did not start until the early nineties of the last century. This fact is under-
lined by the data sample as in only 22% of all transactions, target banks11 are publicly traded 
at the time of the deal announcement. Since public targets due to the market requirements of 
premium payments are more expensive than non-listed targets and in EME, a lot of noise pre-
vails at target capital markets, it is expected that listed targets are value diminishing. This 
deal-specific factor is quantified with a dummy variable equaling 1 for listed targets and 0 
otherwise.12 
                                                 
11  Although 52 listed target banks (approx. 32% of entire data sample) are identified, the data regarding indi-
vidual equities for these banks were not available or the banks experienced only thin trading. To ensure com-
parability between the regressions of section 3.5.2 and the regressions of 3.5.4, only 36 target banks are con-
sidered. 
12  This variable is not necessary when the study regresses for the M&A success of target banks as they are all 
publicly traded. 
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4. Bidder Experience: Empirical studies prove a positive relation between bidder 
experience and abnormal returns from M&A transactions. DeYoung (1997), for instance, 
finds concentrated efficiency gains in mergers where bidder banks accomplish frequent acqui-
sitions suggesting positive effects of bidder experience. Zollo & Leshchinkskii (2000) also 
expose a significantly positive correlation between codification of experience related to M&A 
deals and bidder CAR. Beitel et al. (2004), conversely, discover that experience does not have 
any influence on M&A success measuring the experience of a bidder bank by the frequency 
of its conducted M&A transactions. Following former findings, the study assumed that more 
experienced bidders have learned how to perform value-creating M&A transactions generat-
ing higher synergies and resulting in higher returns for bidders and targets. To measure the 
Bidder Bank Experience, the study examines the M&A frequency of cross-border deals using 
a dummy variable. It considers a bidder as experienced if it has successfully conducted at 
least three cross-border transactions within the period between 1994 and 2007 prior to a trans-
action analyzed. The experience of a bidder bank in a foreign country may also be measured 
by its previous involvement. Since in the early stage of privatization, emerging countries re-
stricted foreign direct investments and only allowed foreigners to acquirer minority stakes in 
local firms. The data sample shows that about 20% of bidder banks already held a minority 
stake in the banks they took control over. Therefore, such acquiring banks are not only in-
volved in the specific country but already have inside knowledge of the specific target. This 
inside knowledge about the target bank and its financial situation, in addition, permit the bid-
der bank to assess the target in a correct manner preventing from overpaying. Kaufman 
(1988), for example, discovers that bidder with prior ownership stakes in the target firm pay a 
smaller premium by acquiring an additional stake. Moreover, previous research analyzes that 
gaining majority control over a target firm in an emerging country is the key to successful 
investment (Chari et al. (2004)). The market rewards banks attaining majority control to turn 
around an underperforming minority investment. According to the described arguments, it is 
expected that holding a minority stake in the target prior to the final transaction and thus hav-
ing a specific experience in the target country and bank influence the success of transactions 
positively. 
5. Target Country-Specific Factors: At last, target country-specific factors may influence the 
success of M&A transactions. As already stated in the literature review, some studies state 
that acquisitions in developing countries create more value compared to acquisitions in devel-
oped countries. The degree of target-country development is determined by Economic Free-
dom and annual GDP Growth. Moreover, the study qualifies the institutional and environmen-
tal conditions in the target bank home country by the rule of law and the annual inflation 
change. Proved by empirical results, regulation of a local market has a significant impact on 
bank mergers (Buch & DeLong (2004)). In EME, target banks were previously under gov-
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ernment regulation. Therefore, the degree of market deregulation can be used as a proxy for 
the degree of economic development. It is supposed that a high degree of regulation will have 
especially a positive influence on bidder CAR and negative influence on target CAR. In order 
to measure the regulation of the respective economy in the target countries the study employs 
the index of economic freedom published by the Heritage Foundation (2009). Williams & 
Liao (2008) find out that target returns on cross-border M&A deals are higher in countries 
with poorer governance. Both target and bidders might be compensated for relatively poor 
governance and legal protection via a risk premium. Following this argument, it is assumed 
that a low degree of governance will have a positive impact on shareholder CAR. In emerging 
markets, furthermore, the prospect of future growth indicates the pace of development of a 
country measured in annual GDP growth rates. Kiymaz (2004), for instance, utilizes target 
country GDP growth to explain abnormal returns analyzing the impact of macroeconomic 
factors associated with cross-border acquisitions. His study proves that a higher GDP growth 
in the target market is negatively related to wealth gains by bidders and positively related to 
target wealth gains, respectively, because favorable economic conditions force bidders to pay 
higher premium and/or bidders become over-optimistic about the potential benefits. This 
study follows this line of argumentation. The Rule of Law, in addition, captures the success of 
a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for 
economic and social interactions. It is an indicator of governance with higher values corres-
ponding to better governance and quantified by using the data provided by Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi (2008). Finally, the Change in Inflation Rate is an indicator of the stance of the 
domestic monetary policy in the respective emerging countries. Therefore, it is presumed that 
high abnormal returns are associated with a strong record for macro-economic management 
measured by a low inflation growth rate. The data is derived from the World Economic Out-
look database. 
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Table 3.1: Definition of Independent Variables 
 
Source: Accounting data – Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Freedom of Market – Heritage Foundation 2009; GDP 
growth and inflation change – United Nations Statistics Divisions; Rule of law – Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
a Per December 31 of the year prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
b The scale of the Heritage Foundation originally ranges from 0 to 100 with 0-50 for repressed economies, >50-
60 for mostly unfree economies, >60-70 for moderately free economies, >70-80 for mostly free economies, and 
>80-100 for free economies. Since the values of this scale are not equally distributed, the scale is changed using 
1 for repressed economies equivalent to 0-50, 2 for mostly unfree economies equivalent to >50-60, 3 for mod-
erately free economies equivalent to >60-70, 4 for mostly free economies equivalent to >70-80, and 5 for free 
economies equivalent to >80-100. Moreover, steps of value of 0.5 divide the respective categories, e.g., a former 
value of 51 is transformed into the value of 2 whereas a former value of 56 gets the value of 2.5. 
c Since 1996, the rule of law is calculated by Kaufmann et al. (2008). However, the data are not collected for the 
years 1997, 1999 and 2001. On this account, the average of the previous and following year of the missing re-
spective years is taken to calculate the data. 
 
Description Definition
Profitability and Cost Efficiency
a
Var1: Target ROAE Return on average equity of the target 
Var2: Target CIR Cost-Income-Ratio of the target 
Var3: Target CA-Ratio Total operating costs divided by total assets of the target
Relative Profitability and Cost Efficiency(target/bidder)
a
Var4: Relative ROAE ROAE of target divided by ROAE of bidder 
Var5: Relative CIR CIR of target divided by CIR of bidder
Var6: Relative CA-Ratio Total operating costs/total assets of the bank divided by total 
operating costs/total assets of the bidder
Relative asset size
a
Var7: Relative asset size Logarithm of total assets of the target divided by the logarithm of 
total assets of the bidder
Deal-specific factor
Var8: Dummy of listed target Binary dummy variable: 1 for listed target, 0 for non-listed target
Bidder experience 
Var9: Cross border M&A 
experience bidder
Binary dummy variable: 1 for experienced bidder, 0 for bidder 
without experience
Var10: Dummy for minority stake Binary dummy variable: 1 for bidder that holds a minority stake in 
the target, 0 for bidder with no stake in the target it acquires
Target country-specific factors
Var11: Freedom of target market Index of economic freedom: 1 for repressed economies to 5 for 
free economies
b
Var12: GDP growth in target 
country (in %)
GDP growth rate in target country at constant prices (in %)
Var13: Rule of law Extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in the quality of contract enforcement, the police 
and the courts
c
Var14: Inflation change (in %) Inflation change in target country at consumer prices (in %)
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3.4 Methodology and Data Sample 
3.4.1 Methodology 
This study targets to analyze two aspects. The first aspect should assess the wealth implica-
tions of cross-border bank M&A in EME through acquiring banks from industrialized coun-
tries in order to compare them with results from previous studies analyzing international bank 
M&A between industrialized countries. The second aspect aims at explaining the value crea-
tion and in particular, the preconditions for value creation of bank M&A deals in emerging 
financial markets. 
To assess the value implication of cross-border M&A, the study follows the event 
study methodology relying on the market model based approach according to Brown & 
Warner (1985) and Dodd & Warner (1983).13 Abnormal returns for firm  at date  U
V are 
estimated as 
 B 
    	
, where 
 is the return of the local (national) industry 
index employed on day . Since on the bidder and target side there are always banks, the na-
tional banking index offered by Datastream is utilized.14 In their study, Cybo-Ottone & Mur-
gia (2000) apply both the national industry index as market index and the general market in-
dex to conduct their analyses but could not detect any differences in using the general market 
index from using an industry index. Hereby, abnormal returns describe the difference between 
the expected returns and the actual returns observed in the market.  
Since some bidding banks in the data sample completed several transactions within 
one year, the study deviates from the approach of previous studies (e.g., Beitel et al. (2004); 
Brown & Warner (1985)) by using a shorter estimation window to estimate both parameters. 
Hence, the market model parameters are estimated over an observation period of 100 trading 
days instead of 252 trading days (one full year) starting at day t-120 to t-21 relative to the an-
nouncement date. The study uses the announcement date as reported by Thomson Financial. 
The dates are crosschecked using press research in the Financial Times. The event window 
comprises 41 days: T = [-20;+20] days, where  = 0 determines the announcement day of a 
transaction. The abnormal returns are summed up over various event windows, e.g., [-1;+1], 
[-20;0] etc. to attain CAR for each stock in the sample. Finally, the CAR are aggregated over 
the stocks and divided by the number of stocks to yield the CAAR of the group. This is done 
for bidder as well as target banks. 
                                                 
13  The applied short-term methodology as well as the cross-sectional regression is explained in detailed by 
Chapter 2.3.1 and Chapter 2.3.4, respectively. 
14  For Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, national banking indices are not available in 
Datastream due to an insufficient number of listed banks in these countries. In these cases, as a result, the 
banking index for emerging Europe is applied provided by Datastream. 
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This short-term CAAR will reflect changes in the expected future cash-flows to 
shareholders resulting from future synergies in the merging entity or from redistribution 
among shareholders. In a first step, only the effects on bidder shareholders are analyzed ac-
quiring both listed and non-listed targets. In a second step, the effects on listed bidder and 
target shareholders are observed. This approach allows the study to examine both effects on 
bidder and target investors. To analyze the combined entity the study follows the suggestion 
by Houston & Ryngaert (1994). As market capitalizations for the entire event window, it re-
lies on those observed at the end of the estimation period (on  = -21). Thereafter the abnor-
mal returns for all observations are averaged to receive average abnormal returns. 
To test for significance for CAAR, the standard t-test statistic and the suggestions by 
Dodd & Warner (1983) are applied. Beitel & Schiereck (2001), DeLong (2001), and Hudgins 
& Seifert (1996), for instance, have also employed the latter test statistic. Moreover, the test 
statistic is adjusted to reflect cross-sectional independence (Brown & Warner (1985); Dodd & 
Warner (1983)). To test for significance for the combined entity of the target and bidder, the 
study follows the suggestions by Houston & Ryngaert (1994) to adjust the calculation of the 
standard deviation. 
Besides the overall value creation for bidders, targets and combined entities of cross-
border M&A in EME, the respective drivers of the success in bank M&A transactions pre-
sented in the previous chapter are analyzed. Therefore, multivariate cross-sectional regression 
analyses are conducted to determine the influence of the respective variables on M&A suc-
cess. The dependent variable in this regression analysis is the CAR of bidders, targets and 
combined entity, respectively. All conducted regressions are OLS-regressions assuming a 
linear relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. Moreover, they are 
controlled for autocorrelation using the Durbin-Watson statistic, multicollinearity using va-
riance inflation factors and tolerance for individual variables, heteroscedasticity using the 
White test. 
3.4.2 Data Sample 
Relevant cross-border M&A transactions between 1994 and 2007 are identified using the 
Thomson Financial SDC (Securities Data Company – Mergers and Acquisitions Database). 
Moreover, Datastream (also provided by Thomson Financial) is employed to attain returns on 
individual equities, market indices, and market caps. For the analysis of accounting data (e.g., 
total equity; total assets) of the banks analyzed in the sample, the study relies on Fitch IBCA 
Bankscope and where necessary on annual reports. The respective transactions are chosen 
according to the following criteria: 
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 Transactions have been announced between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2007. 
 Bidders have been classified either as a Western European bank15 or as a North 
American bank16. 
 Targets have been classified according to TF Mid Code either as “bank” or as “credit 
institution”. 
 Targets were located in emerging countries17 of Asia, CEE, and LatAm. 
 Transactions have been closed – the deal status hence is “completed”. 
 In all transactions, a true change of corporate control took place – bidders attain full 
control (>50%) over the targets after the transaction.18 
 Bidders were listed on a public stock exchange for at least 120 days prior to the an-
nouncement and 20 days after the announcement of transaction. 
Since the study is analyzing in a second step only transactions where both bidders 
and targets are publicly listed, an additional selection criterion needs to be applied: 
 Targets were listed on a public stock exchange for at least 120 days prior to the an-
nouncement and 20 days after the announcement of transaction. 
According to the first seven selection criteria, 163 transactions are identified initiated 
by listed banks located in industrialized countries purchasing majority stakes in banks from 
EME. As shown in Figure 3.2, the transaction volumes of the entire sample have risen steadi-
ly since 1994 reaching their first peak with approximately USD 5.8 bn in 1999 – the starting 
point of the privatization phase in CEE (Patev, Lyroudi, & Kanaryan (2002)). The decreasing 
transaction volumes after 2001, however, point out the burst of the dot-com bubble. The re-
covery of the financial markets began in 2003 with augmenting transaction volumes and 
peaked with USD 13.7 bn in 2006. Moreover, applying the last described select criterion, 36 
                                                 
15  Western European countries in the study: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and Switzerland. 
16  Overview of North American countries: Canada and the US 
17  EME in the study: Albania, Argentina, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Moldova, Macedonia, Mexico, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Paraguay, 
Romania, South Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Salvador, 
Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. 
18  Only transactions with change of corporate control are chosen as these transactions are presumed to be value 
creating as they do not show problems of ineffective monitoring and incomplete contracting (Antràs (2003)). 
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transactions of the entire sample are recognized comprising both listed bidders and listed tar-
gets.  
Figure 3.2: Development of Transaction Volumes/Entire Sample 
 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
a Transaction volumes are undisclosed dollar values. 
b Without the outlier transaction of USD 12,812 m (Citi (US) acquiring Banacci (Mexico)). 
Table 3.2 presents a geographical and value-based overview of the identified transac-
tions between 1994 and 2007. The data reflect the ongoing penetration of CEE and LatAm 
banking sectors and more recent penetration of Asia. Hereby, Western European banks are 
very active acquirers of EME banks applying cross-border M&A as an entry point into host 
financial markets. Regarding Panel I, they purchased 138 banks for USD 45.3 bn whereas 
North American banks acquired 25 banks for USD 19.6 bn. This partly reflects the strategic 
decision by some North American banks concentrating on organic growth rather than on 
M&A activities. Concerning the average value, one can see that the Asian targets of Western 
European banks are on average the most expensive. For the North American bidders, howev-
er, the targets from LatAm are the most costly. Regarding Panel II, the picture looks equal to 
the one given by Panel I: Western European banks are more active than North American 
banks. Although Panel II contains fewer transactions, the average transaction value is higher 
compared to Panel I, strengthening the fact that listed targets are more expensive than non-
listed as financial markets request a premium for value transparency. 
A more detailed overview of geographical distribution by bidding countries and tar-
get regions of the identified transactions is given in the appendix (Appendix 1 shows all 163 
transactions; Appendix 2 displays only transactions involving listed targets). According to 
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Appendix 1, Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, the UK, and US are the seven countries 
with above average bidder activity. Moreover, Western European banks (excluding Spanish 
ones) have predominantly purchased stakes in CEE banks (95 out of 119 targets) whereas 
Spanish banks acquired almost exclusively stakes in LatAm banks (18 out of 19 targets). 
These patterns express the fact that Spanish banks sought for targets with shared language and 
culture while other European banks purchased banks, which are geographically close by their 
home markets. This fact even holds true if looking at transactions involving only listed targets 
and bidders (Appendix 2). With regards to North American bidders, their numerically lower 
transaction activity occurred by the majority in LatAm (14 deals) what amplifies again the 
importance about geographically proximity if the cultural background and language are dif-
ferent. As measured by the sample of 36 transactions, however, US banks as the most active 
acquirers besides Italian banks target prevalently purchasing Asian institutions. 
Table 3.2: Overview of Cross-Border M&A Transaction Sample – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
Note: EUR = Western Europe; NA = North America. 
Finally, Table 3.3 presents an overview of the selected key figures of the identified 
transactions in the sample. With regards to total assets (USD 412 bn) and total equity (USD 
20.7 bn), bidder banks are on average tremendously larger than the overall targets (total as-
sets: USD 4.3 bn; total equity: USD 0.4 bn) presented by Panel I. The highly significant dif-
ferences in means underlines the fact that the banking industry in EME is still underdeveloped 
as targets are rather small compared to their acquirers. Moreover, their weak cost-efficiency 
reflected by high mean CIR and CA-Ratios indicate potential synergy gains which can be 
achieved by respective actions of the bidding banks. 
Observing exclusively listed targets in Panel II, the average difference between tar-
gets and their bidders regarding total assets and a total equity is indeed important but one can 
FDI flow N
Value 
(USD m)
Share 
of 
value 
(%)
Average 
value 
(USD m)
N
Value 
(USD m)
Share 
of 
value 
(%)
Average 
value
(USD m)
EUR-ASIA 7 4.957,30 7,6 708,19 2 1.332,38 4,8 666,19
EUR-CEE 96 25.192,42 38,8 262,42 23 9.260,77 33,4 402,64
EUR-LATAM 35 15.161,64 23,4 433,19 5 3.282,82 11,8 656,56
EUR-EME 138 45.311,37 69,8 328,34 30 13.875,97 50,0 462,53
NA-ASIA 8 2.092,33 3,2 261,54 4 449,42 1,6 112,35
NA-CEE 3 1.045,92 1,6 348,64 1 610,92 2,2 610,92
NA-LATAM 14 16.429,72 25,3 1.173,55 1 12.821,00 46,2 12.821,00
NA-EME 25 19.567,97 30,2 782,72 6 13.881,33 50,0 2.313,56
Total EME 163 64.879,34 100,0 398,03 36 27.757,30 100,0 771,04
Panel I: All targets Panel II: Listed targets
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notice that listed targets are larger compared to the entire data sample shown in Panel I with 
total assets of USD 9.7 bn and total equity of USD 0.9 bn. Moreover, bidders are more profit-
able and efficient demonstrated by the higher ROAE and lower CIR and CA-Ratio compared 
to targets, respectively. This holds true for both panels. However, listed targets seem to be 
more cost efficient as the mean difference between listed targets’ CIR and bidders’ CIR is not 
significant anymore. 
Table 3.3: Key Figures of Cross-Border Transactions 
Source: Own illustration; Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Annual bank reports. 
Note: Financial figures are per December 31 of the year prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Short-term Valuation Effects to all Bidders 
The event study results of the entire sample for banks acquiring (non-) listed targets in EME 
are given in Table 3.4. Although the analyzed intervals apart from [-10;0] show slightly nega-
tive cumulative abnormal returns, these negative results are not statistically significant em-
ploying both the t-test and z-test. Thus, there is no conclusive evidence that shareholders at 
Characteristics Targets Bidders
Ratio 
(T/B)
Diff. in 
Means 
(t-value)
Targets Bidders
Ratio 
(T/B)
Diff. in 
Means 
(t-value)
Total assets in USD m
Mean 4.276,09 411.950,26 1,0% -12.1*** 9.740,35 433.280,19 2,2% -6.4***
Standard deviation 8.144,28 429.013,70 11.275,75 399.810,67 
Min. 9,60 1.726,68 324,81 60.738,95 
Max. 46.546,01 1.896.935,34 46.546,01 1.884.318,00 
Total equity in USD m
Mean 356,15 20.659,70 1,7% -10.4*** 875,67 22.503,01 3,9% -5.5***
Standard deviation 744,75 24.815,77 1.213,68 23.569,55 
Min. -263,79 76,77 30,66 1.843,77 
Max. 5.191,30 135.272,00 5.191,30 119.783,00 
Return on Average Equity
 
(ROAE) in %
Mean 7,38 15,94 46,3% -2.9*** 5,64 15,51 36,4% -1.7*
Standard deviation 36,93 6,74 33,87 4,53 
Min. -199,42 -18,47 -121,17 4,89 
Max. 267,60 45,92 49,47 25,10 
Cost-to-income ratio (CIR) in %
Mean 75,43 62,73 120,2% 3.7*** 66,29 65,87 100,6% 0,14
Standard deviation 43,47 8,01 16,31 6,84 
Min. 12,87 44,88 41,50 53,42 
Max. 391,67 92,27 106,48 81,79 
Total operationg costs/total assets in %
Mean 6,67 2,58 257,9% 9.4*** 5,12 2,65 193,1% 5.5***
Standard deviation 5,26 1,82 2,49 1,03 
Min. 0,67 0,94 1,74 0,96 
Max. 32,80 23,11 14,47 5,99 
Panel I: All targets (N=163) Panel II: Listed targets (N=36)
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acquiring banks experience value creation or destruction through M&A deals in EME. The 
results are consistent with previous US and European event studies of bank cross-border 
M&A occurring between industrialized countries as they also detect no significant abnormal 
returns for bidding banks on average (e.g., Beitel et al. (2004); Cybo-Ottone & Murgia 
(2000); Hudgins & Seifert (1996)). The market does not recognize potential benefits and 
competitive advantages to industrialized bidders entering new financial markets in emerging 
countries. Hence, the positive findings for bidder banks in the studies of Kiymaz (2004) and 
Waheed & Mathur (1995) could not be confirmed by the results. The results presume that 
acquired targets are too small having positive overall effects to bidders as shown by Table 3.3 
with large bidders and small targets. 
Table 3.4: CAAR to all Bidders 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to all bidders acquiring listed and non-listed targets 
in EME. Abnormal returns were calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a 
period of 120 trading days prior to the event window [-20;+20]. For the market returns of each country, respec-
tive market indices are applied. Statistical significance is tested using the standard t-test statistic and the test 
according to Dodd & Warner (1983). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Looking closer at CAAR subdivided into the respective target regions presented by 
Table 3.5, international banks purchasing majority stakes in Latin American banks receive 
throughout positive returns in the observed intervals, which are statistically significant for the 
event windows [-10;0] and [-10;+1]. The data suggest that such acquisitions are perceived as 
value creating by financial markets of the purchasing bank. Since almost 42% of the deals in 
LatAm originate from Spanish and Portuguese banks (19 deals), the stock markets expect 
positive developments from these transactions, as the cultural background and the language in 
Spain and Portugal are similar to those in LatAm (Berger, DeYoung, et al. (2000)). The bid-
ders’ CAAR of acquiring Asian targets are mixed. Whereas the mean returns are significantly 
Event window
CAAR 
(%)
t-value z-score
Median 
(%)
Std.dev. 
(%)
Positive
Pos. 
(%)
[-20;0] -0,21 -0,62 -0,30 0,03 4,38 83 50,9
[-10;0] 0,02 0,10 0,28 0,01 3,11 82 50,3
[-5;0] -0,17 -0,77 -0,54 -0,11 2,73 77 47,2
[-1;0] -0,01 -0,14 -0,53 -0,09 1,28 77 47,2
[0] -0,01 -0,08 0,08 0,00 0,98 81 49,7
[-1;+1] -0,05 -0,44 -0,29 -0,05 1,55 79 48,5
[-5;+1] -0,21 -0,93 -0,41 -0,10 2,82 75 46,0
[-10;+1] -0,02 -0,06 0,34 0,01 3,14 82 50,3
[-5;+5] -0,32 -1,35 -0,65 -0,12 3,06 77 47,2
[-10;+10] -0,25 -0,75 -0,50 -0,22 4,20 76 46,6
[-20;+20] -0,40 -0,83 -0,37 -0,52 6,08 79 48,5
Returns to all transactions (N=163)
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negative at announcement date with -0.53%, they display a significant value of +2.06% for 
the interval [-20;+20]. It seems that over the whole event window the market perceives acqui-
sitions in Asia as value creating. Moreover, apart from the announcement day acquisitions in 
CEE banks display only negative returns. As the respective tests attest statistical significance 
of the negative abnormal returns, transaction in CEE countries are perceived as value destroy-
ing for bidder bank shareholders. These results subdivided by target regions contradict partly 
previous studies of international bank M&A deals as the market perceives some regions as 
opportunity to export successfully their business abroad. Nevertheless, the results regarding 
the CAAR to bidders targeting banks in CEE and in LatAm, respectively, contradict the find-
ings of Williams & Liao (2008) analyzing significantly negative bidder CAAR in LatAm and 
positives ones in CEE. 
Table 3.5: CAAR to all Bidders by Regions 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to all bidders acquiring listed and non-listed targets 
subdivided by regions in EME. Abnormal returns were calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have 
been estimated for a period of 120 trading days prior to the event window [-20;+20]. For the market returns of 
each country, respective market indices are applied. Statistical significance is tested using the standard t-test 
statistic and the test according to Dodd & Warner (1983).  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Returns according to the nationality of acquiring banks are presented in Table 3.6. 
The largest returns to bidder bank shareholders are observed when ownership stakes are ac-
quired by Spanish banks. The positive mean returns vary between +0.30% of interval  
[-10;+10] and +1.55% of event window [-20;0]. Since both significance tests approve mean-
ingful results, this may reflect the stock market’s belief that Spanish banks can carry their 
domestic efficiency advantages into overseas markets supported by common culture and lan-
guage (Berger, DeYoung, et al. (2000)). This fact is even amplified if bearing in mind that the 
returns to bidders acquiring Latin American banks are value-creating as they are positively 
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-20;0] 1,13 0,75 0,93 -0,82 -1,89 * -1,47 0,59 1,08 0,97
[-10;0] 0,63 0,47 1,11 -0,39 -1,27 -1,18 0,67 2,01 * 1,56 *
[-5;0] -0,19 -0,17 -0,34 -0,37 -1,32 -1,32 0,25 0,91 1,00
[-1;0] -0,55 -1,37 -1,23 -0,02 -0,12 -0,48 0,16 0,96 0,25
[0] -0,53 -1,70 -1,56 * 0,00 -0,04 0,05 0,15 1,01 0,76
[-1;+1] -0,57 -1,50 -0,47 -0,07 -0,45 -0,69 0,14 0,68 0,53
[-5;+1] -0,21 -0,21 0,03 -0,43 -1,47 -1,42 0,24 0,74 1,14
[-10;+1] 0,62 0,49 1,32 -0,44 -1,48 -1,28 0,65 1,67 * 1,65 *
[-5;+5] -0,29 -0,33 0,10 -0,53 -1,71 * -1,59 * 0,08 0,20 0,98
[-10;+10] 0,47 0,36 1,01 -0,49 -1,13 -1,37 0,02 0,05 0,34
[-20;+20] 2,06 1,09 1,58 * -1,19 -1,86 * -1,41 0,46 0,69 0,40
Returns by regions (N=163)
Asia (N=15) CEE (N=99) LatAm (N=49)
t-valuet-value t-valuez-score z-score z-score
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influenced by the returns of Spanish bidders. Italian bidder banks, on the other hand, pre-
dominately experience negative average abnormal returns. Given that both event windows [-
5;0] and [-5;+1] with -1.45% and -1.65%, respectively, are statistically significant, the Italian 
market perceives cross-border M&A transactions of its local banks towards emerging coun-
tries as value destroying. Unlike Spanish bidders, the stock market does not believe that Ital-
ian banks are able to install their efficiency advantages abroad as bidders and targets do not 
share the same culture and language. 
Table 3.6: CAAR by Nationality of all Bidders 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to all bidders acquiring listed and non-listed targets 
in EME subdivided by nationality of bidder banks. Abnormal returns were calculated using OLS-regression. 
OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 120 trading days prior to the event window [-20;+20]. For 
the market returns of each country, respective market indices are applied. Statistical significance is tested using 
the standard t-test statistic and the test according to Dodd & Warner (1983). 
a North American includes transactions involving Canadian and US bidders. 
b  European excludes transactions initiated by Italian and Spanish bidders. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Moreover, the sub-sample of North American bidders including Canadian and US 
bidder banks demonstrates statistically insignificant results. As the average abnormal returns 
display positive as well as negative values, a concrete statement about wealth creating or de-
stroying cross-border M&A activities of North American banks cannot be made. The last sub-
sample containing European bidders predominately purchasing targets in CEE generates only 
negative CAAR. As two intervals display significantly negative mean returns, value is de-
stroyed in the short-run ([-20;0]; [-20;+20]). Although the geographical distance between bid-
ders and their CEE targets is not as large as between Spanish banks and their targets in La-
tAm, the markets do not believe in overcoming the efficiency barriers such as differences in 
languages, cultures or politics. Investors seem to be punished for the still uncertain business 
environment in Eastern European emerging countries. Moreover, the study assumes that syn-
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-20;0] 1,14 1,19 1,17 -0,67 -1,72 * -0,87 -1,30 -0,99 -1,56 1,55 1,85 * 1,48
[-10;0] 0,60 0,73 1,09 -0,18 -0,63 -0,88 -0,77 -1,03 -0,91 1,22 2,46 ** 2,50 **
[-5;0] 0,08 0,13 0,05 -0,14 -0,57 -0,84 -1,46 -1,97 * -2,00 ** 0,82 1,70 2,43 **
[-1;0] 0,08 0,24 -0,15 -0,08 -0,61 -1,00 -0,15 -0,52 -0,40 0,35 1,52 1,21
[0] -0,01 -0,06 -0,58 -0,06 -0,59 -0,36 -0,08 -0,42 -0,40 0,34 1,48 1,90 *
[-1;+1] -0,02 -0,07 0,15 -0,09 -0,58 -0,59 -0,34 -0,89 -0,92 0,40 1,09 1,37
[-5;+1] -0,02 -0,03 0,23 -0,15 -0,59 -0,63 -1,65 -2,27 ** -2,23 ** 0,87 1,33 2,50 **
[-10;+1] 0,50 0,61 1,18 -0,19 -0,66 -0,73 -0,96 -1,52 -1,17 1,27 1,85 * 2,59 ***
[-5;+5] -0,17 -0,24 0,51 -0,30 -1,09 -1,20 -1,19 -1,52 -1,23 0,32 0,42 1,72 *
[-10;+10] -0,49 -0,44 0,19 -0,53 -1,36 -1,35 0,89 0,88 0,42 0,30 0,40 1,09
[-20;+20] 1,03 0,70 0,68 -1,01 -1,91 * -0,85 -0,35 -0,19 -0,80 0,87 0,81 0,96
Returns by nationality of bidder banks (N=163)
t-value t-value t-value t-value
North American
a 
(N=25)
European
b 
(N=98) Italian (N=21) Spanish (N=19)
z-score z-score z-score z-score
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ergies are not easily to obtain in these ancient communist countries and that high investments 
are necessary in the beginning to realize a beneficial outcome in the long run. These assump-
tions are also underlined by the negative results to acquisitions in the CEE region (Table 3.5). 
Overall, the whole data sample shows no differences in wealth creation to previous 
studies analyzing deals between industrialized countries as the respective values are insignifi-
cant negatively. With regards to sub-samples, however, the assumption that cross-border bank 
M&A transactions in EME generate wealth to bidding banks’ shareholders is partly con-
firmed. Hence, these results are different to the ones of previous studies. 
3.5.2 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of all Bidders 
In order to determine the influence of the respective value drivers, which shall explain cross-
border M&A success and identify differences to previous studies analyzing international bank 
transactions between developed countries, several cross-sectional OLS regressions of the 5-
day cumulative abnormal returns are conducted. The characteristics of these drivers are sum-
marized in Appendix 3, from which some outliers are excluded for the regression analysis in 
order to prevent bias. Table 3.7 gives a summary of the different regression models which 
were performed for CAR of all bidders. 
In all regression models neither the target ROAE nor the relative ROAE have any 
explanatory power. Although both variables are negative correlated to the bidder CAR in all 
regressions, this negative relation is not significant. These findings contradict the findings of 
previous research (Pilloff (1996)), which observe a strong negative correlation between rela-
tive ROAE and bidder CAR. Thus, profitability of the target bank does not seem to be a driv-
er for a successful bank acquisition and abandons the hypotheses that bidders targeting unpro-
fitable banks located in EME exhibit a significant higher CAR. Moreover, the target CIR as 
well as the relative CIR also show no explanatory power. On contrary to previous studies, the 
assumption that a less cost efficient target is value creating does not hold true (synergy hypo-
thesis; Hawawini & Swary (1990)). Target CA-Ratio and relative CA-Ratio give again no 
explanations for the success of M&A transactions as both variables do not show any consis-
tent relationship to bidder CAR. These findings hazard a guess that profitability and cost effi-
ciency factors do not play a predominant role. Hence, the market considers accounting data of 
(non-) listed targets in EME as unreliable contradicting the results of studies analyzing deter-
minants of M&A success of bidders targeting banks in developed countries (e.g., Beitel et al. 
(2004)). 
The relative asset size of targets to bidders has explanatory power in the regression 
models. However, the findings contradict the assumption and other empirical results (e.g., 
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Zollo & Leshchinkskii (2000); Hawawini & Swary (1990)): Apart from Models II and IV, the 
study displays significantly positive influence of relative asset size on bidder CAR. Although 
the integration of smaller targets might be less complex, these findings argue for the hypothe-
sis that larger target banks enable larger potential synergy gains for bidder banks and thus 
influence the success of M&A positively. This might be a peculiarity in EME as targets are 
less efficient and therefore, bidder banks from industrialized countries can easily realize syn-
ergy gains in their investments even if targets are larger. 
Table 3.7: Determinants of the CAR to all Bidders 
Estimated coefficients are determined using a multivariate regression of the CAR to all bidders in the 11-day 
event window [-5;+5]a against a number of explanatory variables.b 
 
Source: Own calculations; Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Heritage Foundation 2009; United Nations Statistics Divi-
sions; Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Note: Accounting figures are year-end financial figures prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
a  CAR are derived for a sample of 163 bidder banks using the market model approach in the event study. 
b  For a detailed description of the underlying equation and variables see Chapters 2.3.4 and 3.3, respectively. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Considering listed and non-listed targets, listed ones have a significantly negative in-
fluence on the success of M&A transactions in all conducted regression models. Although 
only 24% of the targets19 are publicly traded at the time of the acquisition announcement, the 
CAR of bidders are negatively influenced by this circumstance. The expectations prove true 
                                                 
19  The relation of 24% based on the 36 listed target and data sample of 151 transactions excluding outliers. 
Constant -0,04121 -0,02207 -0,06063 ** -0,04716 * -0,04247
Profitability and Cost Efficiency
Target ROAE -0,00016 - -0,00004 - -0,00001
Target CIR -0,00013 - -0,00007 - -0,00007
Target CA-Ratio -0,00075 - -0,00016 - -0,00009
Relative ROAE - -0,00168 - -0,00059 -
Relative CIR - -0,0088 - -0,00755 -
Relative CA-Ratio - -0,00089 - 0,00021 -
Asset Size
Relative asset size 0,0794 ** 0,04231 0,07555 ** 0,05743 0,06322 *
Deal Specific Factor
Listed target -0,01902 *** -0,01615 ** -0,01078 -0,00888 -0,01223 *
Bidder Experience
M&A expericence 0,01393 ** 0,01631 *** 0,01287 ** 0,01445 ** 0,01449 **
Stake 0,00883 0,00995 0,00264 0,00424 0,00338
Target Country Specific Factors
Freedom of market -0,00173 -0,00027 - - -
GDP growth -0,00109 ** -0,0021 *** - - -0,0021 ***
Rule of law - - -0,00255 -0,00217 -0,00578
Inflation change - - 0,00031 0,00023 -
Number of Observations 136 135 148 147 150
Adj. R
2
0,107 *** 0,1094 *** 0,038 0,0417 0,0779 **
Model V
CAR [-5;+5]; 
Estimation Period [t -120 ;t -20 ]
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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that listed targets are value diminishing. Therefore, the study argues that market participants 
are likely to see the danger of overpaying when acquiring a public target by paying too high 
premiums. This argument is also proposed by Kiymaz (2004). 
The results show that bidder experience has significantly positive influence on M&A 
success. They prove that especially in emerging markets, acquiring banks benefit from their 
cross-border M&A experiences and hence, perform value-creating M&A transactions, which 
may generate higher synergies. They are in line with previous research (DeYoung (1997); 
Zollo & Leshchinkskii (2000)), which also expose a significantly positive correlation between 
codification of experience related to M&A deals and bidder CAR. The “stake” variable, 
which shows whether the acquiring bank held a minority stake in the target prior to the trans-
action interpreting as specific experience allow no meaningful interpretation. Hence, overall 
experience in cross-border mergers seems to positively influence abnormal returns, while 
deeper insight into the operations and financials of the targets does not lead to successful 
M&A deals. This leads to the interpretation that the overall experience of the bidders out-
weighs the inside knowledge and that the market believes in bidder’s ability of a correct 
stand-alone value assessments of the target. This explanation is strengthened by respective 
event study results demonstrating no positive CAR to acquisitions in which bidder banks al-
ready hold stakes in the acquired banks. 
Finally, regarding target country-specific factors, the variables freedom of market, 
rule of law, and inflation change have any explanatory power regarding cross-border M&A 
success displaying insignificantly coefficients in all models. The only factor, which is highly 
significant related to the bidder CAR, is GDP growth in the respective target countries. Using 
only GDP growth as a proxy for the degree of economic development, the study confirms the 
hypothesis that acquisitions in less developed markets in EME create more value. Bidding 
banks expanding in less developed countries face less foreign competition and might be able 
to maintain higher profitability. The diversification benefits, in combination with the advan-
tages of lower competition might outweigh the political risk and uncertain business environ-
ment associated with expansion in such countries. Summarizing the determinants of bidders’ 
CAR targeting bank in EME differ from the explaining variables of bidders’ CAR purchasing 
stakes in banks located in industrialized countries. 
3.5.3 Short-term Valuation Effects to Sub-Sample 
Analyzing only transactions involving listed bidders and listed targets, the study examines 
that the overall CAAR for bidder banks, although not statistically significant, are more nega-
tive compared to the bidder CAAR of entire data sample; e.g., CAAR of -0.40% (all transac-
tions) vs. CAAR of -0.90% (sub-sample) for the interval [-20;+20]. Besides of displaying 
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more negative values, the mean abnormal returns demonstrate significantly negative values. 
According to the standard t-test, intervals [-5;0] and [-5;+5] are meaningful confirming the 
hypotheses that listed targets in EME are seen as more risky investments as they are more 
expensive, and the uncertainties whether the investments are paid off and promised synergies 
are realizable in the medium term are very high. Table 3.8 presents the respective CAAR to 
bidders. 
Table 3.8: CAAR to Bidders 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to bidders acquiring listed targets in EME. Abnormal 
returns were calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 120 trading 
days prior to the event window [-20;+20]. For the market returns of each country, respective market indices are 
applied. Statistical significance is tested using the standard t-test statistic and the test according to Dodd & 
Warner (1983). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Turning the attention on the target bank CAAR, only positive results can be ob-
served, which are highly significant according their z-scores and partly significant according 
the standard t-test as demonstrated in Table 3.9. They symbolize important wealth creation to 
target bank shareholders in EME ranging from +0.64% of interval [-1;+1] to +6.26% of event 
window [-10;+10]. Despite of the positive mean abnormal returns, they are much smaller 
compared to targets’ CAAR purchased in developed countries (e.g., the lowest CAAR to tar-
gets in the study of Beitel & Schiereck (2001) is at announcement day with +8.27%). The 
lower values may indicate that the wealth creation to shareholders in EME is not as developed 
as in industrialized countries as emerging market targets do not receive a distinct takeover 
premium as developed market targets do. 
 
 
Event window
CAAR 
(%)
z-score
Median 
(%)
Std.dev. 
(%)
Positive
Pos. 
(%)
[-20;0] -0,59 -0,63 -0,74 -1,04 5,63 16 44,4
[-10;0] -0,61 -1,10 -0,31 -0,25 3,36 16 44,4
[-5;0] -0,86 -1,86 * -1,19 -0,42 2,77 13 36,1
[-1;0] -0,23 -0,97 -0,85 -0,23 1,44 17 47,2
[0] -0,24 -1,31 -1,01 0,01 1,10 18 50,0
[-1;+1] -0,15 -0,53 0,22 0,00 1,70 19 52,8
[-5;+1] -0,78 -1,58 -0,50 -0,35 2,95 15 41,7
[-10;+1] -0,53 -0,94 0,16 -0,29 3,39 16 44,4
[-5;+5] -0,78 -1,67 * -0,69 -0,15 2,79 16 44,4
[-10;+10] -0,52 -0,74 -0,18 -0,18 4,24 17 47,2
[-20;+20] -0,90 -0,70 -0,64 0,15 7,65 18 50,0
Returns to bidder banks (N=36)
t-value
50 3  Study 1: Cross-Border Bank M&A in Emerging Market Economies 
 
Table 3.9: CAAR to Targets 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to targets located in EME. Abnormal returns were 
calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 120 trading days prior to 
the event window [-20;+20]. For the market returns of each country, respective market indices are applied. Sta-
tistical significance is tested using the standard t-test statistic and the test according to Dodd & Warner (1983). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
The joint returns of bidders and targets show negative cumulative abnormal returns 
as seen in Table 3.10. The t-test detects the negative returns of internal [-20;0] as significant 
at the 10% level. The test according to Dodd & Warner (1983), however, demonstrates no 
meaningful findings. Nevertheless, the findings permit to state that bank M&A transactions in 
EME initiated by banks from industrialized countries cannot be considered on average as 
wealth creating from an overall economic point of view. Stressing again the negative bidder 
results and positive target results just a transfer in value from the shareholders of bidders to 
the shareholders of targets happens contradicting previous event studies identifying signifi-
cantly positive CAAR to combined entities (e.g., Beitel & Schiereck (2001); Hawawini & 
Swary (1990)). As the targets in EME are rather small and the acquirers are large entities with 
regards to their market capitalization, it is most likely that the negative returns to bidders out-
weigh the positive returns of targets resulting in negative combined entity returns. This fact is 
perfectly illustrated by Figure 3.3 presenting CAAR to combined entities with the same gra-
dient as CAAR to bidders, only with slightly higher values. 
 
 
 
 
Event window
CAAR 
(%)
t-value z-score
Median 
(%)
Std.dev. 
(%)
Positive
Pos. 
(%)
[-20;0] 4,33 1,44 3,66 *** 1,83 18,09 19 52,8
[-10;0] 5,21 2,52 ** 5,19 *** 2,45 12,41 25 69,4
[-5;0] 3,06 2,24 ** 4,88 *** 1,06 8,20 21 58,3
[-1;0] 1,18 1,67 * 3,31 *** 0,26 4,25 20 55,6
[0] 0,75 1,43 3,55 *** 0,10 3,16 19 52,8
[-1;+1] 0,64 0,56 2,87 *** 0,59 6,82 20 55,6
[-5;+1] 2,52 1,46 4,63 *** 0,96 10,38 19 52,8
[-10;+1] 4,67 2,24 ** 5,05 *** 2,37 12,51 22 61,1
[-5;+5] 3,72 1,79 * 4,74 *** 0,47 12,51 19 52,8
[-10;+10] 6,26 2,42 ** 4,91 *** 4,34 15,50 21 58,3
[-20;+20] 2,17 0,54 2,61 *** 1,87 24,35 19 52,8
Returns to target banks (N=36)
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Table 3.10: CAAR to Combined Entities 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to combined entities. Abnormal returns were calcu-
lated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 120 trading days prior to the 
event window [-20;+20]. For the market returns of each country, respective market indices are applied. Statistic-
al significance is tested using the standard t-test statistic and the test according to Dodd & Warner (1983). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In the next step, the study analyzes sub-samples according to target regions as pre-
sented by Appendix 4. The returns for banks purchasing stakes in listed Asian banks present 
consistently negative values whereas the entire data sample display some positive values (cp. 
Table 3.5). Hence, transactions between bidder banks and listed targets in Asia are perceived 
as value destroying deals. Since the bidders of Asian listed targets are exclusively US banks, 
the initiator’s stock market does not value these transactions positively. Similar to previous 
findings of all 163 transactions, bidders in CEE experience negative results by purchasing 
listed CEE banks. Moreover, their CAAR are more negative compared to former results with 
statistical significance. Moreover, compared to the entire data sample, bidders targeting ex-
clusively listed banks in LatAm display higher returns at a more profound significance level 
of 5%. Although presenting two negative returns, the positive results for the bidder banks 
acquiring listed LatAm banks are higher as for bidder banks purchasing stakes in (non-) listed 
banks of the same region. Equally to the entire data sample, same cultural background and 
language are evaluated positively by bidder stock market as predominately Spanish banks 
acquired stakes in LatAm banks. 
Taking into account the abnormal returns to public targets banks, the study observes 
that returns for Latin American banks are partly negative and partly positive. However, the 
positive returns are statistically significant. Regarding returns to target banks in the regions of 
Asia and CEE, a transfer in value can be detected from bidding banks to targets: The CAAR 
for Asian and CEE targets are significantly positive. Especially by considering the respective 
Event window
CAAR 
(%)
Median 
(%)
Std.dev. 
(%)
Positive
Pos. 
(%)
[-20;0] -1,47 -1,96 * -1,13 -1,44 4,49 15 41,7
[-10;0] -0,71 -1,26 -0,40 -0,02 3,40 17 47,2
[-5;0] -0,65 -1,43 -0,78 -0,06 2,73 17 47,2
[-1;0] -0,11 -0,49 -0,61 -0,04 1,37 18 50,0
[0] -0,24 -1,22 -1,04 0,02 1,18 19 52,8
[-1;+1] -0,15 -0,53 0,17 -0,11 1,70 17 47,2
[-5;+1] -0,69 -1,44 -0,29 -0,31 2,87 16 44,4
[-10;+1] -0,75 -1,31 -0,05 -0,59 3,44 16 44,4
[-5;+5] -0,80 -1,64 -0,70 -0,06 2,93 17 47,2
[-10;+10] -0,68 -0,98 -0,25 -0,09 4,19 18 50,0
[-20;+20] -2,08 -2,05 -1,17 -2,51 6,08 17 47,2
Returns to combined entities (N=36)
z-scoret-value
52 3  Study 1: Cross-Border Bank M&A in Emerging Market Economies 
 
returns to combined entities, this transfer is realizable as the combined entity returns are nega-
tive and even significantly negative in CEE. This result underlines the fact that the joint re-
turns are rather influenced by negative returns to bidders instead by positive returns to targets. 
This one-way value transfer, however, is not observable in case of combined entities, e.g., in 
LatAm. The study analyzes significantly positive combined returns of three event windows 
going up to 2.56% for [-20;0], which are influenced by the positive returns to bidders banks. 
For this reason with regards to transaction towards LatAm, the results confirm previous stu-
dies analyzing bank M&A between industrialized countries with positive combined entity 
returns (e.g., Beitel & Schiereck (2001); Hawawini & Swary (1990)). 
Considering the returns by nationality of bidder banks, this smaller sample again is 
clustered in four panels as seen in Appendix 5. Compared to the bidders of 163 transactions 
(Table 3.6) the study attains a similar picture of results for the acquirers of 36 transactions of 
listed banks. Hence, Spanish bidders purchasing exclusively LatAm banks experience signifi-
cantly positive returns. The wealth creation to bidder shareholders expresses the confidence 
that Spanish banks are able to implement their efficient structures within overseas banks sup-
ported by familiar culture and language. US banks, on the other hand, experience significantly 
negative returns symbolizing wealth destruction for US banks’ shareholders. The returns to 
Italian bidder banks of the sub-sample are less negative and now insignificant compared to the 
entire sample. Comparing the European bidder bank returns between the sub- and whole data 
sample, the negative sub-sample returns are more profound with statistical significance. 
Turning the attention to target bank returns, one can observes – apart from target re-
turns of Spanish banks – that returns to targets of US, European and Italian banks are signifi-
cantly positive symbolizing wealth creation for EME shareholders. Moreover, the positive 
returns are especially strong for targets of European bidder banks. Since they are targeting 
predominately targets in CEE, this means a huge wealth transfer from bidder to target share-
holders investing in CEE. This fact is underlined observing the returns of the combined enti-
ties of European bidder banks. Although they are only significantly negative on the an-
nouncement day, it is assumed that the negative returns to European bidder banks overweight 
the positive returns to target banks of European bidders. This also holds true in case of trans-
actions initiated by Italian banks: The interval [-20;0] with -3.14% is significantly negative at 
the 5% level according the standard t-test. 
This wealth transfer is as well as observable for US banks: The returns to combined 
entities are negative whereas target returns show a positive and bidder returns a negative sign. 
Looking at returns to combined entities for Spanish bidders, the study examines that for some 
event windows the joint returns are significantly positive symbolizing a wealth creation from 
the transactions. Moreover, the study again stresses the specific performance of returns to 
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Spanish bidders and to targets of Spanish banks: Spanish bidder banks show significant posi-
tive returns whereas targets of Spanish banks are negative. This can be explained by bidder 
shareholders expecting positive synergies from the transactions and by target shareholders 
fearing the loss of national champions and the dependence on foreign banks. However, the 
joint returns to combined entities are significantly influenced by the returns to Spanish ac-
quirers. 
Figure 3.3: CAAR to Targets, Bidders, and Combined Entities 
 
Source: Own calculations and illustration; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
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3.5.4 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Sub-Sample 
Considering the impact of value drivers on the sub-sample of 36 transactions, the study also 
performs several cross-sectional OLS regressions in the [-5;+5] event window according to 
bidders, targets, and combined entities as presented by Table 3.11, Table 3.12, and Table 
3.13, respectively. Since only transactions involving listed bidders and listed targets are ob-
served, the previous dummy variable concerning deal-specific factor (Var8: Listed target) is 
excluded from the regressions. Appendix 6 gives an overview of the drivers’ characteristics. 
3.5.4.1 Bidder Bank Returns 
The regression results of the first category profitability and cost efficiency are equal to the 
bidder findings of the entire data sample. Neither the target ROAE nor the relative ROAE 
have any explanatory power displaying negative values. Profitability of listed target banks 
does not seem to be a factor for a successful bank acquisition opposing previous research 
(e.g., Beitel et al. (2004), Pilloff (1996)). Moreover, target CIR as well as relative CIR also 
has no explanatory power. Since it is supposed that less cost efficient targets are value creat-
ing and the study examines that listed targets are more cost efficient compared to all target 
banks (Table 3.3), wealth creation through synergies might be even more difficult underlined 
by these findings. Although presenting negative coefficients, target CA-Ratio and relative 
CA-Ratio also do not explain the success of M&A transactions. All these findings underline 
the previous assumptions that the six accounting factors do not play a predominant role eva-
luating M&A deals from the view of bidder banks. 
Different from the findings of Section 3.5.2, the relative asset size of targets to bid-
ders has only weak explanatory power in these models. Only at Models II and V, the study 
demonstrates significantly positive influence of relative asset size on bidder CAR what never-
theless contradicts the initial assumption of integration benefits of smaller targets and other 
empirical results (e.g., Hawawini & Swary (1990); Zollo & Leshchinkskii (2000)). Although 
listed targets are bigger and their integration might be more complex, the results assume larg-
er possible synergy gains for the bidders purchasing stakes in bigger targets. This result ex-
presses a specific characteristic of EME that targets are less efficient and thus, the realization 
of synergies for bidder banks can be easily achieved even if targets are larger. However, it is 
also presumed that the bigger the targets the less value creating get the transactions and that 
there is a kind of “asset size efficient frontier” – after exceeding this frontier, transactions of 
bigger targets are getting value destroying.  
Similar to all 163 transactions, bidder experience has significantly positive influence 
on acquisitions of listed banks. Bidders seem to benefit from their cross-border M&A expe-
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rience to perform value-creating M&A transactions corresponding to previous studies 
(DeYoung (1997); Zollo & Leshchinkskii (2000)). The variable stake, however, gives again 
no meaningful results. Although the coefficients are positively correlated to the bidder CAR, 
there is no statistical significance. Therefore, the study asserts again that overall experience in 
cross-border M&A has a positive impact on CAR, deeper insight into the operations and fi-
nancials of the listed targets does not seem to be advantageous. 
Table 3.11: Determinants of the CAR to Bidders 
Estimated coefficients are determined using a multivariate regression of the CAR to bidders in the 11-day event 
window [-5;+5]a against a number of explanatory variables.b 
Source: Own calculations; Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Heritage Foundation 2009; United Nations Statistics Divi-
sions; Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Note: Accounting figures are year-end financial figures prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
a  CAR are derived for a sample of 36 bidder banks using the market model approach in the event study. 
b  For a detailed description of the underlying equation and variables see Chapters 2.3.4 and 3.3, respectively. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Similar to the regression outcomes of Chapter 3.5.2, the variable inflation change has 
no explanatory power regarding cross-border M&A success. Of special interest are the re-
maining three target country-specific variables: GDP growth shows no significant relation to 
CAR in the sample of bidders acquiring only listed targets. Even though the coefficients in all 
regression models are negative, they are not statistically significant anymore. GDP growth as 
proxy for the degree of economic development cannot be used anymore evaluating M&A 
success of listed targets. The factor freedom of market, however, shows a significantly nega-
Constant -0,08272 -0,10071 -0,04679 -0,03591 -0,08194
Profitability and Cost Efficiency
Target ROAE -0,00025 - -0,00027 - -
Target CIR 0,00025 - 0,00018 - -
Target CA-Ratio -0,00194 - -0,00269 - -
Relative ROAE - -0,00258 - -0,00195 -0,00246
Relative CIR - -0,01885 - -0,02186 -0,0286
Relative CA-Ratio - -0,00349 - -0,00326 -0,00395
Asset Size
Relative asset size 0,10562 0,16342 * 0,04139 0,06542 0,1288 *
Bidder Experience
M&A expericence 0,02794 ** 0,02876 *** 0,01848 * 0,01923 * 0,02199 **
Stake 0,01629 0,01398 0,01503 0,01244 0,01329
Target Country Specific Factors
Freedom of market -0,01199 * -0,00935 - - -
GDP growth -0,00142 -0,00179 - - -0,00077
Rule of law - - -0,02171 * -0,02131 * -0,01631 *
Inflation change - - -0,00001 -0,00045 -
Number of Observations 35 35 35 35 35
Adj. R
2
0,128 0,2775 ** 0,1172 0,209 * 0,300 **
Model V
CAR [-5;+5]; 
Estimation Period [t -120 ;t -20 ]
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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tive coefficient in Regression Model I reflecting that bidder returns are higher in highly regu-
lated markets with little economic freedom. Lastly, the other factor displaying a slight signi-
ficance at the 15% level is rule of law. The negative coefficient implies that returns to bidder 
shareholders on cross-border M&A deals are higher in countries with poorer governance. One 
explanation might be that investors are compensated for relatively poor governance and legal 
protection via a risk premium. Since poor governance and legal protection as well as little 
economic freedom are proxies for development of EME countries, the study confirms once 
more the hypothesis, even though proved by different factors, that acquisitions in less devel-
oped economies in EME create more value to bidder investors. The positive investment 
payoff based on synergy gains is assumed to outweigh the corresponding risks regarding po-
litical, legal and social differences. Recapitulating the determinants of bidders’ CAR targeting 
listed bank in EME differ from the explaining variables of bidders’ CAR purchasing stakes in 
banks located in industrialized countries. 
3.5.4.2 Target Bank Returns 
In all regression models the target ROAE and the relative ROAE have significant explanatory 
power as both variables are positively correlated to target CAR even with significance. This 
positive correlation implies that the returns to EME shareholders are higher if the target bank 
is more profitable on the absolute and relative level. Hence, target bank profitability seems to 
be a driver for a successful bank acquisition from target shareholders’ view. With regards to 
cost efficient drivers, target CIR as well as relative CIR show no explanatory power to target 
CAR. Target CIR shows slightly negative values in Models I and III whereas the coefficient 
of relative CIR shows throughout positive values in all regressions. These inconsistent results 
permit no reasonable interpretation. However, Regressions I and III present a positive rela-
tionship between target CA-Ratio and target CAR at significance levels of 10% and 5%, re-
spectively. The significances imply that transactions of less cost efficient banks influence the 
success of the M&A deals positively resulting in higher target CAR. The findings correspond 
to the results of Beitel et al. (2004). The coefficients of the relative CA, furthermore, display 
positive values with a significant one of Model IV. Comparing the findings with the ones of 
bidder returns, one can see that profitability and cost efficiency factors are more important 
when deals in target countries of EME are valued supporting previous empirical results ana-
lyzing cross-border M&A transactions occurring between two industrialized countries. 
The respective coefficients of the relative asset size are significantly negative in all 
regression models. Therefore, the relative asset size of targets to bidders has explanatory 
power supporting empirical results by Hawawini & Swary (1990) and Zollo & Leshchinkskii 
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(2000). The results indicate that the acquisition and integration of smaller targets is less com-
plex and the implementation of potential value creation is easier. 
All regression models show no relationship between bidder M&A experience and 
target CAR. Although the coefficients have positive values, they are not statistically signifi-
cant. Thus, the market does not account for bidder cross-border M&A experience, as target 
CAR are not positively influenced. Since there is no statistical significance, the “stake” varia-
ble gives no meaningful results either. However, its results partly contradict the assumption as 
some coefficients are negatively correlated to the target CAR. Target CAR might be negative-
ly influenced if the bidder already holds stakes in the respective target. Deeper insight into the 
operations and financials of the targets, hence, are not advantageous and value creating. 
Table 3.12: Determinants of the CAR to Targets 
Estimated coefficients are determined using a multivariate regression of the CAR to targets in the 11-day event 
window [-5;+5]a against a number of explanatory variables.b 
Source: Own calculations; Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Heritage Foundation 2009; United Nations Statistics Divi-
sions; Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Note: Accounting figures are year-end financial figures prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
a  CAR are derived for a sample of 36 targets banks using the market model approach in the event study. 
b  For a detailed description of the underlying equation and variables see Chapters 2.3.4 and 3.3, respectively. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
The only variable showing no explanatory power regarding M&A success is freedom 
of market. Although freedom of market is positively related to target CAR, its coefficients are 
not statistically significant and have no meaningful impact to the returns to EME sharehold-
ers. Rule of law, on the other hand, displays only negative values with a significant coefficient 
Constant 0,10770 0,11943 0,56083 0,49843 0,19128
Profitability and Cost Efficiency
Target ROAE 0,00147 * - 0,00243 *** - -
Target CIR -0,00023 - -0,00104 - -
Target CA-Ratio 0,015395 * - 0,02294 ** - -
Relative ROAE - 0,01675 * - 0,02658 ** 0,0187 **
Relative CIR - 0,09739 - 0,04425 0,09105
Relative CA-Ratio - 0,01778 - 0,03013 * 0,01461
Asset Size
Relative asset size -0,37295 -0,41008 -0,64471 * -0,66232 * -0,43035
Bidder Experience
M&A expericence 0,04097 0,05395 0,04694 0,05258 0,04604
Stake -0,02027 0,00419 -0,0137 0,02473 0,00835
Target Country Specific Factors
Freedom of market 0,02013 0,0092 - - -
GDP growth 0,01767 *** 0,01458 ** - - 0,01533 **
Rule of law - - -0,06897 -0,10333 * -0,04429
Inflation change - - -0,01143 *** -0,00899 ** -
Number of Observations 35 35 35 35 35
Adj. R
2
0,265 ** 0,206 * 0,264 ** 0,208 * 0,229 *
Model V
CAR [-5;+5]; 
Estimation Period [t -120 ;t -20 ]
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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in Model IV implying that returns to EME shareholders are higher in countries with poorer 
governance. Moreover, the findings also suit the other factors, GDP growth and inflation 
change. Since GDP growth is positively related to target CAR, this implies that more devel-
oped countries augment the returns to EME shareholders. Considering the variable inflation 
change demonstrating highly significant negative value, it can be interpreted that economies 
with strong record for macroeconomic management – in terms of lower inflation – positively 
influence target CAR. Observing the three variables together, the study argues that developing 
countries with higher economic development and constant price stability as well as poor go-
vernance cause higher returns to target bank investors in the respective countries. To sum up, 
variables explaining cross-border M&A success of targets in EME are comparable to the ones 
of targets in developed countries. 
3.5.4.3 Combined Entity Returns 
Neither the target ROAE nor the relative ROAE have any explanatory power in the conducted 
regressions. Despite of the negative correlation of combined entity CAR (apart from Regres-
sion IV), they are not statistically significant. The findings coincide with the one of Beitel et 
al. (2004), who find insignificantly negative correlation between relative ROAE and com-
bined entity CAR. Moreover, the other four variables (target CIR, relative CIR, target CA, 
and relative CA) also give no explanation for the success of M&A transactions. All these 
findings point out that the accounting-based factors do not play a predominant role evaluating 
M&A deals from the view of combined entities. 
Demonstrating only positive coefficients, the variable asset size is not significant 
permitting any exact analysis. The slightly positive coefficients contradict the hypothesis that 
integration of smaller targets is less difficult resulting in faster value creation for the joint ent-
ity shareholders. 
Equal to bidder CAR, bidder experience affects the results of combined entity share-
holders positively. Combined entities profit from cross-border M&A experience of the bidder 
banks emptying into value-creating M&A transactions. Although the variable stake is positive 
in all regression models, it is again not significant. Consequently, deeper insight into the op-
erations and financials of the targets is not advantageous whereas the cross-border M&A ex-
perience of the bidders have a positive effect on combined entity CAR. 
All four variables do not show any explanatory power regarding cross-border M&A 
success. Although freedom of market, GDP growth, and rule of law present negative coeffi-
cients through all regression models arguing for higher combined entity returns in economies 
with little economic freedom, modest GDP growth and poorer governance, respectively, they 
3.6  Conclusion 59 
 
are not significant. Therefore, the study can give no evaluation which factor influences com-
bined entity CAR positively resulting in higher returns for the joint shareholders.  
A special remark to combined entity returns is necessary: The regression analyses 
clearly show the influence of bidder and target CAR. Some variables, which are significant 
for bidders but not significant for targets neutralize these effects resulting in insignificant val-
ue drivers for combined entities. The only significant factor to combined entity CAR is M&A 
experience of bidders, which is highly negative significant to bidder CAR outweighing the 
positive and insignificant coefficients of target CAR.  
Table 3.13: Determinants of the CAR to Combined Entities 
Estimated coefficients are determined using a multivariate regression of the CAR to combined entities in the 11-
day event window [-5;+5]a against a number of explanatory variables.b 
 
Source: Own calculations; Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Heritage Foundation 2009; United Nations Statistics Divi-
sions; Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Note: Accounting figures are year-end financial figures prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
a  CAR are derived for a sample of 36 combined entities using the market model approach in the event study. 
b  For a detailed description of the underlying equation and variables see Chapters 2.3.4 and 3.3, respectively. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The study builds up a sample of cross-border bank M&A transactions with change of corpo-
rate control between international acquiring banks and target banks in EME covering a total 
of 163 deals between 1994 and 2007. The transactions involve listed bidder banks from West-
Constant -0,05161 -0,03848 -0,05025 0,00259 -0,01024
Profitability and Cost Efficiency
Target ROAE -0,00007 - -0,00016 - -
Target CIR 0,00007 - 0,00012 - -
Target CA-Rato -0,00086 - -0,0021 - -
Relative ROAE - -0,00036 - 0,00001 -0,00034
Relative CIR - -0,01944 - -0,02629 -0,02368
Relative CA-Ratio - -0,00095 - -0,00105 -0,00131
Asset Size
Relative asset size 0,04861 0,05708 0,03128 0,00581 0,01584
Bidder Experience
M&A expericence 0,03593 *** 0,03817 *** 0,02803 ** 0,03097 ** 0,03159 ***
Stake 0,01287 0,01277 0,01353 0,01168 0,01181
Target Country Specific Factors
Freedom of market -0,00651 -0,00596 - - -
GDP growth -0,0008 -0,00095 - - -0,00017
Rule of law - - -0,01259 -0,01793 -0,0151
Inflation change - - 0,0007 -0,00031 -
Number of Observations 35 35 35 35 35
Adj. R
2
0,105 0,199 * 0,075 0,205 * 0,193 *
Model V
CAR [-5;+5]; 
Estimation Period [t -120 ;t -20 ]
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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ern Europe and North America and (non-) listed target banks in Asia, CEE, and LatAm. Con-
structing two data samples – the first covering all transactions and the second only accounting 
for listed bidders and listed targets – the study compares previous findings of cross-border 
M&A transactions among industrialized countries with international bank M&A deals ini-
tiated by banks located in industrialized countries expanding their business in EME. Hence, it 
contributes additional findings to the existing bank M&A literature by analyzing value effects 
associated with cross-border bank M&A deals and establishing value drivers of these transac-
tions and EME conditions that aim to explain variation in returns. The analyzed CAAR show 
some consistency with US and European evidence. In general, acquiring bank shareholders 
receive no significant abnormal returns or wealth creation from cross-border M&A for the 
entire data sample. The sample only including listed target banks, however, demonstrates sig-
nificantly negative abnormal returns to bidder banks. Target bank shareholder in EME, how-
ever, experience significant abnormal returns resulting in wealth creation. However, the ana-
lyzed positive returns are not as elevated as analyzed in previous studies. Moreover, the study 
implies that these cross-border M&A transactions are wealth destroying, as the joint abnormal 
returns are significantly negative opposing other empirical study presenting a positive net 
wealth effect of joint returns to bidders and targets (e.g., Beitel & Schiereck (2001); Hawawi-
ni & Swary (1990)). 
In terms of variability across returns, differences can be explained by geography and 
nationality of bidder banks. Whereas value is created for bidder bank shareholders for deals 
involving LatAm banks (consistent for all transactions and for transactions accounting only 
for both listed bidders and targets), returns to shareholders at target banks are high in Asia and 
CEE. Similarly, value is created for Spanish bidder bank shareholders whereas target banks 
acquired by US, European (without Spanish and Italian ones), and Italian banks receive sig-
nificantly positive abnormal returns. In addition, value for combined entity is only created in 
deals targeting LatAm banks and involving purchases by Spanish banks. The insignificant 
results to other combined entities assume a transfer of wealth from bidder banks to targets 
bank. Hence, on the net basis and from the economic point of view, value is not generated by 
cross-border bank M&A transaction in EME. 
The regression models have reasonable explanatory power. Returns to bidder banks 
accounting for the entire sample of 163 transactions can be explained by asset size, deal-
specific factors, bidder experience and economic condition expressed by GDP growth in 
EME. Larger targets, cross-border M&A experience of bidders, poor GDP growth influences 
bidder CAR positively, whereas listed targets have a negative impact. The identified variables 
of M&A success differ from the ones studies by previous analyses. Looking at bidder banks 
purchasing exclusively listed target banks in EME, the value drivers of bidder CAR alter: Al-
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though bidder M&A experience and asset size has still a positive impact, GDP growth has no 
explanatory power anymore. However, freedom of market and rule of law as two other target 
country-specific factors have an influence on bidder CAR. Unfree economies with high regu-
lation and poorer record on governance appear to command a risk premium for investors. In 
both samples, the factors of category 1 play no specific role what is different to target bank 
shareholders who receive a premium on their investment in more profitable and but less cost 
efficient targets. Moreover, smaller targets in contrast to bidders have a positive impact on 
target CAR. GDP growth, rule of law, and inflation change are additional drivers of target 
CAR: Returns to EME shareholders are associated with economies with promising financial 
development, inferior governance, and stronger stance on monetary policy. The returns to 
combined entities, on the other hand, are only positively influenced by the cross-border M&A 
experience of bidders. None of the other categories has a positive or negative impact on joint 
CAR. 
The study quantifies the stock market perceptions regarding cross-border M&A 
transactions in EME from the different perspective of bidders, targets, and combined entities 
and compares them with previous studies. Regarding the information asymmetries linked with 
evaluating non-transparent banks in EME and uncertainties associated with investing in banks 
in unsecured financial systems, the outcomes are useful and clarified the particular value crea-
tion in EME and its related risks. Since more and more banks facing increasing competitive 
domestic markets, they presume future shareholder value in EME offering potentials for ex-
pansion and diversification. Consequently, bidder banks need a useful direction in which 
countries to invest partly given by the presented findings. However, the study limits its expla-
natory power, as abnormal returns are only short-term market assessments of expected returns 
from M&A transactions. Further studies are required to assure the market valuation of long-
term bank performance following cross-border M&A transactions in EME. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to analyze and assess the consequences on the entire economy of emerging coun-
tries initiated by foreign banks holding the majority of domestic banking assets. 
 
 
 
 
 4 Study 2: Stock Price Impact of Large Blockholder Investments – 
Comparison of Sovereign Wealth Funds and Private Equity Funds 
4.1 Introduction 
SWF are not a new phenomenon. They have been managing actively and successfully the 
investment portfolios on behalf of governments that own the portfolios attracting only little 
attention for decades. Fueled by rising commodity prices and accumulating foreign currency 
reserves, however, SWF have emerged more and more as major international investors in the 
last years catching the intense interest and concerns of media, politics, and financial institu-
tions. Especially their investment activities during the latest financial crisis lead to controver-
sial feedback: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), for instance, acquired Citibank debt 
convertible into 4.9% of its common stock; Singapore’s Government Investment Corp. (GIC) 
today is the largest shareholder of Swiss UBS. The list of SWF multi-billion dollar invest-
ments can easily be extended by various acquisitions in former US investment banks like 
Merrill Lynch or Morgan Stanley, whose capital was decimated by the meltdown in the US 
subprime mortgage market (Gilson & Milhaupt (2008)). The respective financial figures even 
underline their overwhelming financial firepower: The size of assets under management 
(AuM) has grown from USD 1.3 tr in 1997 to about USD 3.7 tr nowadays and is expected to 
reach a volume of USD 8 to 10 tr by the middle of this decade.20 The size and rapid growth of 
state funds suggest that they are an important class of investors and will likely become even 
more significant in the future. 
However, paradoxically to these facts, their structure, objectives, and investment 
strategies are poorly understood so far. They appear very similar to other internationally in-
vestment vehicles like pension funds or mutual funds which have been extensively examined 
by various financial researchers (e.g., Aggarwal, Klapper, & Wysocki (2005); Chen, Harford, 
& Li (2007); Del Guercio & Hawkins (1999); Li, Moshirian, Pham, & Zein (2006)). Actually, 
SWF seem to be most comparable in structure and expressed objectives to private equity 
funds. Like SWF, these funds are stand-alone, unregulated pools of capital, actively managed 
by investment professionals, and they often take large and long-term stakes in selected, pub-
licly traded companies with the objective of profit maximization. Additionally, private equity 
                                                 
20  Actual figures of SWF base upon the estimates of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
(http://www.swfinstitute.org). Historical and growth figures base upon the estimates of International Finan-
cial Services London (IFSL) research. SWF AuM are expected to rise in spite of the recent economic slow-
down linked with the decline of oil prices and slump of global trade, which both serves as an engine of SWF 
growth (Maslakovic (2009)). Since the majority of funds do not disclose their volume, the respective figures 
derive from estimations. Hence, their specifications differ from each other depending on the relevant source. 
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funds have also gained in importance in the last decades. Their capital is raised primarily from 
institutional investor and their AuM have augmented from USD 53 bn in 1990 to USD 700 bn 
in 2008 and expect further growth in the future.21  
Since both groups of investors are large shareholders and their investments in firms 
are often characterized by an acquisition of significant block of voting rights, SWF and pri-
vate equity funds seem to be enabled to monitor management effectively in general. In line 
with this argumentation a number of studies analyzes the function of institutional investors 
assumed to have positive impact on shareholder value creation through efficient monitoring 
and shareholder activism (Shleifer & Vishny (1986)). However, the question arises whether 
SWF are able to play an equally active role in target’s business as private equity funds are 
assumed to do in the light of numerous, severe restrictions on the monitoring and/or discipli-
nary role SWF face (Rose (2008)). 
With regard to academic research, SWF investments are a relatively unexplored top-
ic. The small number of existing working papers on sovereign funds documents significantly 
positive average abnormal returns around the announcement day of SWF acquiring equity 
stakes in publicly traded companies. This contradicts the concerns of being government-
owned (Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson, & Miracky (2009); Chhaochharia & Laeven (2009); 
Dewenter, Han, & Malatesta (2009); Knill, Lee, & Mauck (2009); Kotter & Lel (2008)). 
These market reactions on SWF targets are similar to the positive ones on private equity 
funds’ targets enhancing shareholder value (e.g., Achleitner, Andres, Betzer, & Weir (2008); 
Cotter & Peck (2001); A. Klein & Zur (2009); Menke & Schiereck (2008); Mietzner & 
Schweizer (2007); Wright, Weir, & Burrows (2007)). Nonetheless, the origins of shareholder 
value creation appear to be different in most cases. Since the positive short-term reactions to 
private equity fund investments result mainly from large shareholder activism proven by a 
number of studies, researchers on SWF do not always succeed to verify a relation between the 
positive announcement effects around engagement and the ability of SWF managers to pursuit 
successful activism strategies. The researchers provide different explanations such as the in-
crease in firms’ financial stability especially in times of bad economic conditions 
(Chhaochharia & Laeven (2009)). Moreover, Bortolotti et al. (2009) also do not identify ef-
fective monitoring activities by SWF managers and document significantly negative long-run 
returns in the two year period after the SWF engagement suggesting these equity acquisitions 
are followed by deteriorating firm performance which is different to private equity funds’ 
targets. Dewenter et al. (2009), on the other hand, analyze that SWFs are often active inves-
                                                 
21  Historical and growth figures of private equity funds base upon the estimates of McKinsey Global Institute 
(2007) and IFSL research (Maslakovic (2009)). 
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tors and that half of target firms undergo one or more events indicating SWF monitoring ac-
tivity or influence. 
Since both groups of institutional investors, SWF and private equity funds, seem to 
be comparable to each other, this study evaluates and compares SWF and private equity fund 
minority investments and their associated valuation effects on directly affected intra-industry 
rivals of targets. This study tries to fill a research gap by providing detailed empirical evi-
dence using the example of listed financial services firms as this industry is targeted majorita-
rianly by state funds and SWF have announced active shareholding especially in this industry. 
Specific research questions should be answered: (1) What similarities and differences exist 
between the two groups of institutional investors on the basis of their respective targets? (2) 
Do their investments create elevated short-term shareholder value and what kinds of determi-
nants influence the wealth creation? (3) Are both groups of investors active blockholders? (4) 
Do their investments created increased long-term shareholder value? (5) What different ef-
fects have investments of both investors on the intra-industry rival firms both short- and long-
term? 
For this purpose, 46 SWF and 68 private equity fund investments in financial servic-
es targets as well as 336 intra-industry rivals are identified between 1990 and 2009 (164 rivals 
to SWF targets and 172 rivals to private equity fund targets, respectively). By using a detailed 
and extensive dataset on SWF and private equity fund target firm, first, the investment pat-
terns are examined exhibited by SWF and private equity funds. The study analyzes that SWF 
targets are larger than private equity fund targets with higher dividend payouts and yields, but 
with lower the managerial ownership suggesting shareholder activism potential of SWF. The 
results from an extensive matched sample of SWF targets and industry peers show that SWF 
targets are indeed much larger but not more profitable than their industry peers. Since the ana-
lyses cannot depict any improvements in operating performance of SWF targets, shareholder 
activism cannot be completely confirmed. Furthermore, the differences between private equi-
ty fund targets and their intra-industry rivals demonstrate that these investors purchase firms 
with shareholder activism potential as they pay lower dividends and display poorer PE-Ratios 
and minor managerial ownership. But again, private equity fund managers do not reach im-
provements in operating performance two years after the transactions contradicting active 
monitoring.  
By applying the event study methodology, the study in a second step examines the 
stock market reactions to announcements of these investments and tests with cross-sectional 
regressions which variables have value-increasing or decreasing impact. Moreover, the valua-
tion effects of listed rival firms, which are not targeted by sovereign and private equity funds, 
respectively, are also investigated. The study finds out that short-term market reactions to 
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SWF and private equity fund targets are significantly positive; surprisingly, the abnormal re-
turns to SWF targets are higher compared to private equity fund targets. With regards to SWF 
investments, the analysis detects a positive relationship between the percentage of closely 
held shares and the market reaction supporting again study’s assumption of active shareholder 
strategy. Consistent with the perception and previous studies that private equity funds are ac-
tive and long-term orientated investors, the cross-sectional analysis confirms this assumption 
by, e.g., by positive relation between the percentage of closely held shares and the market 
reaction or the negative relation between EPS and valuation effects. 
The rivals of both groups of institutional investors demonstrate two different results. 
Whereas the rivals of SWF targets react significantly positive to the announcements confirm-
ing the information signaling hypothesis, rivals of private equity fund target companies dis-
play negative CAAR proving the competitive hypothesis. SWF rival portfolio assesses that 
the transactions of SWF shed light on the quality and future potential of the financial services 
industry. As private equity funds are already known as active shareholders amplifying the 
operating performance of targets, rivals fear the consequence of being not competitive any-
more as they could not increase the efficiency. Finally, the long-term impact on the acquisi-
tions of the different ownership claims is examined, both on targets and on rivals. The results 
indicate that the long-lasting abnormal returns to SWF and private equity fund target firms are 
not different from zero for large holding periods consistent with the view of efficient markets, 
but contradicting the theory of active investing. The long-term abnormal returns to both rival 
portfolios, nonetheless, demonstrate positive values verifying the quality of the financial ser-
vices industry in general. Regarding all results, the study analyzes that SWF investments in 
the financial services industry are comparable to private equity fund investments to some ex-
tent and that markets evaluate them positively with a slight proof of active shareholder and 
monitoring potential, which is assumed to improve the operating performance of their targets. 
The remaining study is organized as follows. The next section gives information on 
SWF and private equity funds. The literature review in section 4.3 firstly describes large insti-
tutional blockholders and their impact on corporate governance and, secondly, the valuation 
effects of large blockholder investments on listed rival firms. The following section describes 
the applied methodology and variables and explains the data construction of the sample. In 
the penultimate section, three sets of results are presented: firstly, short-term abnormal stock 
returns; secondly, the regression analysis, and thirdly, long-term abnormal stock returns. The 
study is summarized with a concluding discussion in section 4.6. 
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4.2 Background on Institutional Investors 
4.2.1 Sovereign Wealth Funds – From Stabilization to Wealth Preservation 
Having a history of more than 50 years, SWF funds are not a new phenomenon. Only the ex-
pression “sovereign wealth funds” was created recently (Rozanov (2005)). In the past, they 
were named as stabilization funds, nonrenewable resource funds, trust funds, or with similar 
terms. Due to their heterogeneity reflected by these various earlier descriptions, there is no 
universally agreed definition of sovereign wealth funds, even though many suggestions have 
been made.22 Regardless of their heterogeneity, most sovereign funds share the common ori-
gin of principal purpose to stabilize revenues. In reality, governments whose accumulation of 
excess revenues and reserves are dependent on the value of one underlying commodity have 
engaged in diversification of investments with the goal of stabilizing revenues and securing 
future liquidity needs. As a result, the majority of SWF can be found in oil exporting or oth-
erwise commodity-rich countries symbolizing the first category of SWF. The second category 
of sovereign funds, the non-commodity SWF, originate from general budget or external sur-
pluses as a result of substantial net exports (Kern (2007)). 
As already stated, SWF have a long history with the first commodity funds estab-
lished by Kuwait in 1953. It had the aim of investing surplus oil revenues to reduce the coun-
try’s reliance on its finite oil resources. The number of SWF has grown steadily since then. 
The first SWF wave was in the 1970s as rising oil prices led to increase of oil export reve-
nues. During 1980 and 2000, further SWF, both commodity and non-commodity originated, 
were launched. Since 2000, the SWF industry experienced expansion resulting in more than 
50 nowadays-existing institutions with AuM of approximately USD 3.8 tr estimated by the 
SWF Institute (2009). As illustrated in Table 4.1, SWF assets are highly concentrated: The 
top ten funds account for about 80% of all AuM and approximately 70% of all fund assets are 
held by commodity exporting countries. Moreover, East Asia and the Middle East account 
almost for three quarters of all sovereign fund assets. Without doubt, SWF are large players 
among the new financial power brokers23. In comparison to other types of institutional inves-
tors, Maslakovic (2009) assesses that total sovereign fund assets are twice the aggregate size 
of the hedge fund industry’s USD 1.7 tr AuM and much larger than private equity funds of 
USD 0.7 tr AuM. Yet, SWF are still relatively small in contrast to pension funds (USD 25 tr 
                                                 
22  Compare, for example, the different definition of SWF suggested by Aizenman & Glick (2007), Kern (2007), 
Blundell-Wignall, Hu, & Yermo (2008b), and Fernandez & Eschweiler (2008). 
23  Other new financial power brokers are Asian central banks, hedge funds and private equity (Farrell & Lund 
(2007)). 
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AuM) and mutual funds (USD 22 tr AuM) and even smaller when considered in the context 
of the more than USD 160 tr in global financial assets. 
Table 4.1: Overview of Worldwide Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
Note: Data as of December, 2009. 
Source: Own illustration; SWF Institute (http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php). 
# Region Country Fund Name Origin
Assets in 
USD bn
Incep-
tion
1 Middle East UAE - Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Oil 627 1976
2 Developed countries Norway Government Pension Fund – Global Oil 445 1990
3 Middle East Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings Oil 431 n.a.
4 East Asia China SAFE Investment Company Non-Commodity 347,1 n.a.
5 East Asia China China Investment Corporation Non-Commodity 288,8 2007
6 East Asia Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Non-Commodity 247,5 1981
7 Middle East Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority Oil 202,8 1953
8 Other emerging markets Russia National Welfare Fund Oil 168 2008
9 East Asia China National Social Security Fund Non-commodity 146,5 2000
10 East Asia China - Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio Non-Commodity 139,7 1993
11 East Asia Singapore Temasek Holdings Non-Commodity 122 1974
12 Africa Libya Libyan Investment Authority Oil 70 2006
13 Middle East Qatar Qatar Investment Authority Oil 65 2005
14 Developed countries Australia Australian Future Fund Non-Commodity 49,3 2004
15 Africa Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund Oil 47 2000
16 Other emerging markets Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund Oil 38 2000
17 Developed countries Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund Non-Commodity 30,6 2001
18 East Asia Brunei Brunei Investment Agency Oil 30 1983
19 Developed countries France Strategic Investment Fund Non-Commodity 28 2008
20 East Asia South Korea Korea Investment Corporation Non-Commodity 27 2005
21 Developed countries US - Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund Oil 26,7 1976
22 East Asia Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Non-Commodity 25 1993
23 Middle East Iran Oil Stabilisation Fund Oil 23 1999
24 Other emerging markets Chile Social and Economic Stabilization Fund Copper 21,8 1985
25 Middle East UAE - Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai Oil 19,6 2006
26 Middle East UAE - Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company Oil 14,7 2002
27 Middle East Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company Oil 14 2006
28 Middle East UAE - Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment Company Oil 14 1984
29 Developed countries Canada Alberta's Heritage Fund Oil 13,8 1976
30 Other emerging markets Azerbaijan State Oil Fund Oil 13,4 1999
31 Developed countries US - New Mexico New Mexico State Investment Office Trust Non-Commodity 12,9 1958
32 Developed countries New Zealand New Zealand Superannuation Fund Non-Commodity 11,4 2003
33 Africa Nigeria Excess Crude Account Oil 9,4 2004
34 Other emerging markets Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil Non-commodity 8,6 2009
35 Middle East Oman State General Reserve Fund Oil & Gas 8,2 1980
36 Africa Botswana Pula Fund Diamonds & Minerals 6,9 1996
37 Middle East Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund Oil 5,3 2008
38 East Asia China China-Africa Development Fund Non-Commodity 5 2007
39 East Asia East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund Oil & Gas 5 2005
40 Developed countries US - Wyoming Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund Minerals 3,6 1974
41 Africa Trinidad & Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund Oil 2,9 2000
42 Middle East UAE - Ras Al Khaimah RAK Investment Authority Oil 1,2 2005
43 Other emerging markets Venezuela FEM Oil 0,8 1998
44 East Asia Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation Non-Commodity 0,1 2006
45 Other emerging markets Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund Phosphates 0,4 1956
46 East Asia Indonesia Government Investment Unit Non-commodity 0,3 2006
47 Other emerging markets Mauritania National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves Oil & Gas 0,3 2006
48 Middle East UAE - Federal Emirates Investment Authority Oil n.a. 2007
49 Middle East Oman Oman Investment Fund Oil n.a. 2006
50 Middle East UAE - Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Council Oil n.a. 2007
51 Middle East Oman Oman Investment Fund Oil n.a. 2006
52 Middle East U.A.E. - Dubai Dubai World Oil n.a. 2006
Total commodity funds 2328,8
Total non-commodity funds 1489,8
TOTAL 3818,6
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Nevertheless, the very rapid accumulation of reserves in sovereign funds in the last 
decade caused by a combination of trends is impressive. The most relevant ones include 
booming oil prices, but also mounting prices for other raw materials caused by the steady rise 
of production and consumption often related to the fast economic growth of emerging coun-
tries (e.g., China India). Moreover, improved external trading positions and substantial current 
account surpluses in many emerging market countries financed by negative balance of pay-
ments of Western countries (especially of the US) accumulate large stockpiles of international 
reserves of East-Asian exporters. Many of these countries now hold more reserves than 
needed for prudential reasons (Aizenman & Glick (2007)). These enormous wealth transfers 
from most traditional industrial countries to a number of emerging market and developing 
countries are estimated to continue in the years to come and may change SWF relative future 
weight in global capital markets. 
Figure 4.1: Overview of SWF M&A Volumes in USD bn 
 
Source: Own illustration; Dealogic. 
Recognizing that actual growth rates are going to be extremely sensitive to overall 
macroeconomic factors, in particular the oil price, Kern (2008) supposes that SWF assets will 
continue to grow around an average annual rate of 15% in the next years increasing global 
SWF assets to USD 4.7 tr by 2010 and almost to USD 10 tr by 2015. This massive growth of 
reserves, in turn, is linked to other trends. Compared to earlier behavior following a long-
term, conservative investment strategy and investing foreign exchange surpluses in treasury 
notes and deposits in international banks of the industrialized world, SWF start to have a de-
sire to seek higher returns looking for new investment options (Shediac & Samman (2009)). 
In addition to that, SWF cross-border investments are supported by alterations of the global 
financial system incorporating substantial elimination of restrictions on international capital 
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flows, increased global integration, technical innovation, recognition that diversification con-
tributes to increased investment returns, and loss of “home bias” in investment decisions 
(Truman (2007)). Hence, this fast accumulation of reserves coupled with a swelling appetite 
for returns has led to a dramatic increase in the rate of acquisitions as shown in Figure 4.1. 
Attributable to the actual volume of SWF assets, estimated future growth, and the as-
cending rate of equity stake purchases in Western companies, different concerns over the mo-
tives and operating style of SWF arise. Since governments control SWF, critics have been 
concerned that their investment strategies may be politically motivated and potentially con-
flict with the national interests of the countries in which they invest. Some industrialized 
countries question why they should privatize state-owned enterprises only to see them 
snapped up by foreign government entities. This so-called “state capitalism” may provoke 
financial protectionism in recipient countries having negative impact on the free flow of capi-
tal worldwide (Lyons (2007)). Moreover, the acquisitions of even partial ownership raise 
fears that SWF may not make investments with the commercial intention of maximizing re-
turns but rather abuse such investments as cover for both political and industrial espionage or 
as an instrument of the sovereign government owner’s geo-strategic interests. Especially the 
establishment of SWF by strategically important countries, such as China and Russia, are in 
the center of these worries and raise national security issues such as giving foreign govern-
ment control or access to defense-related technologies (Fernandez & Eschweiler (2008)). In 
addition, since SWF are generally not subject to the disclosure standards that apply to regu-
lated investors, the worry is that this lack of transparency leaves little insight of their motives 
and portfolios. This concern is amplified by the assumptions that SWF may have lower costs 
of capital than private sector competitors, or may have access to asymmetric information and 
intelligence leading to a distortion of competition (Miracky, Dyer, Fisher, Goldner, Lagarde, 
& Piedrahita (2008)). All these fears and concerns were even stoked by SWF high-profile 
investments in developed countries’ financial institutions during the credit crunch of 2007 and 
2008 raising unease about the desirability of these investments. 
Regrettably, the recent debate on SWF investments pays much less attention to the 
benefits of their investments and the constructive role that SWF can play. In the long-term, 
interlocking, cross-border investments contribute to international peace and stability. Espe-
cially, in times of recent financial turmoil, SWF contributed needed liquidity when investment 
targets, in particular financial institutions, were facing considerable distress and alternative 
sources of funding and capitalization were sparse. SWF behave as constructive and responsi-
ble market participants making an important contribution to the global financial system. 
Moreover, financial stability has been identified as a central policy issues to SWF. Sovereign 
funds are financial investors whose liquidity and solvency have to be managed prudently in 
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order to meet their objectives of long-term profitability. Hence, SWF investments can have of 
stabilizing impact on firm’s share price. Moreover, as government-owned investment vehicle, 
SWF are unlikely to engage in speculative activities and largely devoid of highly leveraged 
positions and stringent capital requirements. Instead, risk management will be high on their 
agenda and be reflected in well-diversified portfolios. Combined with their higher return tar-
gets, this means that SWF are likely to be stable providers of long-term risk capital. Indeed, 
SWF have not been seen following the mainstream and compounding volatility in the current 
market crisis. Therefore, SWF are rather anchor investors with stabilizing effects in times of 
elevated uncertainty, strengthening the capital base of the targets and providing stable long-
term risk capital and important positive signals to other investors. Moreover, as long-term 
investors, they inject further needed capital in time of crisis (Kern (2008)). 
Although the concerns of recipient countries are comprehensible, due to their well-
performing track record and long-term investment outlook, SWF can be perceived as a value-
investing shareholder equally comparable to other types of institutional investors, especially 
to private equity funds. Attributable to the recent experience of substantial declines in their 
investment valuation but their still vast pool of assets, sovereign funds are predicted to be 
important participants in shaping the future of global finance, become more active and exert 
more influence on target’s strategy and corporate policy to optimize their returns.24 
4.2.2 Private Equity Funds – Significant Market for Corporate Finance 
Private equity funds are composed of two main types of investments: leveraged buyout (LBO) 
and venture capital (VC). The first and main type of private equity, LBO, which is in the cen-
ter of attention in this analysis, usually purchases stakes of mature companies with steady free 
cash flows.25 These cash flows are essential for the repayment of debt, which has been used 
for the acquisition. To amplify the economic value of the acquired companies, they are often 
restructured or strategically repositioned. Then, after certain holding period, target firms will 
be sold by the private equity fund. The other category of private equity funds, VC, invests in 
companies that are in the first phase of their life cycle and often do not generate profit or even 
sales yet. In contrast to buyout funds emphasizing more on active management of their portfo-
lio companies, VC funds manage them less actively (Kaplan & Strömberg (2009); Phalippou 
(2007)). 
                                                 
24  According to the latest report on SWF issues by State Street in 2009 (Hoguet, Nugée, & Rozanov (2009)), 
exceptional events within the financial market have significantly changed the way these funds perceive their 
own role as very large institutional investors. Sovereign funds are assumed to become more active in the near 
future. The first funds pronouncing this intention of taking an active role within its investment is Temasek. 
25  The terms private equity and leveraged buyout are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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Turning the attention on the origins of private equity, this industry has a relatively 
long history similar to SWF. The roots of private equity as institutional investors date back to 
the time after World War II. At that time, the first investment companies were established in 
the UK and the US (Leopold, Frommann, & Kühr (2003)). Since the origins of the private 
equity industry, four major epochs have taken place marked by three boom and bust cycles. 
The early history of private equity, from 1946 and 1981, was characterized by relatively small 
volumes of private equity investments, rudimentary firm organizations and limited awareness 
of and familiarity with the private equity industry. The introduction of the limited partnership 
construction and the regulatory changes for banks and pension funds characterized the first 
boom and bust cycle from 1982 through 1993. Large institutional investors adopted the role 
of private individuals in investing in private equity (Tolkamp (2007)). The industry became 
generally known when large takeovers were executed by private equity funds. Moreover, this 
period was also shaped by the remarkable increase in leveraged buyout activity financed by 
junk bonds before the near collapse of this industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the 
junk bonds market crashed (Kaplan & Strömberg (2009)). In 1992, the second cycle appeared 
from the latest savings and loan crisis, the real estate market collapse, the insider trading 
scandals, and the recession of the early 1990s. The period witnessed the emergence of more 
institutionalized private equity firms, ultimately culminating in the massive Dot-com bubble 
in 1999 and 2000. After the burst of the internet-bubble, the private equity industry expe-
rienced a few hard years. However, the industry has showed its resilience, mostly based on 
global macro economic growth. Due to the combination of decreasing interest rates, loosening 
lending standards and regulatory changes for publicly traded companies, the third and latest 
cycle (from 2003 through 2007) was the golden age of private equity. Leveraged buyouts 
reach unparalleled size and the institutionalization of private equity firms is exemplified by 
the Blackstone Group’s 2007 initial public offering (Krantz (2006)).  
Today, the private equity industry is considered an important asset class managing 
approximately USD 700 bn of capital and therefore symbolizes the fastest growing market for 
corporate finance and restructuring over the last two decades (Fenn, Liang, & Prowse (1997)). 
LBO funds manage about two-third of the private equity funds capital. Because LBO funds 
use high leverage ratios, their economic impact is even greater than these figures suggest and 
the investment size can be multiplied by three or four times base capital (Phalippou (2007)). 
As seen in Figure 4.2, global leveraged buyout investment has seen considerable expansion in 
the last few years: From 1995 to 2007, the deal volume has grown by approximately 30% on 
average. Generally speaking, private equity funds play more and more an important role as 
financial intermediaries additionally to their significant day-to-day active participation as 
board members and advisors (Metrick & Yasuda (2009)). 
4.2  Background on Institutional Investors 73 
 
Figure 4.2: Global Leveraged Buyout Volumes in USD bn 
 Source: Own illustration; Dealogic. 
The reason why private equity funds need to be successfully active shareholders and 
increase the financial and operating performance of the acquired companies lies within the 
compensation structure of private equity funds and their managers: Managers charge an year-
ly management fee of 2% with carried interest of 20% and a hurdle rate of 8% (Beauchamp 
(2006); Metrick & Yasuda (2009); Phalippou & Gottschalg (2009)).26  
By considering the respective life cycle of private equity funds, the interaction bet-
ween manager compensation and shareholder activism becomes even clearer. The first stage 
is fundraising and seeking new capital from outside investors. Therefore, investors or limited 
partners (LP) sign a legal agreement with the general partner (GP) obligating them to provide 
a certain amount of cash. The GP, on the other hand, is responsible to manage the fund on a 
daily basis, including investment decisions. Nonetheless, after the capital commitment, it is 
not necessarily transferred immediately to the fund. The cumulative capital calls equal zero at 
the time. In the second step, the GP looks initially for investment opportunities in target com-
panies. At this point in time, the fund is not yet generating profits, but it is charging annual 
management fees reflecting the first capital calls of the fund. As soon as the fund begins to 
invest in selected firms, some of the committed capital is called. The third and last step is the 
exit of the private equity fund by divesting their stakes of portfolio companies and distributing 
returns to investors. This process of generating negative revenues in the beginning and high 
expected returns from successful exits at fund end, is well known as private equity’s “J-
                                                 
26  The carry interest is a high incentive for private equity managers and reflects the lion’s share of their com-
pensation. In good years, it can be above USD 100 m. 
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curve”27. As the private equity funds’ carried interest is only calculated on these realized gains 
at the end, the expected returns need to exceed the hurdle rate in order that managers receive 
their respective compensations. Otherwise, if private equity funds do not surpass the hurdle 
rate, they do not generate profits and consequently, the managers earn only their annual fees. 
Hence, private equity managers are assumed to have the skills and preference to become ac-
tive in their portfolio companies and increase operating performance.  
As private equity funds are the group of institutional investors, which are mostly 
comparable to SWF, the impact of SWF shareholder activism on targets’ performance is ex-
pected to be similar to ordinary private equity engagements, although there are concerns that 
SWF could have potentially more politically driven motivations for their investments. 
4.3 Literature Review 
4.3.1 Large Institutional Blockholders and Corporate Governance 
While there is only limited academic research addressing the impact of SWFs on corporate 
governance and shareholder value, there is a large body of research focusing on the effect of 
large institutional shareholders on the latter. In spite of being government-owned, the similari-
ty to private equity investors seems most suitable given that both sovereign and private equity 
fund assets are invested over a long horizon and their investments are made in a limited num-
ber of carefully selected target companies managed by experienced professionals with the 
objective of profit maximization.  
 
Monitoring hypothesis 
Regarded as long-term and large shareholders, SWF and private equity funds are predicted to 
have a positive impact on firm profitability based on the agency-theoretical background pro-
vided by Jensen (1986) and Shleifer & Vishny (1986). According to them, large blockholders 
often use the relationship between shareholder size and corporate governance and thus, en-
hance shareholder value due to a reduction of agency costs. This fact leads to the first hypo-
thesis, the so-called monitoring hypothesis, suggesting that small shareholders lack incentives 
to monitor managerial performance leading to a free-rider problem. The presence of large 
shareholders, however, partly solves this problem and improves monitoring as they are pre-
dicted to have much stronger monitoring incentives and hence, amplify the equity value of 
                                                 
27  The J-curve phenomenon was firstly introduced by Magee (1973). Since then, a large number of studies have 
applied it to various industries. 
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companies through an increase of target firm’s management efficiency and future perfor-
mance. Supporting the monitoring hypothesis, Barclay & Holderness (1991) and Holderness 
& Sheehan (1985), for example, find that stock purchases of large shareholders are typically 
followed by abnormal stock price appreciations and also increased management turnover for 
both purchases by “corporate raiders” and negotiated block trades, respectively, due to their 
active involvement in target firms’ business.  
Nevertheless, large institutional investors do not only have beneficial impacts on 
corporate governance but they may cause costs. Theoretical arguments focus on two main 
sources of costs. A first problem symbolizes the risk that large shareholders force the compa-
ny to act in their own interest and expropriate resources from the firm at the expense of other 
(minority) investors, employees or managers (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny 
(2002)). The theory regarding conflicts of interest and the related agency costs relates to Jen-
sen & Meckling (1976). Secondly, institutional shareholders may reduce firm performance 
either because they do not have adequate monitoring skills or because their objectives conflict 
with shareholder value maximization preventing active monitoring (e.g., Chen et al. (2007); 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985); Gillan & Starks (2000)). 
Applying the monitoring hypothesis with its related costs to private equity funds, the 
engagement of private equity managers in target company’s day-to-day business is an essen-
tial part of their investment strategy. This engagement is even underlined by the fact that pri-
vate equity funds invest only in selected target companies. As a result, private equity funds 
have a higher probability becoming active investors, and this activism seems to have value 
implications. After private equity investors have purchased a large stake in a target company, 
an improvement in management capabilities is often detected. These target firms characteris-
tically undergo certain changes such as divestments of non-core assets, improvement of effi-
ciency, decline in working capital, increase in research and development expenditures, opti-
mization of cash flows, and decline in capital expenditures (Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1990)) 
leading to improved operating profits at the engagement period. Cotter & Peck (2001) and 
Wright & Robbie (1998), for instance, examine that private equity firms provide a degree of 
expertise to target company’s management that will result in more active monitoring. In addi-
tion, private equity investors have been shown to improve post-buyout performance which 
indicates more effective monitoring (e.g., Hogan, Olson, & Richard J. Kish (2001); Kaplan 
(1989); Kaplan & Stein (1993)). This activism also has value implications as previous evi-
dence on the engagement of private equity investors as blockholders indicates that target firm 
shareholders receive substantial positive stock price adjustments in response to the acquisition 
announcement (e.g., Achleitner et al. (2008); A. Klein & Zur (2009)). Moreover, Mietzner & 
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Schweizer (2007) document that private equity investors enhance shareholder value due to a 
reduction of agency costs. 
With regard to state funds’ investments, the empirical studies on SWF investments 
also detect positively stock price reactions around announcement days. However, one analysis 
demonstrates that the investments do not significantly affect target firm growth, profitability 
or governance in the three years following the investment (Kotter & Lel (2008)) whereas 
another even finds negatively long-term returns of SWF investment targets (Bortolotti et al. 
(2009)). Moreover, the study of Dewenter et al. (2009) analyzes the impact of SWF invest-
ments on the values of the companies in which they invest and provide evidence consistent 
with the tradeoff between the monitoring and lobbying benefits versus tunneling and expro-
priation costs of SWFs as blockholders. Moreover, the researchers find that SWFs are often 
active investors. Slightly more than half of the target firms experience one or more events 
indicative of SWF monitoring activity or influence.  
 
Undervaluation hypothesis 
The second hypothesis that may explain the source of value creation to shareholders is the 
undervaluation hypothesis. This theory assumes that block purchases are generally attempted 
by investors who possess either private information about the company and its intrinsic value 
or superior security analysis skills enabling them to ascertain that target firm’s shares are 
temporarily undervalued (Choi (1991)). One of the potential sources for undervaluation is 
financial invisibility occurring when listed firms are small and do not experience sufficient 
coverage in the financial press or from financial analysts in contrast to larger, listed ones. 
Therefore, the main reason for companies going private is the stock market undervaluation 
supported by empirical evidence, for instance, from Andres, Betzer, & Weir (2007) or Mau-
pin, Bidwell, & Ortegren (1984). This invisibility aggravates the trouble of getting accurate 
information to the market about the company’s performance, which amplifies the thin trading 
of its shares. As a result, the management observes that the stock market does not provide an 
accurate fundamental valuation of the firm. Therefore, if there is no other evidence of other 
potential buyers, managers will welcome the share purchase of private equity investors or 
SWF sending a positive sign at the market. 
Moreover, undervaluation makes companies particularly attractive to private equity 
funds because they can bring their expertise to improve the performance of the company. 
Weir, Wright, & Scholes (2008), for instance, analyze that private equity funds – attributable 
to their well-qualified managers and their expertise – are able to identify undervalued firms, 
which suggests that they have private information about the company and its true value. Since 
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SWF are government-owned investment vehicles, they are thought to have also exclusive 
access to private information, especially if the information flows freely between them and 
government’s agencies. Hence, SWF managers would know about alterations in government 
actions or regulations having an effect on firm values before their private sector investment 
management counterparts. This would enable SWF to buy before good news and to sell be-
fore bad news is available to private investors. Nonetheless, the robust empirical validation of 
this hypothesis is rather difficult given the methodological problems to identify exactly a state 
of temporary undervaluation (Holderness & Sheehan (1985); Shome & Singh (1995)).  
Certification hypothesis 
Finally, the certification hypothesis is supposed to influence target’s stock price positively. It 
arises from the expanding literature on reputational signaling, most notably the study by B. 
Klein & Leffler (1981). The researchers demonstrate the circumstances under which a non-
salvageable capital expenditure can serve as a successful connection to guarantee the quality 
of a firm’s products. Customers recognize this kind of investments as a commitment to prod-
uct quality. Their willingness to pay a premium over product cost for the commitment pro-
vides a stream of quasi-rents on the initial investment, which will only persist to be paid as 
long as the firm does not cheat. Their reputational capital reasoning is extended to several 
studies about financial markets. One of the most important works is the study by Booth & 
Smith II (1986), who model the certification role provided by investment bankers to reduce 
information asymmetry in new equity offerings. Beatty & Ritter (1986), Carter & Manaster 
(1990), J. Johnson & Miller (1988), and Titman & Trueman (1986) examine how auditors and 
underwriter help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering 
(IPO) process. Megginson & Weiss (1991) find that the initial return to venture-capital-
backed IPOs is lower than that of non-venture-capital-backed IPOs. They suggest that the 
presence of large block shareholders may provide a complement to underwriter reputation in 
reducing IPO uncertainty. Hertzel & Smith II (1993) use certification as the motivation for 
private placements and analyze that private placement discounts are strongly related to their 
proxies for information cost. Informed investors put their stamp of approval on the market’s 
valuation of the firm by agreeing to purchase a large block of stock. By increasing stock pri-
ces, hence, buyers are compensated for information production and value certification.  
Applying the previous empirical evidence to SWF and private equity investors, it can 
be assumed that their investments certify the quality of targets and their respective future 
positive cash flows. Since both institutional investors have superior analysis skills, they are 
enabled to identify valuable targets. Moreover, they are assumed to possess private informa-
tion about the targets. All the mentioned factors may signal to the market that the target is a 
valuable investment certified by the actions of SWF and private equity funds. 
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Based on the three hypotheses and previous empirical studies, the study theorizes 
positive short-term valuation effects on listed financial services targets of SWF and private 
equity funds. Hereby, it is predicted that the monitoring hypothesis is confirmed as it empha-
sizes extensively the assumed activities of SWF and private equity funds. In the long-run, it is 
assumed that positive abnormal returns for private equity targets generated by active monitor-
ing. Although previous studies according to long-term effects for SWF targets are not conclu-
sive or even negative, the study expects positive long-term effects on SWF targets through 
shareholder activism as the study focus on the financial services industry targeted majorita-
rianly by SWF. As the experiences of SWF management in this industry are most evolved, it 
is predicted them to be value-increasing. Moreover, the study presumes that the positive valu-
ation effects on private equity targets are more profound compared to SWF targets due to the 
fact that private equity investors are known to be even more active as SWF and that the latter 
are supposed getting more active only recently.28  
4.3.2 Valuation Effects of Large Blockholder Investments on Listed Rival Intra-Industry 
Firms 
SWF and private equity investors generate the overwhelming part of their profits when they 
divest their stakes. This profit structure motivates them to increase target firms’ profitability 
and equity value as already addressed shortly in the previous chapter. Against this back-
ground, the engagements of these blockholders are assumed to affect not only target compa-
nies and their industry wide competition, but they also might have an effect on the respective 
industry as a whole. Therefore, announcements of this particular change in ownership struc-
ture should generate market valuation effects on industry rival firms. The assumptions find 
theoretical foundations through two hypotheses explained briefly in the following. 
 
Information signaling hypothesis 
Unlike inter-firm M&A transactions, acquisitions of stakes by outside blockholders do not 
involve consolidation of separate operating firms. Therefore, changes in the value of rival 
companies induced by new blockholders are neither due to the effect of increased market 
power (or collusion) nor to the demonstration of synergies associated with a consolidation of 
operating firms as firstly proposed by Eckbo (1983) or Stillman (1983). The valuation effects 
on rivals are rather explained by the so-called information signaling hypothesis asserting that 
                                                 
28   According to the newest report on SWF issues by State Street in 2009 (Hoguet et al. (2009)), exceptional 
events within the financial market have significantly changed the way these funds perceive their own role as 
very large institutional investors. Sovereign funds are assumed to become more active in the near future. The 
first funds pronouncing this intention of taking an active role within its investment is Temasek. 
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large bidding shareholders possess private, valuable information about targets. It argues that if 
the financial market perceives the elements of this private information rather industry-wide 
than firm-specific, the value of the target firm’s horizontal rivals should change in response to 
the announcement of ownership structure change. Applying this hypothesis in going-private 
transactions, Slovin, Sushka, & Bendeck (1991) analyze that these bids generate significantly 
positive valuation effects for industry rivals of target firms. They find that these announce-
ments generate statistically significant positive intra-industry effects with a two-day average 
excess return of +1.3%. In this regard, the researchers identify three potential factors deter-
mining these positive returns. First, bids of new large blockholders may disclose private in-
formation about expected future cash flows in the respective industry; secondly, rivals may be 
more likely to turn into targets of future bids; and thirdly, the market may recognize the agen-
cy problem as industry-wide and force rival firm managements to improve company’s per-
formance to avoid becoming the next target. 
 
Competitive hypothesis 
In contrast to the above statements, the competitive hypothesis supposes that acquisitions of 
SWF and private equity funds may have an adverse effect on target firm rivals’ future perfor-
mance supported by two main factors. First, if these new blockholders obtain a sufficient level 
of voting power in a target company, they often seek to change the board of directors and 
force management to pursue strategic alternatives (A. Klein & Zur (2009)). Secondly, by 
changing target firm’s objective functions toward higher shareholder wealth, the way in 
which companies compete may change significantly (e.g., F. Allen, Carletti, & Marquez 
(2008); Boyson & Mooradian (2007)) leading to a more competitive environment and distinct 
consequences for peers. Target firm managers extending their current market share in the re-
spective industry and/or improving firm efficiency adversely affect rivals reducing their pro-
fits as it becomes more difficult for them to maintain their level of performance. As a result, 
large blockholder investments can result in negative excess returns for rival firms.  
The recent study of Mietzner & Schweizer (2008) tests the two hypotheses by inves-
tigating the valuation effects of industry rivals to firms targeted by hedge funds and private 
equity investors. The short-term market reactions to private equity target rivals are substan-
tially positive confirming the information signaling hypothesis. Considering long-run returns, 
private equity portfolio experiences negative results on average being in line with the compet-
itive hypothesis. Since the study is analyzing SWF and private equity investments in the fi-
nancial services industry supposing comparability between these two groups of institutional 
investors, the study supposes that valuation effect on rivals are positive in the short-term and 
80 4  Study 2: Stock Price Impact of Large Blockholder Investments 
 
negative in the long-term supporting, on the one hand the information signaling and on the 
other hand the competitive hypothesis. 
4.4 Data Sample and Methodology 
4.4.1 Sample Construction 
For the analysis, it is needed to construct four different data panels composed of SWF and 
private equity fund financial services industry targets and their respective intra-industry rival 
companies. Therefore, the study reverts to three primary databases: (1) Thomson Financial 
SDC database provides the analyzed M&A transactions; (2) Thomson Financial DataStream 
offers time series data, i.e., daily closing prices29 for all firms and country industry index; and 
(3) Thomson Financial Worldscope delivers accounting data. 
4.4.1.1 Indentifying SWF Financial Services Industry Targets 
The sample of relevant SWF mergers and acquisitions in the international financial services 
industry is drawn from the Thomson Financial Mergers and Acquisition database. It includes 
SWF transactions announced between January 1st, 1990 and August 31st, 2009 indicated by 
the SWF involvement flag. In a second step, all SWF names specified in Balding (2008), 
Bortolotti et al. (2009), Kern (2007), and Truman (2008) dedicated websites are assembled.30 
Afterwards, the announcement days are extracted for all transactions conducted by the rele-
vant SWF from the database and the two samples are matched. The total number of SWF 
deals is reduced to yield only those transactions meeting the following criteria: 
 Transactions have been closed – the deal status hence is “completed”. 
 SWF hold 50% or less of the total shares of the target company after acquisition – 
Thus, no change of corporate control. 
 Only transactions with target primary SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 
representing the financial services industry are considered. 
                                                 
29  To reflect the influence of dividend payments as well as share issuances or repurchases on return data, the 
adjusted stock prices denoted by date type “RI” were selected. 
30  Like Bortolotti et al. (2009) the study employs the http://www.swfinstitute.org website to identify fund 
names and obtain suggestions for additions, deletions and transaction information. 
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 All SIC codes, which are related to the real estate and insurance sector, are eliminat-
ed.31  
Since SWF can make use of special purpose vehicles (SPV), which might not be 
cited in public sources, the ultimate parent CUSIP for each state fund is identified. All trans-
actions associated with the ultimate parent CUSIP are extracted again from the Thomson Fi-
nancial Mergers and Acquisition database. After searching LexisNexis, this sample is 
matched with the sample described above in order to obtain suggestions for additions, dele-
tions, and transaction information.  
The described selection criteria and steps result in a final sample of 46 SWF transac-
tions in the international financial services industry between November 1st, 1996 and January 
31st, 2009, whose historical stock prices are available in DataStream for the upcoming analy-
sis. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the frequency distribution over time and reveals a 
strong concentration of events between the years 2005 and 2008. 
Table 4.2: Overview of SWF Transaction Sample – Descriptive Statistics 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
a Only one month has been considered. 
                                                 
31 Specifically, all transactions with SIC codes for life insurance (6311), accident and health insurance (6321), 
hospital and medical service plans (6324), fire, marine and casualty insurance (6331), surety insurance 
(6351), title insurance (6361), insurance carriers (6399), insurance agents, brokers and service (6411), real 
estate operators and lessors (6510), operators of nonresidential buildings (6512) and apartment buildings 
(6513), lessors of real property (6519), real estate agents and managers (6531), real estate dealers (6532), 
land subdividers and developers, except cemeteries (6552), and real estate investment trusts (6798) are ex-
cluded. 
Africa Asia Australia Europe
North 
America
1996 1 2,2 122,8 1
1997 1 2,2 n.a. 1
1998 3 6,5 1.652,4 2 1
1999 1 2,2 10,7 1
2002 2 4,3 35,7 2
2003 2 4,3 n.a. 2
2004 2 4,3 n.a. 2
2005 4 8,7 672,0 4
2006 4 8,7 409,6 2 2
2007 18 39,1 3.166,8 1 6 7 4
2008 7 15,2 2.645,5 4 3
2009
a 1 2,2 70,5 1
Total 46 100,0 1.888,4 1 23 1 14 7
Acquirer Region - Number of Transactions
Year
Trans-
actions
Average value 
(USD m)
%
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The average transaction value ranges from USD 10.7 m to USD 3,166.8 m, whereas 
the later is mainly driven by the acquisitions of the Swiss UBS (USD 9.8 bn) and the US 
banks Citigroup (USD 7.5 bn), Merrill Lynch (USD 4.4 bn), and Morgan Stanley (USD 5.0 
bn). Furthermore, the transaction of UBS represents the largest transaction volume in the 
sample. Moreover, although Asian financial services companies are targeted more frequently 
than North American targets (23 deals vs. 7 deals), the invested amount of USD in North 
America is higher than in Asia reflecting once again the latest liquidity injection of SWF to 
the crisis shaken US financial services industry. 
4.4.1.2 Indentifying Private Equity Financial Services Industry Targets 
Similar to the identification of SWF targets, the Thomson Financial Mergers and Acquisition 
database provides the transaction information for private equity funds’ target companies over 
a period from January 1st, 1990 to August 31st, 2009. The total number of private equity fund 
deals is reduced to yield only those transactions meeting the following criteria. 
 Transactions with acquirer primary SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 representing 
the financial services industry are extracted. 
 Acquirers from the banking or insurance industry are excluded. 
 Acquirers must be a private equity fund or an appropriate SPV, i.e., a company fully 
controlled by a private equity fund with an objective to purchase another company. 
 Transactions have been closed – the deal status hence is “completed”. 
 Private equity funds hold 50% or less of the total shares of the target company after 
acquisition – Thus, no change of corporate control. 
 Only transactions with target primary SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 
representing the financial services industry are considered. 
 All SIC codes, which are related to the real estate and insurance sector, are eliminat-
ed.32 
                                                 
32 Specifically, all transactions with SIC codes for life insurance (6311), accident and health insurance (6321), 
hospital and medical service plans (6324), fire, marine and casualty insurance (6331), surety insurance 
(6351), title insurance (6361), insurance carriers (6399), insurance agents, brokers and service (6411), real 
estate operators and lessors (6510), operators of nonresidential buildings (6512) and apartment buildings 
(6513), lessors of real property (6519), real estate agents and managers (6531), real estate dealers (6532), 
land subdividers and developers, except cemeteries (6552), and real estate investment trusts (6798) are ex-
cluded. 
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Compared to SWF, SPV of private equity funds are not always classified with 6000-
6999 SIC codes. Consequently, the deal synopsis is searched for private equity funds that own 
a SPV, or for terms like LBO to classify a transaction as a private equity deal. The purchases 
of subsidiaries of publicly listed companies are included as the analysis predicts that the reac-
tion of the market to the announcement of selling the business unit to a private equity investor 
also affect the parent company. The sample is validated by conducting a search on LexisNexis 
for additions, deletions, and transaction information. 
After the execution of the explained selection criteria and steps, the study is left with 
a final sample of 68 private equity funds’ deals within the financial services industry between 
October 1st, 1990 and June 30th, 2009, whose historical stock prices are available in Data-
Stream for the upcoming analysis. Table 4.3 gives a summary of the recognized transactions. 
Table 4.3: Overview of Private Equity Fund Transaction Sample – Descriptive Statistics 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
a Only three months have been considered. 
b Only six months have been considered. 
The average transaction value ranges from USD 1.3 m to USD 907.8 m, whereas the 
later is mainly driven by the acquisitions of the US bank Washington Mutual (USD 2.0 bn) 
Africa Asia Australia Europe
Latin 
America
North 
America
1990
a 1 1,5 19,7 1
1992 1 1,5 6,9 1
1993 1 1,5 n.a. 1
1994 1 1,5 n.a. 1
1995 2 2,9 92,8 1 1
1996 1 1,5 n.a. 1
1997 2 2,9 11,5 1 1
1998 3 4,4 328,8 1 2
1999 5 7,4 124,4 3 1 1
2000 5 7,4 337,4 4 1
2001 3 4,4 197,4 2 1
2002 2 2,9 11,1 1 1
2003 1 1,5 1,3 1
2004 5 7,4 61,1 1 1 2 1
2005 8 11,8 53,1 5 1 1 1
2006 8 11,8 416,5 1 5 1 1
2007 7 10,3 408,4 1 2 1 3
2008 10 14,7 907,8 1 4 5
2009
b 2 2,9 114,5 2
Total 68 100,0 298,5 3 15 7 27 4 12
Acquirer Region - Number of Transactions
Year
Trans-
actions
%
Average value 
(USD m)
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and asset manager Legg Mason (USD 1.3 bn). The first transaction represents the largest 
transaction volume in the whole transaction sample. Moreover, European financial services 
companies are in the center of attention of private equity funds with 27 minority stake pur-
chases followed by Asian targets (15 deals). Nonetheless, similar to SWF transactions, the 
deals in North America represent the ones with the highest deal value. The average deal vo-
lume of private equity funds is significantly smaller compared to the mean volume of SWF 
(USD 298.5 m vs. USD 1,888.4 m) symbolizing the sheer financial firepower of SWF.  
4.4.1.3 Indentifying Intra-industry Rivals 
After the identification of the transactions concerning SWF and private equity fund targets, 
the respective rival portfolios are constructed. In a first step, the study creates these portfolios 
by identifying all firms listed on each country’s major stock exchange(s) during the sample 
period with the same three-digit INDG industrial classification code and matching them with 
the relevant SWF and private equity fund target firms. In an ideal world, the study would 
classify a rival portfolio sample for each company based on country, industry, size33 and mar-
ket-to-book ratio. Since some acquisitions by SWF and private equity funds occur in less de-
veloped capital markets, however, some targets have only an unsatisfying amount of potential 
rivals accessible. After considering the reduction of the sample comprising only companies of 
mature and large economies in order to insure a sufficient number of rivals within the match-
ing portfolios, it is decided to form the rival portfolios based only on country and industry 
affiliation. Otherwise, this would result in a deduction of a significant part of the samples. 
Moreover, rivals that themselves became targets over the sample period were removed. 
Therefore, the study is left with a rival universe of 336 intra-industry rival companies 
between 1990 and 2009 subdivided in 164 rivals to SWF targets from 1996 to 2009 and 172 
rivals to private equity funds’ targets from 1990 to 2009. Table 4.4 provides an overview of 
the regional distribution of competing firms, which constitutes the rival portfolios of SWF and 
private equity fund targets, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33  By firm size, market capitalization of each firm is meant. 
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Table 4.4: Overview of SWF and Private Equity Fund Rival Samples 
 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC; Thomson Financial Worldscope. 
4.4.2 Variables 
The next section briefly describes target firm, country, SWF and private equity fund characte-
ristics, which are used in the cross-sectional analysis to test regarding their impact on share-
holder wealth creation. These characteristics are classified into six categories and presented in 
Table 4.5. 
SWF
Private Equity 
Funds
Continent Rival Country
# of Rival 
Firms
# of Rival 
Firms
Africa Egypt 1 - 1
Asia Hong Kong 9 -
India 20 8
Japan - 37
Malaysia 16 -
Pakistan 10 -
The Philippines - 6
Singapore 3 -
South Korea 8 3
Taiwan 4 8
Thailand 6 - 138
Australia Australia 4 14 18
Europe Austria - 2
Belgium - 7
France - 10
Germany - 18
Greece 18 -
The Netherlands - 1
Russian Fed - 2
Spain - 1
Sweden 9 3
Switzerland 2 5
Turkey - 3
United Kingdom 22 12 115
North America United States 32 32 64
164 172 336Total
Total
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1. Profitability and Cost Efficiency: The effect of SWF and private equity fund tar-
gets’ financial performance is observed by analyzing Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Eq-
uity (ROE), Dividend Payout per Share, Dividend Yield, Earnings per Share (EPS), Market-
to-Book-Ratio, Price-Earnings-Ratio (PE-Ratio), and Costs-Assets-Ratio (CA-Ratio). ROA is 
the net income before preferred dividends and capitalized interest expense on debt-interest 
over lagged total assets. ROE is the net income before preferred dividends and capitalized 
interest expense on debt-interest over total equity. Dividend payout per share is calculated as 
dividends per share to earnings per share. The dividend yield is quantified as dividends per 
share divided by the market value of the firm at the end of the previous year. EPS represent 
the earnings for entire the fiscal year of the company divided by average outstanding shares 
for the entire fiscal year. As a valuation benchmark, the study uses the market-to-book ratio 
calculated by the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. A low market-
to-book ratio may indicate that a company is undervalued. Moreover, the PE-Ratio defined as 
the ratio of price per share at year end to earnings per share is analyzed. The cost efficiency is 
determined by CA-Ratio dividing total operating cost for the entire fiscal year by total assets.  
2. Financial Policy: The study applies three characteristics to control for firm leve-
rage and financial policy: Leverage Ratio, Total Debt/Total Assets, and Equity % Total Capi-
tal, which are three measures of long-term financial distress. Leverage ratio is defined by the 
division of book value of total debt by book value of total equity. Total Debt/Total Assets is 
calculated as book value of total debt over the book value of total assets. Equity % Total 
Capital is defined as book value of equity over total capital. Both variables are measures of 
long-term financial distress. 
3. Firm Characteristics: Three variables are used describing target companies. Firm 
size is defined by the natural logarithm of a company’s Total Assets and its Market Capitali-
zation. The variable % Closely Held Shares is calculated by the number of closely held shares 
divided by the number of outstanding common shares and serves as a measure for managerial 
ownership. As already stated in previous chapters, it is generally believed that managerial 
ownership could attenuate the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership 
and control (Jensen & Meckling (1976)). 
4. Target Country-Specific Factors: It is assumed that the level of uncertainty in 
cross-border investments is lower in countries with higher economic freedom. In order to 
quantify these impacts, the analysis applies the Index of Economic Freedom for each country 
of the sample issued by the Heritage Foundation34. This index aggregates the score of ten 
economic categories, while higher scores indicate a higher degree of economic freedom. Ad-
                                                 
34  Refer to the organization’s website http://www.heritage.org. 
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ditionally to a country’s total score, the study also evaluates the contract enforceability (Prop-
erty Rights) and the financial industry’s independence from government control (Financial 
Freedom). 
Table 4.5: Definition of Independent Variables 
 
Source: Accounting data – Thomson Financial Worldscope; Freedom of Market, Property Rights, and Financial 
Freedom – Heritage Foundation 2009; SWF Structure, Behavior, Accountability and Transparency, and Gover-
nance – Truman (2008). 
Note: Per December 31 of the year prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
 
Description Definition
Profitability and Cost Efficiency
Var1: ROA Return on assets
Var2: ROE Return on equity
Var3: Dividend Payout per Share Dividends per share over earnings per share
Var4: Dividend Yield Dividends per share over market price-year end times 100
Var5: EPS Total earnings over number of shares outstanding
Var6: Market-to-Book-Ratio Market price-year end over book value per share
Var7: PE-Ratio Market price-pear end over earnings per share
Var8: CA-Ratio Total operating expenses over total assets
Financial Policy
Var9: Leverage Ratio Total debt over total common equity
Var10: Total Debt/Total Assets Total debt over total assets
Var11: Equity % Total Capital Common equity over total capital times 100
Firm Characteristics
Var12: Total Assets Value of a company’s book assets
Var13: Market Capitalization Value of a company’s total shares at year end
Var14: % Colsely Held Shares Number of closely held shares over common shares outstanding times 100
Target country-specific factors
Var15: Freedom of target market Index of Economic Freedom: Low value for repressed economies and high value for 
free economies
Var16: Property Rights Index of the contract enforceability
Var17: Financial Freedom Index of financial industry’s independence
SWF and Private Equity Funds Characteristics
Var18: SWF Structure
Var19: SWF Behavior
Var20: SWF Accountability and 
Transparency
Var21: SWF Governance
Var22: Reputation Binary dummy variable: 1 for private equity investors larger than USD 5 bn, 0 otherwise
Deal-specific factors
Var23: Time Effects 1 Binary dummy variable: 1 whether acquistion took place in the period between 2001 
and 2009, 0 otherwise
Var24: Time Effects 2 Binary dummy variable: 1 whether acquistion took place in the latest financial crisis 
(July 2007 till 2009), 0 otherwise
Var25: Local Effects Binary dummy variable: 1 when transactions occured in Europe or North America, 0 
otherwise
Higher scores for every index indicate a higher degree of transparency, independence 
from the government and return related investment activities.
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5. Sovereign Wealth Fund and Private Equity Funds Characteristics: To describe 
SWF, Truman (2008), designs various indices, which are related to SWF Structure, Behavior, 
Accountability and Transparency, and Governance.35 Generally, higher scores for every index 
of Truman (2008) indicate a higher degree of transparency, independence from the govern-
ment and return related investment activities. For private equity funds, the study examines the 
extent to which the Reputation of the private equity investor has an influence on the wealth 
effects of private equity announcements. Reputation is defined as a binary dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if the private equity investor belongs to the largest private equity investors 
in the world (measured as having capital invested larger than USD 5 bn) and 0 otherwise.  
6. Deal-Specific Factors: Measuring Time Effects, the study controls with two binary 
dummy variables: The first tests for whether the acquisition took place in the period between 
2001 and 2009, where most of the partial acquisitions occurred and the second examines 
whether the acquisition occurred during the latest financial crisis starting in July 2007 till 
2009. Local Effects are considered by allocating a binary dummy variable with the value of 1 
if the transaction occurred in Europe or North America and 0 otherwise. 
4.4.3 Estimation of Valuation Effects 
As mentioned before, the event study methodology is applied to evaluate whether there are 
any short-term abnormal value effects on financial sector targets’ stock prices because of 
blockholder purchases by SWF and private equity funds. Moreover, this study is adopted to 
estimate the valuation effects of these investments on intra-industry rival firms. Because of 
the wide spread application of event studies, there are numerous different methods for the 
individual steps. 
For this study, the event study methodology is pursued relying on the market model 
based approach according to Brown & Warner (1985) and Dodd & Warner (1983). Abnormal 
returns for firm  at date  U
V are estimated as 
 B 
    	
, where 
 is the 
return of the relevant country-specific Datastream industry index on day . Hereby, abnormal 
returns describe the difference between the expected returns and the actual returns observed in 
the market. The market model parameters are estimated over an observation period of 180 
trading days starting at day t-210 to t-31 relative to the announcement date. The study employs 
the announcement date as reported by Thomson Financial and the date is crosschecked using 
press research via Factiva. The event window comprises 61 days: T = [-30;+30] days, where   = 0 determines the announcement day of a transaction. The abnormal returns are summed up 
over 11 event windows, e.g., [-2;+2], [-30;0] etc. to attain CAR for each stock in the sample. 
                                                 
35  Refer for a detailed description of the index components to Truman (2008). 
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Finally, the CAR are aggregated over the stocks and divided by the number of stocks to yield 
the CAAR of the group. This is done for target firms as well as for respective rivals. 
Statistical inferences for the different event-window CAAR are drawn following the 
recommendation of Harrington & David (2007) and applying the test statistics of Boehmer et 
al. (1991).The test statistic z is used to account for the likely difference in cross-sectional re-
turn variance between the estimation period from t-210 to t-31. Furthermore, the study also uses 
the t-statistic suggested by Dodd & Warner (1983) and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic sug-
gested by N. J. Johnson (1978). Tests for difference in means and medians are evaluated using 
the standard t-test statistic and the Wilcoxon rank sum z-score, respectively. A multivariate 
cross-sectional regression analysis is performed to determine the sensitivity of market reac-
tions to transactions and firm-specific characteristics. The dependent variable in this regres-
sion analysis is the cumulative abnormal returns of targets for the interval [-2;+2]. The study 
estimates the t-statistics using White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 
(1980)). 
In order to detect the long-term impact of the acquisition of ownership claims by 
SWF and private equity funds, the study calculates 60-day, 120-day, 240-day, and 480-day 
BHR to measure the performance of target company portfolio according to Brav & Gompers 
(1997) and Loughran & Ritter (1995). In general, buy-and-hold returns are influenced by 
overall market performance. Consequently, the BHAR are estimated using the daily closing 
prices relative to the associated Datastream industry index. The statistical significance of the 
mean and median portfolio return of target and rival firms are evaluated using a standard t-test 
statistic, the skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested by N. J. Johnson (1978), and the Wilcox-
on signed rank z-score.36 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 SWF and Private Equity Fund Target Firm Characteristics 
To understand the impact of SWF and private equity fund ownerships in general, the study 
compares in a first step SWF and private equity fund targets’ financial policy and perfor-
mance two years prior to two years after the announcement with each other. This matching 
procedure should identify similarities and difference between SWF and private equity funds 
targets proving either active monitoring potential or rather portfolio diversification with for-
eign direct listed equity investments like other institutional investors such as pension and mu-
                                                 
36  The applied research methods are described extensively in Chapters 2.3.1 to 2.3.4. 
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tual funds do. In a second step, both SWF and private equity fund targets are matched with 
their respective rival portfolios.  
4.5.1.1 SWF Targets vs. Private Equity Fund Targets 
Appendix 7 reports the average of the firm attributes for companies targeted by SWF as well 
as by private equity funds. In addition, the study applies tests for differences in firms’ 
attributes for t-2, t-1, t0, t+1, and t+2. It can be clearly seen from the table that SWF prefer large, 
cost efficient financial services companies with high dividend payments and yields whereas 
private equity funds focus on smaller firms regarding total assets and market capitalization 
with lower leverage and higher percentage of equity on total capital compared to SWF targets. 
Preferences of SWF for firms distributing high dividends can be driven by the focus 
of these state funds to finance major development projects (Balding (2008)). Moreover, as 
these funds have order to preserve wealth for adjacent generations, their managers need the 
assurance that they get a payback from their investments in form of high dividend payments 
(Kern (2007)). In addition, Dong, Robinson, & Veld (2005) demonstrate that institutional 
investors often prefer dividends because selling the stocks is more expensive than cashing in 
dividends. Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001), moreover, argue that long-term oriented foreign 
investors show a preference for high dividends because cashing in dividends is, at least from a 
tax perspective, advantageous than realizing capital gains. Furthermore, this supposition is 
supported by a preference for firms with high return on equity (apart from year t0) and high 
dividend yields indicating that SWF seek for continuous future payments from their invest-
ments. With regards to targets of private equity funds, dividend payout and yield play a minor 
role as both financial ratios are significantly lower on average matched against SWF targets. 
Private equity funds generate their returns through other actions taken. As seen in Panel II of 
Appendix 7, private equity fund targets demonstrate significantly lower leverage ratios and 
higher percentage of equity on total capital compared to SWF targets. Bearing in mind the 
financial strategy of private equity funds performing LBO by acquiring firms with high 
amount of debt and using their equity of paying back, the respective targets perfectly reflect 
this strategy.  
Moreover, Appendix 7 clearly shows that SWF invest in significantly larger firms 
compared to private equity funds measured by total assets and market capitalization. In this 
context, Helwege, Pirinsky, & Stulz (2007) argue that a negative relationship exists between 
firm size and the level of information asymmetry assuming that larger companies are covered 
by analysts more frequently reducing information asymmetries for outside investors. Due to 
this fact, literature on asymmetric information argues that foreign investors might show a pre-
ference for larger firms with higher information levels (Kang & Stulz (1997)). Therefore, firm 
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size might be the most suitable proxy for firm recognition. As SWF managers need to con-
serve their wealth, they rather invest capital in firms assumed to be safe investments with 
steady cash flows and on which much information are available. This outcome is in line that 
SWF behave like foreign investors which prefer firms with certain characteristics, like size or 
firm recognition (Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001)). Private equity funds, however, invest in 
smaller firms what might have several reasons. Firstly, their financial firepower is not as 
strong as the one of SWF and therefore, they cannot purchase stakes of larger financial ser-
vices companies; e.g., a single private equity fund might have some difficulties to finance a 
USD 10 bn transaction of UBS stakes. Moreover, such investments imply high concentration 
risks for private equity funds. Secondly, by purchasing smaller companies with assumed low-
er analysts’ attention, private equity funds may identify undervalued targets whose value they 
want to boost after investments. The lower market-to-book-ratio, although not significantly 
compared to SWF targets, might support the hypothesis. Thirdly, private equity managers 
may be more experienced and more professional in contrast to the ones of SWF as they dare 
to invest in companies with information asymmetry to outside investors. These managers 
seem to act more risky as SWF managers as they invest in firms with less information availa-
ble. In addition, company size is in general positively correlated with the liquidity in the re-
spective companies stock. Therefore, SWF might also have a preference for liquid stocks and 
private equity funds more for illiquid stocks supporting again the undervaluation hypothesis. 
Interestingly, the percentage of closely held shares reflecting companies’ monitoring 
level of SWF targets is significantly different from the level observed for private equity fund 
targets, indicating that SWF do systematically invest in companies with low monitoring (ma-
nagerial ownership) levels. In fact, this result supports the hypothesis that SWF create value 
by investing in firms with low level of managerial ownership and play an active monitoring 
role in order to reduce agency costs (Jensen & Meckling (1976)). However, the question aris-
es whether SWF could be active blockholder as they invest in very large firms and whether 
their actions are noticeable.37 Private equity funds invest in smaller firms in which sharehold-
er actionism might be easier however they are investing in firms with already high managerial 
ownership. 
Although the profitability ratios of SWF are predominantly higher as the ones of pri-
vate equity fund targets, the study cannot state a significant difference. ROA, ROE, EPS and 
PE-Ratios attest no outstanding performance of SWF targets. This outcome might be nega-
                                                 
37  SWF target firm attributes are fairly stable two years prior to and two years after investment. In unreported 
tables, the study analyzes the impact of SWF ownership by calculating changes between two years prior to 
and two years after the SWF acquisition and find no significant effect. However, if SWF engage in activism 
then improvements in operating performance should follow in the post investment period. 
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tively influenced by the various transactions during the latest financial crisis at which SWF 
bought stakes in distressed European and US financial services firms. Nevertheless, SWF 
investments in financial service companies might be a seal of quality as these targets are large 
and important players with a good track record and which are too big to fail. 
Summarizing, it seems that SWF rather act in their investment behavior more like 
passive, institutional investors seeking for further portfolio diversification with investments in 
foreign public equity. Those investors typically have preferences to invest in large companies 
with high dividend payments and cost-efficiency (Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001); Kang & 
Stulz (1997)). On the other hand, SWF target firms endow with low managerial ownership 
reflecting the possibility of active monitoring. 
4.5.1.2 SWF Targets vs. SWF Rival Portfolio 
As can be seen in Appendix 8, the matching of SWF targets with their rivals of the financial 
services industry confirms the previous outcomes that SWF purchase large firms regarding 
their total assets size and market capitalization. SWF seem to behave like foreign investors 
which have a preference for companies with certain characteristics like firm size and recogni-
tion as they are covered by analysts more regularly reducing information asymmetries and 
providing a clear picture of the company (Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001); Kang & Stulz 
(1997)). Regarding the dividend payments and yields of SWF targets, the analysis demon-
strates on the other hand that the ones of SWF targets are lower compared to rival companies. 
However, the mean differences are not statistically significant. Moreover, state fund targets 
are less cost-efficient as their matched companies as the CA-Ratios of SWF targets are signif-
icantly higher compared to rivals on average. This cost-inefficiency could be proxy for the 
potential future improvement as SWF take an active role in target companies trying to push 
their efficiency to better outcomes.  
Regarding the profitability ratios, the study analyzes that SWF targets are less gainful 
as their rivals. Although mean ROA of SWF targets are still significantly higher than the aver-
age ROA of rivals two years and one year before a transaction, the mean ROA of rivals are 
significantly higher two years after the transactions. Moreover, mean ROE are lower for SWF 
targets for all periods even if without statistical explanatory power. EPS of rivals are higher in 
the periods of one and two years after transactions. Nevertheless PE-Ratio and Market-to-
Book-Ratio is more profound for SWF targets as for the rival portfolios. These rather poor 
performance values of SWF targets might symbolize the investments in distressed targets dur-
ing the most recent crisis. Hereby, SWF appear as responsible market participants providing 
massive liquidity to distressed banks even if these investments do not pay off till now. Many 
SWF investments lost a huge portion of their initial values; e.g., loss of USD 3.8 bn for Sin-
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gapore’s SWF Temasek by investment in Merrill Lynch (Riecke, Hauschild, Benders, & 
Maisch (2010)). This argumentation also fits to the higher leverage and higher portion of debt 
to total assets of SWF targets compared to match industry group. Since many financial servic-
es firms are huge and some of them are under financial distress, taking an elevated portion of 
debt is comprehensible. 
As seen before in the comparison of SWF and private equity fund targets, the percen-
tage of closely held shares of SWF targets is again significantly different from the level ob-
served for rivals. It is demonstrated that SWF might create value by acquiring firms with low 
level of managerial ownership and taking an active part in the every day business of the com-
panies (Jensen & Meckling (1976)). But as beforehand, the study questions again whether 
SWF are active at their very huge targets firms as the study does not detect significant effect 
by analyzing the impact of SWF ownership by calculating changes between two years prior to 
and two after the SWF acquisition.  
4.5.1.3 Private Equity Fund Targets vs. Private Equity Fund Rival Portfolio 
Appendix 9 represents the differences of various ratios and financial figures between private 
equity fund targets and the matched rival portfolio. Since the statistical significance is ex-
pressed less profoundly, the comparison is not as informative as the one between SWF targets 
and their rivals. The study demonstrates that private equity investors target financial services 
firms with lower dividend payments and yields symbolizing that private equity funds are not 
investors that buy targets in order to diversify their portfolio and realize profits from divi-
dends. They rather focus on investments from which they expect repayment after reorganiza-
tion and restructuring. The difference in size of firms is not important to private equity funds 
as both targets and rivals are almost equally large measured in total assets and market capita-
lization. Only the period of two years after transactions, private equity fund targets demon-
strate higher market capitalization as the matched portfolio. This symbolizes that capital mar-
kets evaluate the taken measurements of private equity managers at their targets as successful. 
Taking into consideration the profitability ratios, private equity funds acquire pre-
senting a poorer performance as the matched companies especially before the transactions. 
Differences in ROA, EPS and PE-Ratio are significantly between the two compared groups. It 
is assumed that private equity investors focus on companies demonstrating room for operating 
improvement in the medium- and long-term. Even without statistical significance, the differ-
ence in the CA-Ratio also shows cost inefficiency for private equity targets.  
Moreover, the percentage of closely held shares of private equity fund targets is sig-
nificantly different from the level observed for rivals. Private equity funds acquire firms with 
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lower level of managerial ownership reflecting the possibility of active shareholder monitor-
ing. Combining this assumption with the poor performance of targets before transaction and 
the increasing market capitalization, active blockholder behavior could be confirmed. Howev-
er, by analyzing the impact of private equity fund ownership by calculating changes between 
two years prior to and two after the respective acquisition, the study does not discover any 
significant effect that the operating performance increases significantly.38 
Summarized, the sample of private equity fund targets versus their rivals and SWF il-
lustrates more indication of active monitoring potential. Nonetheless, they also do not provide 
a clear picture of active monitoring as the improvement of operating performance after the 
acquisition fails to appear.  
4.5.2 Short-term Valuation Effects 
4.5.2.1 Short-term Valuation Effects to Intra-Industry Targets 
Previous evidence on the engagement of new institutional investors as blockholders 
indicates that target firm shareholders obtain substantial positive returns in response to the 
announcement. Based on the events identified in the previous chapter, the study proceeds in 
assessing the short-term market reactions of financial services companies in which the SWF 
and private equity funds invest. As shown in Table 4.6, stock price effects for all 114 transac-
tions to financial service industry targets designate significantly positive market reactions. 
The stock price effects for 46 SWF targets are higher as the transactions to private 
equity fund targets as can be seen in Panel I. The CAAR for financial services industry targets 
range from +0.81% at announcement date to +6.94% for the event window [-30;+30], which 
are both significant at the 1% level under the respective test-statistics. The results indicate that 
SWF investments generate positive CAAR during the 30 trading days prior to the announce-
ment of the investment. For example, the aggregated mean abnormal return displays a posi-
tive value of +4.27% over the period [-15;0] with a significance level of 1% for all applied 
test-statistics. Bearing in mind that at announcement day the market reacts only positively 
with +0.81%, it is suggested that the investments are already known to market participants 
several days in advance of the official announcement. Moreover, the positive abnormal re-
turns imply that the market perceives purchases of large blocks of voting rights by SWF in the 
                                                 
38  Private equity target firm attributes are fairly stable two years prior and to two years after investment. In 
unreported tables, the study analyzes the impact of private equity fund ownership by calculating changes be-
tween two years prior to and two years after the private equity fund acquisition and find no significant effect. 
However, if private equity funds engage in activism then improvements in operating performance should fol-
low in the post investment period. 
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financial services industry as value-enhancing in general. Compared to other studies on SWF 
investments, the estimates of the announcement period for the investment sample exceed 
those of Bortolotti et al. (2009), Chhaochharia & Laeven (2009), and Kotter & Lel (2008). 
The first two studies report CAAR of +2.43% and +0.97%, respectively, for a [-2;+2] win-
dow. The third analysis reports average abnormal returns of 0.93% for a [-1, +1] window. All 
applied test statistics certificate statistical significance, mostly at the 1% significance level, 
which underline the hypothesis that SWF as large investors are seen as valuable investors and 
may enhance firm value. However, the study cannot state yet if the positive valuation effects 
are evoked through active monitoring potential of target firm managements or through other 
effects. It could be possible that SWF are seen as anchor investors providing liquidity and 
protect targets from hostile takeovers causing positive valuation effects. 
Table 4.6: CAAR to Intra-Industry Targets 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to targets in the financial services industry. Abnormal 
returns were calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 180 trading 
days prior to the event window [-30;+30]. For the market returns of each country, respective market indices are 
applied. Statistical significance is tested using the cross-sectional test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), the 
test according to Dodd & Warner (1983), and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested by N. J. Johnson 
(1978). Panel I includes SWF events (N = 46) and Panel II covers private equity fund events (N = 68). The last 
two rows report statistical tests for differences between the CAAR of Panel I and Panel II using t-tests for differ-
ences in means and Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the medians. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Turning the attention to the 68 targeted financial services firms by private equity 
funds a comparable picture is apparent. Panel II of Table 4.6 shows significantly positive 
CAAR varying from +0.09% for the interval [-30;+30] to +4.58% for the [-30;0] event win-
dow. Both mean abnormal returns show a 1% significance level according to Dodd & Warn-
er’s z-score. Compared to other studies on private equity funds, the study denotes similar an-
nouncement returns when the acquirer of voting rights is a private equity fund. A. Klein & 
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-30;0] 5,21 1,97 ** 3,33 *** 2,73 *** 4,58 1,73 * 6,42 *** 0,94 0,11 -0,62
[-15;0] 4,27 2,90 *** 5,10 *** 2,92 *** 3,82 1,98 ** 8,20 *** 1,56 0,15 -0,49
[-3;0] 2,30 2,54 ** 6,33 *** 2,46 ** 1,55 2,42 ** 7,11 *** 1,10 0,43 -0,64
[-3;+5] 4,06 2,77 *** 5,77 *** 4,01 *** 0,95 2,75 *** 5,33 *** 0,56 1,45 0,09
[0] 0,81 1,27 5,18 *** 1,07 0,72 1,59 8,27 *** 0,87 0,08 -0,99
[0;+3] 2,61 1,97 ** 5,09 *** 3,01 *** 0,43 1,69 * 4,32 *** 0,41 1,50 0,75
[0;+5] 2,57 1,85 * 4,01 *** 2,76 *** 0,11 1,98 ** 4,10 *** 0,08 1,58 1,01
[-2;+2] 3,80 2,87 *** 7,20 *** 4,24 *** 1,61 2,33 ** 5,66 *** 1,08 1,16 -0,11
[-3;+3] 4,09 2,85 *** 6,67 *** 4,15 *** 1,26 2,53 ** 5,51 *** 0,80 1,38 0,03
[-5;+5] 4,79 2,70 *** 5,37 *** 4,04 *** 1,79 2,76 *** 6,05 *** 0,97 1,29 0,15
[-30;+30] 6,94 2,20 ** 3,05 *** 2,91 *** 0,09 1,30 3,45 *** -0,06 0,93 0,57
z-score z-score
Panel I: SWF transactions (N=46)
Panel II: Private equity fund transactions 
(N=68)
Difference tests
Boehmer
Dodd & 
Warner
Johnson
z-score
Boehmer
Dodd & 
Warner
Johnson t-test
Rank 
Sum 
Test
J-value z-score z-score J-value t-value
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Zur (2009) analyze for the interval [-30;+5] significantly positive abnormal returns of +2.2% 
for US transactions. However, these findings need to be constraint as the acquirers are a mix-
ture of entrepreneurial activists like private investors, venture capitalists and private equity 
funds. Moreover, Achleitner et al. (2008) detect higher CAAR of +14.95% analyzing private 
equity investments in Germany. These studies argue that active monitoring and the possibility 
reducing agency costs can cause substantial positive announcement returns. 
Figure 4.3: CAAR to Intra-Industry Targets 
 
Source: Own calculations and illustration; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
Comparing SWF findings with the abnormal returns of private equity funds, it is dis-
covered that the market reactions for larger event windows are more distinct in absolute 
terms. It looks as if the market participants recognize purchases of large blocks of voting 
rights by SWF as more value enhancing than those by private equity investors supported by 
Figure 4.3 showing positive abnormal returns upon the announcement of a deal with higher 
CAAR to SWF targets compared private equity fund targets. Actually, it is supposed that 
higher CAAR to private equity fund targets as these investors are known for successful re-
structuring and turnarounds of their targets (Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1990)). However, as 
the tests for differences in means and medians detect no meaningful results, the elevated re-
turns to SWF purchased firms are not systematical. The more profound short-term market 
reactions could be a reference to confirmation of the certification hypothesis: SWF invest in 
large financial services companies with good performance in the past and hence, give a seal of 
quality resulting in higher CAAR. 
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4.5.2.2 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Targets’ short-term Valuation Effects 
Next, the study investigates the different variables presented in the previous chapter, which 
might cause the observed positive market reactions of SWF and private equity fund targets. It 
is analyzed whether they are driven either by the probable activism potential associated with 
the amplified monitoring level by the entrance of institutional investors or rather by the fact 
that SWF and private equity funds possess private information of the target or certify the tar-
get’s quality, respectively. Firstly, the study assesses the determinants to SWF transaction 
announcements and in a second step, the ones to private equity funds.  
 
Regression Analysis of SWF Targets’ short-term Valuation Effects 
In order to classify the potential determinants of the possible short-term market reactions, 
various regressions of the 2-day cumulative abnormal returns on respective explanatory va-
riables are performed. Table 4.7 demonstrates that both, a high degree of contract enforceabil-
ity (Property Rights) and financial industry’s independence from government control (Finan-
cial Freedom) increase SWF target shareholders’ wealth around the announcement day. How-
ever, the overall Index of Economic Freedom has no explanatory power. Therefore, a good 
legal framework may serve as a guarantee to investors against expropriation. Therewith, they 
achieve the compensation which has been promised to them (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny (1997)). Hence, larger certification to investors that their investments are 
legally protected will increase their attendance to invest. In general, protection is especially 
required by long-term institutional investors like SWF. For that reason, SWF acquisitions 
signal favorable legal conditions and may indicate that further acquisitions by foreign inves-
tors might follow. Further, recent literature documents a positive relationship between share-
holder protection and agency costs and information asymmetry. 
The study detects a significantly positive relationship between market reaction and 
percentage of closely held shares indicating that positive valuation effects are influenced by 
the activism potential (Model III and Model IV). This positive and significant relation be-
tween the closely held shares and market reaction could be seen as a substitute for monitoring 
and governance mechanisms as CAR are increased by targets with low managerial ownership 
symbolizing monitoring benefits to acquirer. Moreover, since the insignificant coefficients of 
PE-Ratio do not indicate that high valued companies contrasted to their earnings experience 
less pronounced announcement effects, the undervaluation hypothesis is not confirmed (Mod-
el I and Model II). Combining these findings, the perspective of active monitoring is inter-
preted as value enhancing. 
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Additionally, all other profitability and cost efficient ratios do not influence CAR of 
SWF targets. This is indicated by meaningless ROA, ROE, Dividend Payout per Share and 
Yield, Market-to-Book-Ratio, and CA-Ratio. Only the coefficients of EPS are significantly 
positive in Models I and II reflecting that higher EPS have a positive impact on targets’ CAR. 
Nevertheless, these ratios provide inconclusive results neither supporting the monitoring nor 
the undervaluation or the certification hypothesis. 
Regarding the financial policy of SWF targets, the study does not find any relation 
between a target firm’s leverage and the market reaction. Therefore, financial leverage has no 
bearing on the short-term market reaction, indicating that SWFs are not perceived as lender of 
last resort. The other two ratios, Total Debt/ Total Assets and Equity % Total Capital have 
also no meaningful explanatory power. Hence, the results contradict the ones of Kotter & Lel 
(2008) who analyzed evidence that firms with higher default probabilities experience higher 
abnormal returns upon announcement. But they confirm the findings of Dahlquist & Ro-
bertsson (2001) and Kang & Stulz (1997) demonstrating that foreign investors do not prefer 
highly leveraged firms.  
Moreover, target firms’ size has no announcement valuation neither regarding total 
assets nor market capitalization. Although larger firms are more intensively covered by ana-
lysts and monitored by institutional investors and regulators, this extensive observation has no 
meaningful impact. Therefore, it cannot be stated whether the asymmetric information prob-
lem prevails. Additionally, SWF act rather as liquidity provider supporting their large target 
companies by capitalization them during the financial turmoil with (Kotter & Lel (2008)). 
Nonetheless, larger firms might not benefit in the same way as smaller companies from such 
services. 
Like prior research, this study also applies SWF characteristics identified by Truman 
(2008) to explain target firm’s market reactions. Although most of the coefficients are compa-
rable to prior results (e.g., Bortolotti et al. (2009); Kotter & Lel (2008)), Truman’s (2008) 
governance index is of significance at Model III with a negative coefficient. SWFs with high 
scores for the governance index can be characterized as funds operating at arm’s length from 
the government, presumably with an appropriate set of checks and balance. The negative 
coefficient means, however, that SWF targets react positively around announcement if the 
actual investment decisions may not be made exclusively by managers but instead may be 
made by the government or a government-controlled board. 
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Table 4.7: Determinants of the CAR to SWF Targets 
Estimated coefficients are determined using a multivariate regression of the CAR to SWF targets of the financial 
services industry in the five-day event window [-2;+2]a against a number of explanatory variables.b 
 
Source: Own calculations; Thomson Financial Worldscope; Heritage Foundation; Truman (2008).  
Note: Accounting figures are year-end financial figures prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
a  CAR are derived for a sample of 46 SWF transactions in the financial services industry using the market model 
approach in the event study.  
b  For a detailed description of the underlying equation and variables see Chapters 2.3.4 and 4.4.2, respectively. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In the cross-sectional regression this study also analyzes the impact of the target 
country as well as the timing of the transaction finding some evidence that market reactions 
are larger for targets during the recent financial crisis. Barber & Odean (2008) display that 
individual investors prefer to buy stocks that have caught their attention due to, for example, 
CAR [-2;+2]; Estimation Period [t -180 ;t -30 ]
Constant -0,40609 0,00185 -0,09348 0,02096
Profitability and Cost Efficiency
ROA 0,00948 - - -
ROE - -0,00156 - -
Dividend Payout per Share - - 0,00105 -
Dividend Yield - - - 0,00028
EPS 0,01975 * 0,01584 ** -0,03093 -0,02397
Market-to-Book-Ratio -0,00216 0,00897 - -
PE-Ratio 0,00129 -0,00055 - -
CA-Ratio -0,01656 -0,22856 - -
Financial Policy
Leverage 0,00199 -0,00494 - -
Total Debt/Total Assets 0,07879 0,07694 - -
Equity % Total Capital 0,0018 0,00033 - -
Firm Characteristics
Total Assets 0,025668 0,00789 - -
Market Capitalization - - -0,00937 -0,00901
% Closely Held Shares - - 0,00203 * 0,00236 **
Target Country Specific Factors
Index of Economic Freedom -0,00094 -0,00133 - -
Property Rights - - 0,00322 ** -
Financial Freedom - - - 0,00362 **
Sovereign Wealth Fund Characteristics
Structure - - - -0,03785
Behavior - - -0,05584 -
Accountability and Transparency - - - -0,00501
Governance - - -0,0403 * -
Deal Specific Factors
Transaction after 2000 0,06276 - -
Financial Crisis - 0,06406 ** - -
European Transaction -0,0266 0,0136 - -
U.S. Transaction -0,16365 ** -0,12118 ** - -
Number of Observations 36 35 39 27
Adj. R
2
0,258 ** 0,351 *** 0,235 ** 0,321 ***
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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increased media coverage, abnormal trading volume, or high return. Since recent transactions 
by SWF generate huge media coverage during the financial crisis, this dummy can be a proxy 
for transaction recognition. However, the positive valuation during crisis only accounts for 
targets outside the US as these transactions cause negative valuation effects around an-
nouncements, both during financial crisis and transactions after 2000.  
 
Regression Analysis of Private Equity Fund Targets’ short-term Valuation Effects 
The study also performs various regressions of the 2-day cumulative abnormal returns on re-
spective explanatory variables to determine explanatory power for private equity fund targets. 
Table 4.8 demonstrates that neither the overall Index of Economic Freedom nor the two sub-
indices Property Rights and Financial Freedom influence private equity fund target share-
holders’ wealth positively two day prior and two days after announcement. Different from 
SWF targets, a good legal framework as guarantee to investors against expropriation plays no 
meaningful role evaluating CAR. Therefore, private equity funds also invest even if the legal 
protection is not yet matured.  
Equally to SWF targets’ valuation effects, the findings demonstrate significantly pos-
itive relations between market reaction and percentage of closely held shares pointing out that 
the market recognizes the activism potential exercised by private equity managers (Model III 
and Model IV). Due to these positive coefficients of the variable closely held shares, it is as-
sumed that mean abnormal returns of private equity fund targets increase with increasing per-
centage of managerial ownership reflecting reduction of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 
(1976)). 
Furthermore, the assumption that private equity funds may play an active role at the 
day-to-day business of their targets is amplified by analyzing the various figures of profita-
bility and cost efficiency supporting the monitoring hypothesis. The negative relationship 
between EPS and market reaction in Models III and IV points out that target firms with lower 
EPS are more beneficial on CAR as they have a lower, negative impact. Hence, private equity 
funds acquiring firms with lower EPS create short-term shareholder wealth and have the pos-
sibility to amplify this ratio during the investment horizon. The Market-to-Book-Ratio also 
displays significantly negative coefficients implying that low valued targets compared to their 
book value experience less negative announcement effects. Hence, the market believes that 
private equity funds are able to increase this ratio in the medium- to long-term. Moreover, this 
relation also supports the undervaluation hypothesis that private equity funds are able to iden-
tify undervalued targets and boost their values in the near future with respective actions taken. 
The positive link between PE-Ratio and market reaction indicates that higher valued compa-
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nies compared to their earnings experience more pronounced announcement effects. Since 
these companies are not yet highly valued, private equity funds possess the potential to in-
crease shareholder wealth through activism. Regarding targets’ cost-efficiency, the negative 
relation between CA-Ratio and market valuation implies that more cost-efficient targets have 
a positive impact on CAR. Profitability ratios ROA, ROE, Dividend Payout per Share, and 
Yield display equally to SWF targets no impact on short-term valuation effect.  
With regards to the financial policy of private equity fund targets, the study does not 
detect any relation between a target firm’s leverage and the market reaction. However, Equity 
% Total Capital and Total Debt/ Total Assets have meaningful explanatory power presented 
by Model I and Model II, respectively. Both ratios display negative relationships to market 
reactions demonstrating that private equity investors do not prefer highly leveraged firms. 
These finding are in line with the investment strategy of private equity funds as after the ac-
quisition they often leverage the targets. If the potential target has already a high ratio be-
tween debt and assets, this measurement becomes rather difficult. 
Comparable to SWF targets, private equity fund target firms’ size has no announce-
ment valuation neither regarding total assets nor market capitalization. The reputation of pri-
vate equity funds, moreover, also incorporates no meaningful impact on announcement ef-
fects. Finally, the study accounts for deal-specific factors in the cross-sectional finding no 
evidence that market reactions are larger for targets acquired after 2000 or during the recent 
financial crisis. Moreover, US targets cause negative valuation effects around announcements. 
Concluding the results, the cross-sectional regressions support partially the assump-
tion that positive short-term valuation effects to SWF targets are caused by the active moni-
toring potential of SWF as a positive relation between managerial ownership and market reac-
tion prevails. Moreover, the undervaluation hypothesis is not supported either as the relation-
ship between PE-Ratio and CAR is insignificant. Nonetheless, SWF investment behavior 
gives some indications that they are also quite similar to institutional investors who want to 
further diversify their portfolios with foreign public equity. Private equity funds, on the other, 
show many empirical facts supporting their role of an active investor within the financial ser-
vices industry. Since they purchase smaller firms, they could be more active and their activi-
ties might be easier implemented. In addition, private equity investors also confirm the under-
valuation hypothesis as the relation between Market-to-Book-Ratio and valuation effect is 
negative. That implies that firms with lower market value compared to their book value have 
a minor negative impact on CAR. 
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Table 4.8: Determinants of the CAR to Private Equity Fund Targets 
Estimated coefficients are determined using a multivariate regression of the CAR to private equity fund targets 
of the financial services industry in the five-day event window [-2;+2]a against a number of explanatory va-
riables.b 
 
Source: Own calculations; Thomson Financial Worldscope; Heritage Foundation; Truman (2008).  
Note: Accounting figures are year-end financial figures prior to the year of transaction announcement. 
a  CAR are derived for a sample of 64 private equity fund transactions in the financial services industry using the 
market model approach in the event study.  
b  For a detailed description of the underlying equation and variables see Chapters 2.3.4 and 4.4.2, respectively. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
4.5.2.3 Short-term Valuation Effects to Intra-Industry Rivals 
This section describes the short-term valuation effects of the designed financial services in-
dustry rival portfolio in response to the acquisition of minority ownership stakes either by 
SWF or private equity funds. As theoretical framework, two hypotheses were presented pre-
viously, the information signaling hypothesis and the competitive hypothesis, which are both 
used in the literature clarifying stock price reactions of a purchased firm’s horizontal rivals. 
CAR [-2;+2]; Estimation Period [t -180 ;t -30 ]
Constant 0,42033 -0,33358 0,06198 -0,5578
Profitability and Cost Efficiency
ROA 0,00021 - - -
ROE - 0,00179 - -
Dividend Payout per Share - - 0,00027 -
Dividend Yield - - - -0,00449
EPS -0,00206 0,00613 -0,01021 *** -0,00968 ***
Market-to-Book-Ratio -0,04028 *** -0,05347 ** - -
PE-Ratio 0,00159 0,00498 ** - -
CA-Ratio -0,13014 * 0,11656 - -
Financial Policy
Leverage - 0,01931 - -
Total Debt/Total Assets -0,05007 -0,34358 * - -
Equity % Total Capital -0,00209 * 0,00044 - -
Firm Characteristics
Total Assets -0,01315 0,2195 - -
Market Capitalization - - -0,00128 0,00195
% Closely Held Shares - - 0,00201 * 0,00247 **
Target Country Specific Factors
Index of Economic Freedom 0,00102 0,00259 - -
Property Rights - - -0,00125 -
Financial Freedom - - - -0,00003
Sovereign Wealth Fund Characteristics
Reputation - - 0,06198 0,01666-
Deal Specific Factors
Transaction after 2000 - 0,09043 - -
Financial Crisis 0,02844 - - -
European Transaction 0,02489 -0,04347 - -
U.S. Transaction -0,31587 -0,38358 *** - -
Number of Observations 52 54 58 58
Adj. R
2
0,345 *** 0,361 *** 0,293 ** 0,289 **
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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The information signaling hypothesis predicts increasing stock prices, whereas the competi-
tive hypothesis predicts negative market reactions. 
The stock price effects for 164 rival companies of SWF targets present positive ab-
normal returns on average. As seen in Panel I of Table 4.9, these positive market reactions 
range from +0.291% for the event window [-3;0] to +1.12% for the interval [-3;+5]. Only the 
event window [-15;0] displays a negative average value of -0.66%, however without explana-
tory power as it is statistically insignificant. Consequently, the study assesses these signifi-
cantly positive market reactions as a confirmation of the information signaling hypothesis. As 
SWF are institutional investors with financial firepower, the rival portfolio reacts positively 
anticipating that SWF possess private information not only on the target firms’ expected fu-
ture cash flow but also on payment flows of the whole financial services industry. As SWF 
are government-owned, an educated guess is made that these state funds obtain private infor-
mation, to which no other institutional investors like mutual funds or private equity funds 
have access. Due to positive CAAR, moreover, it is assumed that rivals may be more likely to 
turn into targets of future bids of SWF, especially bearing in mind that state funds acquirer 
predominantly are financial services firms. Therefore, investments of SWF investors are per-
ceived as an indication of positive new information about the future of an industry confirming 
the assumption made previously in the literature section.  
Private equity fund rivals of 172 financial services firms, however, display through-
out negative CAAR varying from -0.23% at announcement day to -18.27% for the interval  
[-30;+30]. Panel II of Table 4.9 shows for various event windows statistical significance ap-
plying the different test-statistics. The negative average value of the interval [-15;0] with  
-3.49%, for example, is significant at the 10% level under Boehmer et al. (1991) and Dodd & 
Warner (1983). As a result, this study states that the competitive hypothesis holds true for the 
private equity fund rival portfolio. These negative average abnormal returns are a proof that 
acquisitions of private equity funds have a harmful effect on rivals’ future performance as the 
new institutional blockholders often try to change the board of directors and force manage-
ment to pursue strategic alternatives (A. Klein & Zur (2009)). Moreover, private equity funds 
are known to be active investors to attain higher shareholder wealth. This often changes the 
way in which firms compete profoundly resulting in a more competitive environment and 
severe consequences for peers (F. Allen et al. (2008)). The results indicate that the capital 
markets perceive an engagement of private equity funds in a specific industry as an indication 
of an increase in product market competition. Comparing the results with the study of Mietz-
ner & Schweizer (2008), this analysis displays different results of CAAR for private equity 
fund rivals: The study displays substantially positive short-term reactions to private equity 
target rivals confirming the information signaling hypothesis. Therefore, the assumption that 
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valuation effects on both groups of rivals are positive in the short-term does not hold true. 
Comparing the CAAR on SWF rivals (Panel I) with the abnormal returns on private equity 
fund rivals (Panel II), it can be noticed that the rivals’ shareholders see the purchases of large 
blocks of voting rights by SWF as value enhancing and those by private equity investors as 
value-destroying. Moreover, this comparison is statistically significant for both, means and 
medians. For the intervals [0;+3] and [-2;+2], the positive CAAR of SWF rivals and the nega-
tive CAAR of private equity fund rivals differs significantly from each other at the 10% level. 
The differences in the medians are even significant for four event windows ([-15;0]; [0;+3];  
[-2;+2]; [-3;+3]). These test results confirm the appliance of the two contradicting hypotheses 
already described beforehand. 
Table 4.9: CAAR to Intra-Industry Rivals 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to rival firms in the financial services industry. Ab-
normal returns were calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 180 
trading days prior to the event window [-30;+30]. For the market returns of each country, respective market 
indices are applied. Statistical significance is tested using the cross-sectional test as proposed by Boehmer et al. 
(1991), the test according to Dodd & Warner (1983), and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested by N. J. 
Johnson (1978). Panel I includes SWF rivals (N = 164) and Panel II covers private equity fund rivals (N = 172). 
The last two rows report statistical tests for differences between the CAAR of Panel I and Panel II using t-tests 
for differences in means and Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the medians. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
4.5.3 Long-term Market Reactions 
This section provides a detailed overview of the long-term market reactions on financial ser-
vices industry targets and rivals. Moreover, this study gives respective interpretations based 
on the given literature review and previous studies.  
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-30;0] 0,59 0,14 0,09 0,55 -8,72 0,79 1,06 -1,43 1,00 -1,08
[-15;0] -0,66 -0,69 -0,79 -1,06 -3,49 1,67 * 2,04 * -1,18 0,64 -2,43 **
[-3;0] 0,29 0,79 0,98 0,95 -0,88 1,88 * 2,07 ** -1,02 0,92 -0,74
[-3;+5] 1,12 1,99 * 2,41 * 2,31 * -1,98 1,41 1,94 * -1,13 1,19 0,85
[0] 0,00 -0,20 -0,24 0,02 -0,23 0,13 0,16 -0,94 0,72 0,16
[0;+3] 0,43 1,53 1,85 * 1,44 -1,44 -1,12 -1,52 -2,12 ** 1,78 * 2,50 **
[0;+5] 0,82 1,89 * 2,06 ** 2,25 ** -1,33 0,52 0,75 -1,18 1,32 0,97
[-2;+2] 0,63 1,67 * 2,12 * 1,76 ** -1,72 -0,85 -0,99 -2,00 ** 1,73 * 1,75 *
[-3;+3] 0,72 1,75 * 2,23 ** 1,76 * -2,09 0,29 0,36 -1,59 1,40 1,65 *
[-5;+5] 1,02 1,88 * 2,22 ** 1,97 ** -2,91 0,99 1,27 -1,37 1,24 0,78
[-30;+30] 0,72 0,13 0,01 0,46 -18,27 0,38 0,82 -1,61 1,09 0,00
Panel I: SWF rivals (N=164)
Panel II: Private equity fund rivals 
(N=172)
Difference tests
Boehmer
Dodd & 
Warner
Johnson Boehmer
Dodd & 
Warner
Johnson t-test
Rank 
Sum 
Test
z-score z-score J-value z-score z-score J-value
t-
value
z-score
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4.5.3.1 Long-term Market Reactions to Intra-Industry Targets 
Table 4.10 shows long-term raw buy-and-hold returns for the SWF and private equity targets 
analyzing that the longer the holding periods the respective raw BHR become more positive. 
Panel I displays the raw BHR to SWF targets. For the holding periods of 60, 120, and 240 
days, the mean returns show negative values. Only the raw BHR for the longest period of 480 
days turn into a positive average value of +10.52%. Since all four BHR are not statistically 
significant, their explanatory power of proofing active monitoring is rather limited. In addi-
tion, the medians of SWF targets’ BHR are not significant according the defined periods. 
The raw BHR to private equity fund targets, however, only display negative values 
(Panel II, Table 4.10) for two holding periods (60 and 120 days). The average returns display 
values of 8.86% and +15.28% for the 240- and 480-days periods, respectively. The latter is 
even statistically significant at the 10% for both test-statistics in used supporting slightly ac-
tive monitoring of private equity funds at their targets. However, the median of private equity 
purchased firms have not explanatory power. The tests for difference between the mean and 
median BHR of Panels I and II attest no statistical distinction as both applied test-statistics 
display no meaningful results. Hence, the supposed active monitoring role of private equity 
funds measured by the longest holding period of 480 days is not significant compared to 
SWF.  
Table 4.10: Raw BHR to Intra-Industry Targets 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table shows the average Buy-and-Hold Returns to target firms in the financial services industry. Statistical 
significance in means is tested using the standard t-test and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested by N. J. 
Johnson (1978). Statistical significance in medians is tested using Wilcoxon signed rank test. Panel I includes 
SWF targets (max. N = 46) and Panel II covers private equity fund targets (max. N = 68). The last two rows 
report statistical tests for differences between the BHR of Panel I and Panel II using t-tests for differences in 
means and Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the medians. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
As the explanatory power of raw BHR is not sufficient and they are influenced by the 
overall market performance, BHAR are evaluated using the daily closing prices relative to the 
Holding 
period 
in days
BHR 
(%)
N
BHR 
(%)
N
60 -1,11 -0,35 -0,36 -0,28 46 -1,83 -0,62 -0,63 -0,42 68 0,16 0,14
120 -4,55 -1,11 -1,14 -0,82 46 -2,27 -0,58 -0,58 -0,25 66 -0,39 -0,46
240 -1,12 -0,15 -0,14 -0,51 44 8,86 1,23 1,25 1,17 65 -0,93 -0,93
480 10,52 0,93 0,97 0,69 30 15,28 1,75 * 1,86 * 1,46 58 -0,33 -0,42
Signed 
Rank
Test
t-value
Panel I: SWF transactions
Panel II: Private equity fund 
transactions
Difference tests
t-test Johnson
Signed 
Rank
Test
t-test
Rank 
Sum 
Test
t-test Johnson
z-scoret-value J-value
z-
score
t-value J-value
z-
score
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of the financial services industry index. As a result, Table 4.11 shows these long-term buy-
and-hold abnormal returns for SWF and private equity fund targets. Considering the SWF 
sample (Panel I), only positive mean BHAR are examined, which are taking the highest value 
of +5.62% for the 240-days period. However, these returns are not statistically significant, 
neither regarding the mean test-statistics nor the median test-statistic. The findings are in line 
with Dewenter et al. (2009), finding also insignificantly positive mean BHAR. Bortolotti et al. 
(2009), however, document a negative long-term market performance of SWF targets but fail 
to explain the discrepancy between short- and long-term return drift. Their distinct negative 
long-term stock performance might results from high prevent returns because they positively 
bias the coefficients of the market model. Moreover, the results of Chhaochharia & Laeven 
(2009) and Knill et al. (2009), mesh nicely with these researchers as both studies find a signif-
icantly negative effect of SWF investment on firm performance in longer event windows. 
These finding are also related to Kotter & Lel (2008), presenting deterioration in various ac-
counting measures following SWF investment. The authors suggest that this may be related to 
the fact that state funds tend to invest in distressed firms. The results are consistent with con-
cerns of government ownership in literature (privatization literature as well as Shleifer & 
Vishny (1986)). Nevertheless, active monitoring of SWF is not supported by mean and me-
dian BHAR, the results indicate that the overall market is efficient and that positive valuation 
effects occur only in the short run. 
Table 4.11: BHAR to Intra-Industry Targets 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table shows the average Buy- and Hold Abnormal Returns to target firms in the financial services industry. 
Statistical significance in means is tested using the standard t-test and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested 
by N. J. Johnson (1978). Statistical significance in medians is tested using Wilcoxon signed rank test. Panel I 
includes SWF targets (max. N = 46) and Panel II covers private equity fund targets (max. N = 68). The last two 
rows report statistical tests for differences between the BHAR of Panel I and Panel II using t-tests for differences 
in means and Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the medians. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Regarding the private equity sample in Panel II, this study examines for the two pe-
riods of 60 and 120 days negative mean BHAR of -2.65% and -4.10%, respectively. The 
longer intervals of 240 and 480 days, however, are positive with average BHAR of +4.87% 
Holding 
period 
in days
BHAR 
(%)
N
BHAR 
(%)
N
60 2,38 1,03 1,05 0,85 46 -2,65 -1,03 -1,05 -1,45 68 1,38 1,09
120 1,75 0,59 0,60 0,52 46 -4,10 -1,31 -1,39 -0,99 66 1,30 0,84
240 5,62 1,16 1,21 0,56 44 4,87 0,87 0,91 0,45 65 0,10 0,23
480 3,08 0,49 0,51 0,07 30 1,14 0,15 0,17 -0,07 58 0,17 0,17
z-
score
t-value z-scoret-value J-value
z-
score
t-value J-value
Panel I: SWF transactions
Panel II: Private equity fund 
transactions
Difference tests
t-test Johnson
Signed 
Rank
Test
t-test Johnson
Signed 
Rank
Test
t-test
Rank 
Sum 
Test
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and +1.14%. The findings are different from the ones presented by Mietzner & Schweizer 
(2007), observing significantly negative median buy-and-hold abnormal returns. However, the 
positive mean BHAR have no explanatory power. Moreover, as it is assumed that private eq-
uity funds apply an investment strategy comprising of agency cost reduction policy, they are 
expected to target firms with a high potential for reducing agency costs to perform significant-
ly better in the long term than those interested more in short-term trading-induced profits. 
This perspective is not supported by Panel II as the average long-term abnormal returns are 
indeed positive but statically insignificant. In addition, negative mean BHAR in two shorter 
periods are reasonable, as private equity targets' market value may decline in the subsequent 
year simply because of the beginning of the J-curve as described in previous chapter. The 
target’s J-curve results from underperformance in the beginning of the investment that may be 
attributed to, for example, restructuring effects. The subsequent outperformance, hence, is 
mainly based on increased efficiency from the restructuring. However, this characteristic is 
not supported by the findings. Since this study analyzes only minority stake investments in 
financial services companies, private equity funds may face the problem of having to align 
their interests with those of the supervisory board members. Thus, it is more complex to re-
duce agency costs within a target company resulting in insignificant average abnormal re-
turns. This explanation is in line with findings of Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003) analyzing 
the relationship between corporate performance and shareholder rights. They assess that com-
panies with a high level of shareholder rights outperform those with a weak level. This dis-
crepancy is only partially reflected in share prices at the beginning of the sample period. To 
sum up, the findings show that private equity fund targets display no significant positive 
BHAR contradicting the monitoring hypothesis, but, however, serve as the proof of market 
efficiency.  
Finally, with regards to the mean and median difference tests between Panel I and 
Panel II, the study notices that the mean BHAR to SWF targets are higher than the ones to 
private equity fund targets. Nevertheless, the comparison is statistically insignificant for both 
means and medians serving as no confirmation of active monitoring for both institutional in-
vestors. 
4.5.3.2 Long-term Market Reactions to Intra-Industry Rivals 
Regarding long-term market reactions to financial services rival companies of SWF targets, 
the mean and median BHR are significantly positive at the 5% level for the 480 days-period 
with an average value of +29.54% (Panel I, Table 4.12). Although the SWF rival portfolio is 
significantly negative regarding its medians for the 120- and 240-days period, it turns to a 
positive value with statistical significance for the longest holding period. One can state that in 
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the long run, financial markets see the involvement of SWF as value-creating supporting the 
information signaling hypothesis. Thus, rival companies do not perceive government-owned 
institutional investors as potential threat in the future. 
Table 4.12: Raw BHR to Intra-Industry Rivals 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table shows the average Buy-and-Hold Returns to rival firms in the financial services industry. Statistical 
significance in means is tested using the standard t-test and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested by N. J. 
Johnson (1978). Statistical significance in medians is tested using Wilcoxon signed rank test. Panel I includes 
SWF rivals (max. N = 164) and Panel II covers private equity fund rivals (max. N = 172). The last two rows 
report statistical tests for differences between the BHR of Panel I and Panel II using t-tests for differences in 
means and Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the medians. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
As seen in Panel II of Table 4.12, the mean raw BHR of private equity rivals, more-
over, display significantly positive values for the 120-, 240- and 480-days periods also con-
firming the information signaling hypothesis. The median test-statistics of these holding pe-
riods, however, have no explanatory power. Regarding the difference tests over the four time 
periods, the study considers the difference between the raw BHR of SWF and private equity 
fund rivals are statistically significant in both ways, mean and median. Hence, the difference 
between the positive mean BHR to private equity fund rivals and the negative values to SWF 
rivals is effective. With regards to median BHR, however, negative ones to SWF rivals are 
more profound.  
Since the raw long-term returns do not have a strong explanatory power as a whole, 
the study needs to take a closer look at the market-adjusted BHAR. Panel I of Table 4.13 
shows that mean BHAR are statistically significant for the periods of 480 days. This period 
presents a high positive mean value of +22.22%, statistically significant regarding both, mean 
and median. Looking at the BHAR of private equity rivals (Panel II), both periods with the 
highest average value of +8.38% and +17.77% are significantly positive (periods of 120 and 
240 days, respectively). Furthermore, the mean and median difference tests only display val-
ues with explanatory power for the median implicating that the positive median of the SWF 
rivals is significantly different from the negative median of the private equity rivals. 
Holding 
period 
in days
BHR 
(%)
N
BHR 
(%)
N
60 -2,78 -1,46 -1,50 -0,93 164 -1,63 -1,00 -0,98 -1,81 172 -0,46 0,32
120 -4,71 -1,79 -1,81 -2,53 ** 164 7,36 1,60 1,99 ** -0,18 168 -2,27 ** -1,84 *
240 -2,46 -0,43 -0,43 -2,11 ** 158 14,11 1,74 * 2,26 ** 0,14 165 -1,66 * -1,81 *
480 29,54 2,56 ** 2,54 ** 2,30 ** 106 13,40 1,51 1,94 * -0,18 135 1,13 1,77 *
z-
score
t-value z-scoret-value J-value z-score t-value J-value
Panel I: SWF rivals Panel II: Private equity fund rivals Difference tests
t-test Johnson
Signed 
Rank
Test
t-test Johnson
Signed 
Rank
Test
t-test
Rank 
Sum 
Test
4.6  Conclusion 109 
 
Table 4.13: BHAR to Intra-Industry Rivals 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table shows the average Buy- and Hold Abnormal Returns to rival firms in the financial services industry. 
Statistical significance in means is tested using the standard t-test and the skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested 
by N. J. Johnson (1978). Statistical significance in medians is tested using Wilcoxon signed rank test. Panel I 
includes SWF rivals (max. N = 164) and Panel II covers private equity fund rivals (max. N = 172). The last two 
rows report statistical tests for differences between the BHAR of Panel I and Panel II using t-tests for differences 
in means and Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the medians. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
However, these findings are inconsistent with the results of the short-term event 
study. Although the study estimates positive short-term effects and positive long-term valua-
tion effects of SWF rival portfolio, it is demonstrated that the initial negative valuation effect 
of rivals to firms targeted by private equity investors turns into positive BHAR. Overall, these 
results indicate that the capital markets react to information gleaned from acquisitions of vot-
ing rights by a financial investor for the industry. The positive long-horizon result for both 
rival portfolios is consistent with the information signaling hypothesis, which predicts posi-
tive valuation effects for industry rivals. But why do rivals to private equity targets experience 
a negative valuation effect over the short term, while observing a substantial positive return 
drift of +17.77% on average for 240 days after the announcement? One explanation could be 
that in the short run rivals, which are not acquired by private equity investors, fear disadvan-
tages of being not chosen as targets. Since institutional investors investing substantial 
amounts of equity and resources in acquiring information about a target make an investment 
only if the transaction is expected to increase wealth, the rivals are worried about increased 
market competition and they must respond in order to avoid comparative disadvantages. 
However, in the long run, the whole financial services industry is recognized as a valuable 
industry with high attractiveness to institutional investors resulting in positive valuation ef-
fects consistent with the information signaling theory. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This empirical examination compares sovereign wealth and private equity fund investments in 
the international financial services industry. Moreover, it analyzes the different impact of 
Holding 
period 
in days
BHAR 
(%)
N
BHAR 
(%)
N
60 0,82 0,55 0,50 1,11 164 -0,98 -0,70 -0,68 -1,61 172 0,89 1,85 *
120 2,38 1,25 1,18 1,63 164 8,38 1,92 * 2,50 ** 0,28 168 -1,25 0,95
240 7,36 1,61 1,60 0,89 158 17,77 2,30 ** 3,24 *** 1,73 * 165 -1,15 -0,56
480 22,22 2,12 ** 2,11 ** 2,48 ** 106 5,74 0,68 0,82 -0,82 135 1,24 2,37 **
z-score t-value z-scoret-value J-value z-score t-value J-value
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those investments on respective intra-industry rivals. The findings assume that instead of 
seeking only for international portfolio diversification, SWF proof to some extent investment 
behavior of active rather than passive investors. This fact makes them comparable to private 
equity funds, which are also known for shareholder activism confirmed by the study results. 
Compared to other studies (e.g., Bortolotti et al. (2009)), one obtains slightly empirical sup-
port that the positive announcement effects associated with an SWF investment arise from the 
ability of their managers to pursuit successful activism strategies. Despite of legal restrictions 
or the simple fact that the number of equity holdings exceeds several hundred single positions 
in various countries and currencies, SWF have the opportunity and capacity for shareholder 
activism strategy in such an important industry as the financial services industry. Since they 
invested multi-billions of USD during the recent financial crisis, shareholder activity by SWF 
are more than comprehensible as SWF investments lost highly in values (e.g., due to compul-
sory loan, in March 2010 the GIC suffered a loss of 70% of its original investment of USD 10 
bn). The positive short-term valuation effects to private equity fund targets displays also posi-
tive values. However, this outcome is less surprising as these institutional investors are known 
for shareholder activism strategies in the past. 
By using a detailed and extensive dataset on SWF and private equity target firms and 
firm-specific attributes, the study is able to compare them with each other but also with their 
industry peers and, as a result, characterize SWF and private equity fund ownership in great 
detail. It is analyzed that SWF targets are larger than private equity fund targets with higher 
dividend payouts and yields indicating rather that SWF managers passively seek for portfolio 
diversification in public equity markets instead of pursuing activism strategies. However, the 
managerial ownership of SWF targets is significantly lower as the one of private equity funds 
purchased firms pointing out the shareholder activism potential. Compared to their industry 
rivals, SWF target firms are again larger but they are not more profitable or distribute higher 
dividends to their shareholder. What contradicts shareholder activism, moreover, is the fact 
that SWF do not improve the operating performance in the balance sheet of the target firms 
for the two year following the investment. But, however, some improvements might take a 
longer time especially in such large targets as the ones of SWF. The differences between pri-
vate equity fund targets and their intra-industry rivals are not very profound. The study de-
monstrates that these investors purchase firms with lower dividend payments, poorer PE-
Ratio, and minor managerial ownership symbolizing the potential of shareholder activism.  
Since SWF are government-owned entities, their investments may convey valuable 
information about the target firm and also about the financial services industry as a whole 
and, therefore, cause positive market reactions for the target firm. CAAR of the interval  
[-2;+2] are +3.80%. Moreover, it is assessed that the level of property rights and financial 
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freedom have a significant positive influence on the announcement returns of state fund tar-
gets as the commitment especially of long-term investors may indicate that further acquisi-
tions by foreign investors might follow (La Porta et al. (1997)). Financial leverage has no 
bearing on the short-term market reaction, indicating that SWFs are not perceived as lender of 
last resort. Moreover, the study detects a positive relation between the percentage of closely 
held shares and the market reaction supporting the assessment of active shareholder strategy. 
Surprisingly, the positive mean abnormal returns of +1.01% for the five days-interval to pri-
vate equity fund targets are less intense although expecting them to be higher as private equity 
managers are known as active shareholders. However, consistent with the perception that pri-
vate equity funds are active and long-term orientated investors, this study finds various con-
firmations through the cross-sectional analysis: positive relation between PE-Ratio or the per-
centage of closely held shares and the market reaction and the negative relation between EPS 
or Market-to-Book-Ratio and valuation effects.  
The rivals of both groups of institutional investors demonstrate two different results. 
Whereas the rivals of SWF targets react significantly positive to the announcements, rivals of 
private equity fund target companies display negative CAAR. With positive mean abnormal 
returns of +1.12% during the 9 days-interval [-3;+5], SWF rival portfolio confirms the infor-
mation signaling hypothesis assessing that the transactions of SWF shed light on the quality 
and future potential of the financial services industry. Since private equity fund rivals display 
negative CAAR of -1.98% of the same event window, the competitive hypothesis is con-
firmed. As private equity funds are known as active shareholder amplifying the operating per-
formance of targets, rivals fear the consequence of being not competitive anymore as they 
could not increase the efficiency.  
Finally, the results indicate, however, that the long-lasting abnormal return drift to 
SWF and private equity fund targets is not different from zero for large holding periods. On 
the one hand, this result implies that all price related information is incorporated into stock 
prices upon announcement of the SWF and private equity fund investments and that the mar-
ket mechanisms are efficient. On the other hand, these results militate against the shareholder 
activism hypothesis as one would expect improvements in operating performance and share-
holder wealth. The long-term abnormal returns to both rival portfolios, nonetheless, demon-
strate positive values. Regarding all results, it can be summarized that SWF investments in the 
financial services industry are comparable with private equity fund investments and that the 
market evaluate them positively with the some proof of active shareholder potential improv-
ing operating performance of their targets. 
 
 
 5 Study 3: What Role does Timing play at M&A? – The Case of 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. in light of the latest financial crisis 
5.1 Introduction 
In 2006, the US M&A activities attained their historical height with 11,750 deals and a total 
transaction volume of USD 1,484 bn even exceeding the merger peek of 2000. By midyear of 
2007, however, this merger wave ended abruptly due to the burst of the US residential real 
estate bubble and the emergence of the subprime mortgage crisis causing the biggest financial 
and commercial crisis since the Great Depression. Because of their interdependences with the 
domestic housing market and extensive involvement in and trading with structured financial 
products, both US investment and universal banks suffered awfully from these financial tur-
bulences shaking up the entire US banking industry. 
The most prominent victim linked to this crisis is up to now the investment bank 
Lehman Brothers, which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in September 2008 fol-
lowing the massive exodus of most of its clients, drastic losses in its stock, and devaluation of 
its assets by credit rating agencies (Lobb (2008)). Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch, on the oth-
er hand, have been rescued by acquisitions of JPM and Bank of America (BofA), respectively 
(Sorkin (2008); Mildenberg & Keoun (2008)). Further of these two events, Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley felt impelled to give up their investment bank status transforming into 
common banks (Harper & Torres (2008)). Moreover, the incidents of universal banks are 
mostly the same: Washington Mutual has become casualty of the subprime mortgage disaster 
as its credit rating was reduced to junk and its stock price tumbled. As a consequence, the 
lender put itself up for sale purchased in the end by JPM (Levy & Hester (2008)). Wachovia 
also needed to be acquired by Wells Fargo (WF) after huge losses from its mortgage portfolio 
(Fitzpatrick, Roth, & Enrich (2008)). Citi, over several years world’s largest bank according 
to market capitalization, was afflicted with heavy exposure caused by troubled mortgages and 
poor risk management. After committing huge losses, it received massive governmental sup-
port and started a reorganization with high employee lay-offs (Dash (2009)).  
Nonetheless, not all US banks were negatively affected by the crisis. The outstanding 
example is the full service bank JPM performing extremely well within the crisis and seems 
to come off as market leader. Although the bank also had to write off financial investments 
like other banks, the amount was not as high as compared to its competitors. Despite of these 
write-offs, JPM succeeded to generate profit in 2008, which is astonishing in comparison of 
minor profits and huge losses of rival banks, respectively. Moreover, its financial situation is 
very solid reflected by a high tier one capital ratio and corroborated in addition by a statement 
114 5  Study 3: What Role does Timing play at M&A? – The Case 
 
of the current bank’s CEO Jamie Dimon: “our strong balance sheet, general conservatism and 
constant focus on risk management served us well and enabled us to weather this terrible en-
vironment” (JPM Annual Report 2008, p. 3). 
Regardless of the described financial turmoil on capital markets, M&A deals still oc-
curred at crisis even though with minor extensiveness. BofA, WF, and JPM, for instance, pur-
chased important, distressed market players. Based on specific crisis circumstances such as 
discounted prices, anxious markets, and uncertainties about economic future, the study as-
sumes that such acquisitions occur in a different light compared to acquisitions prior to crisis. 
Hence, by adding the role of timing at M&A as a supplementary aspect to study M&A deals, 
precedent literature is extended examining rather the general question whether M&A transac-
tions generate significant shareholder value (e.g., Berger, Demsetz, & Strahan (1999); Cornett 
et al. (2003); Houston & Ryngaert (1994); Toyne & Tripp (1998)). The study focuses on the 
role that timing plays at M&A for shareholder value creation and examines how banks’ acqui-
sitions are evaluated, occurring at time of crisis compared to time prior to crisis. Following 
research questions shall be analyzed: Is a strong bank with a good reputation able to take ad-
vantage of the weakness of its competitors and grow substantially within the crisis? How do 
M&A deals of one bank, taking place prior to and during crisis, influence rival banks’ per-
formance? The results provide evidence particularly in favour of JPM, as it seems to be a 
clear crisis winner. 
For this purpose, 72 M&A transactions of JPM and selected competitive banks are 
identified between January 2003 and April 2009 accounting for the latest merger wave and 
the most recent financial crisis.39 By applying the event study methodology, firstly the an-
nouncement effects of pre-crisis and crisis transactions are measured. Pre-crisis transactions 
of JPM display mixed evidence affirming previous research. Crisis deals, however, yield 
overall very positive results to JPM even if statistically insignificant.Competitors, alternative-
ly, generate negative average abnormal returns prior to crisis and mixed results during it. Se-
condly, the reaction of JPM to competitors’ M&A announcements and the impact of JPM’s 
transactions on results to rival banks, both prior to and during crisis, are studied. The impact 
of rivals’ pre-crisis acquisitions on JPM yields significantly negative results and significantly 
positive average abnormal returns during crisis. Moreover, pre-crisis results for JPM’s rivals 
are negative without statistical significance and demonstrate significantly negative average 
abnormal returns during crisis. Finally, analyzing the long-term market performance of JPM 
                                                 
39 An extract of this study has been accepted by the International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance 
(Mueller & Schiereck (2011)). Additionally, a German version of the extract will be published in Setzer & 
Schiereck (2011). 
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and rival banks compared to all US listed banks and the average US market, the study ap-
proves JPM’s predominant performance. 
The rest of the study proceeds as follows. The next section describes the merger 
waves in the US underlining the dynamics in the market environment, mainly during the latest 
wave. In section 5.3, the causes and development of the subprime crisis are shortly described 
overlapping to financial market. Moreover, it outlines the predominantly negative conse-
quences for US universal banks. The next section provides theoretical foundations of the 
study presenting the working hypotheses, which are examined in chapter 5. Furthermore, it 
explains the applied methodology and clarifies the data construction of the sample. In the pe-
nultimate section, two sets of results are presented: firstly, event study results and secondly, 
overview of the long-term market performance. The study is concluded in section 6. 
5.2 US Mergers & Acquisitions Activities 
Mergers and acquisitions activities in the US are embossed by six waves (Gaughan (2002))40: 
The first wave took place between 1897 and 1904, the second between 1916 and 1929, the 
third one spread from 1965 to 1969, the fourth from 1981 to 1989, and the fifth ranged from 
1993 to 2000. The latest M&A, whose US banking transactions are analyzed by this study, 
accelerated in 2003 and continued until early 2007. All these waves have been caused by 
shocks in the business environment including technological innovations creating excess ca-
pacity and the need for industry consolidation, supply shock like oil prices, and deregulation, 
liberalization as well as globalization, which simplified mergers on various industry-levels 
(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford (2001); Mitchell & Mulherin (1996)). Moreover, all waves 
were terminated in the end by an economic recession resulting in worldwide financial disas-
ters (Ernst & Young (2006)). Figure 5.1 illustrates the last four M&A waves showing that 
starting points between waves have diminished from wave to wave and their persistence is 
getting shorter as well. These waves are presented in more detail in the following. 
Beginning with the third wave, which was characterized by a large number of deals 
between companies with unrelated business operating in different industries, is often called 
the conglomerate wave. This wave was supported by a booming economic environment at 
that time offering companies with necessary resources to purchase other firms (Kleinert & 
Klodt (2002)). Liberalization and deregulation on the other hand caused the fourth merger 
wave. Comparing the third with the fourth wave, transaction values of the latter were much 
                                                 
40  Gaughan describes only five of the six mergers waves in the US The latest wave was determined by the 
worldwide financial crisis caused by the burst of the US residential real estate bubble. 
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higher although the third one comprised of many more deals. As a result, this wave is known 
for its billion-dollar mega-transactions, which were financed with large amount of debt 
(Gaughan (2002)). After the economic downturn in the early 1990s, globalization and the new 
economy gave rise to the fifth M&A boom typified again by many large mega-transactions. 
However, these deals were financed through the increased use of equity and were more stra-
tegic in nature leading to consolidation in many industries (Andrade et al. (2001; Lipton 
(2006)). The burst of the dot-com bubble and the resultant overall downshift of the global 
economy terminated this wave (Wübben (2007)). 
Figure 5.1: Number and Value of US M&A Transactions 
 
Source: Own illustration; Mergerstat. 
Note: Transaction value data is only available since 1968 and reflects the base equity price offered; Data displays 
M&A activity in the US and US cross-border transactions. 
After the crash of 2000 with a 2001 merger activity half as large as the one of 2000 
(USD 683 bn vs. USD 1,269 bn), the US transaction market recuperated quickly. From a low 
of USD 442 bn in 2002, the M&A activity restarted already in 2003 and accumulative to a 
total of USD 1,484 bn by the end of 2006.41 This relatively short period of four years reflects 
the sixth merger wave, which is by far the largest one according to annual transactions as well 
as to annual dollar deal value. Comparing the transaction statistics of the last two M&A 
waves presented by Table 5.1, the intense market dynamic predominated during the sixth 
wave is even amplified: The already high annual transaction value of USD 730 bn of the fifth 
wave was exceeded by sixth wave annual value of USD 1,018 bn.  
Besides the principal factors of globalization, rapid worldwide economic growth and 
higher stock market valuations, the market dynamic of this wave was driven by strategic 
                                                 
41  The data concerning M&A Activity for US and US cross-border transactions are provided by Mergerstat 
(https://www.mergerstat.com). 
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choices of companies in light of opportunities provided by rising economic profits rather than 
by opportunistic factors. Since these companies wanted to grow internationally, cross-border 
M&A deals also played a vital importance (UNCTAD World Investment Report (2006)). In 
addition, different from the previous M&A boom, at which transactions have been carried out 
primarily through the exchange of shares, these M&A transactions were largely supported by 
favorable financing conditions reflected by low debt-financing costs and an abundant supply 
of credit both causing the emergence of financial crisis. Moreover, a new kind of investors 
such as private equity funds and other collective investment funds benefited from this ample 
liquidity at global financial markets and hence served as an additional engine for M&A activi-
ties. The steadily growing size of funds available to private equity markets resulted in greater 
competition between buyers increasing the target prices substantially. The whole transaction 
market was heated up even more resulting in very expensive deals. (UNCTAD World Invest-
ment Report (2007)). Due to these incidents, market participants obtained the illusion that this 
disproportionate economic growth and extremely positive market development would last 
forever. Consequently, the shock was sharply as at the middle of 2007, the US M&A activity 
slowed down because of the burst of the US residential real estate market terminating the 
merger wave and causing the financial crisis, whose causes, development and consequences 
for US universal banks are explained in the following. 
Table 5.1: Overview of US Merger Waves 
 
Source: Own calculations; Mergerstat. 
Note: Data displays M&A activity in the US and US cross-border transactions. 
a Given that transaction value data is only available since 1968, a meaningful information regarding to the total 
and annual transaction value of the third merger wave is not possible.  
Merger waves ∑ Deals
∑ Trans-
action 
value
Wave 
period 
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Deals 
p.a.
CAGR 
Deals
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value p.a.
CAGR 
transaction 
value
Third merger wave
a
(1965-1969)
Fourth merger wave
(1981-1989)
Fifth merger wave
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Sixth merger wave
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5.147 535All merger waves 133.825 11.231 26 -
18.046
22.810
51.678
41.291
n.a.
1.316
5.842
4.072
n.a.
146
730
1.018
23,5%
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19,6%
9,3%
5
8
9
4
3.609
2.534
6.460
10.323
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28,0%
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-
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5.3 From Subprime Mortgage to Financial Crisis and Banking Consolidation 
5.3.1 The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Risks 
Simultaneous to the assembling of the latest M&A wave, a speculative bubble arose in the 
background incorporating the US housing and especially the subprime mortgage market. The 
collapse of these markets causing the most recent financial and commercial crisis is attributa-
ble to many factors, but three basis issues appear to be the main reasons. 
Firstly, after the burst of the dot-com bubble and the uncertainties caused by the 
events of September 11, many investors turned to supposedly secured investments such as 
real estate encouraged by historically low interest rates around 1% (Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2: Development of Fed Funds Rate 
Source: Own illustration; Federal Reserve System. 
Additional dynamics experienced the real estate market with the beginning of the 
public policy partnership for affordable housing42 spawned by the Bush Administration in 
2004. This program helped low-income families with minor creditworthiness, the so-called 
subprime segment, to obtain mortgages. As a result, a housing bull market comprising all so-
cial levels was created: Between 2000 and 2006, the construction of houses in the US ob-
tained its historic peak (Shiller (2007)). Simultaneously, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller 
Home Price Index, the housing prices rose with two-digit growth rates. In the same period, 
furthermore, the subprime segment mounted from USD 150 bn to almost USD 700 bn. The 
                                                 
42  The White House press release (2004), President George W. Bush, “Increasing Affordable Housing and Ex-
panding Home Ownership”, September 2, 2004.  
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fraction of these risky credits on the entire mortgage market rose from 8% to 23% whereas the 
volume of these credits also increased (Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3: US Subprime Mortgage Market 
Source: Own illustration; Inside Mortgage Finance. 
The massive mortgage demand had to be financed leading to the second reason. By 
2004, banks normally sold their mortgages to government-sponsored mortgage securitization 
monoliths collecting them at federal mortgage pools. Greater capital requirements and balance 
sheet controls on these monoliths imposed by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight, however, caused revenue gaps with the banks facing now an interruption to their earn-
ings. As a solution, banks created their own monolith look-alikes: Structured investment ve-
hicles (SIV) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) emerged. Consequently, private resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) increased aggressively, whose disposition served 
as necessitated refinancing for further mortgages of the prime and subprime segment. This 
was a momentous step as formerly mortgage loans were highly illiquid and financed mostly 
from deposits acquired by thrift institutions. The creation of a secondary market for these 
loans and standardization of mortgage products (through RMBS) transformed them into liquid 
assets and provided a channel through which funds from banks and other financial interme-
diaries and (international) investors could readily flow to the mortgage market. (Blundell-
Wignall, Atkinson, & Lee (2008a)). 
The third factor reflects errors and lapses committed by regulators regarding bank 
regulatory policy, especially bank involvement in securitization, and rating agencies. They 
were even exacerbated by the failure of highly sophisticated risk-management techniques de-
veloped by banks and other financial institutions. Therefore, the combination of rapid growth 
of over-the-counter derivatives and securities, favorable accounting rules blessed by the Se-
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curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), and risk-based capital requirements authorized by the Congress in 1991 facilitated 
banks to purchase, package and sell unregistered securities. Especially the distribution of sub-
prime CDO to a wide variety of institutional investors led to a breakdown in safety (Whalen 
(2008)). Moreover, rating agencies underestimated the involved risk that such financial in-
struments were not able to furnish the payment of the interest or the principal debt. Many 
CDO received an AAA rating, even though they were completely based on subprime mort-
gages. Banks themselves, in addition, relied entirely on their models of risk assessment, 
which totally underestimated the risk (Rakshit (2008)). 
5.3.2 Development of Subprime Mortgage Crisis leading to Financial Crisis 
On the basis of the boom at the residential housing market caused by low interest rates and 
governmental support, the housing prices stabilized at a high level by late summer of 2005 as 
in 2006, this boom found an end with a radical price decline. The problem was not the general 
mortgage market but mainly the subprime segment. The rate of foreclosure sales doubled over 
the course of the year. Especially house owners financing their property by adjustable rate 
mortgage were affected paying in the beginning a fixed rate mortgage and after a certain time 
an adjustable rate mortgage which was linked to the Fed interest rate: As interest rates 
climbed back up from 1% in 2004 to 5.25% in 2006 (Figure 5.2), many subprime borrowers 
defaulted when their mortgages were revised into much higher monthly payments. During the 
boom phase, borrower’s creditworthiness played a minor role as the real estate could be sold 
at profit or be lent on supplementary. However, this practice was not feasible anymore. De-
faults increased, the problem snowballed, and several lenders went bankrupt or were acquired 
by other banks. 
In spite of the described events, most analysts expected the subprime defaults to 
leave the rest of the financial system and the real sector relatively unscathed (IMF (2007)). As 
a consequence, the real extent of the financial bubble initiated by the real estate boom hit the 
market participants unprepared and with terrific impact as in July 2007 Bear Stearns declared 
two of their hedge funds invested in CDO as worthless (Creswell & Bajaj (2007)). The trade 
with structured financial products ended abruptly reflected by a low issuing volume in of 
USD 23 bn November 2007 compared to USD 38 bn in March 2007 (Lahart (2007)).  
This slowdown of the market released a chain reaction: banks and hedge funds 
around the globe tried to sell their CDO to only a few buyers. The crash of the CDO prices led 
to enormous write-downs as they were valued according the fair value principle. Due to the 
fear of credit failures and the unexpectedly emerged difficulties to pass acquired risk on other 
market participants, banks were suddenly no longer willing to lend money to companies and 
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to each other (Illing (2007)). The interventions of central banks worldwide calmed the nerv-
ous markets only shortly. The hoped stabilization of the money market and the disappearance 
of liquidity shortage could not be reached. The crash of the fixed income market overlapped 
the stock markets signifying the end of the latest M&A and economic boom phase and caus-
ing a tremendous increase of gold and oil prices. 
5.3.3 Consequences for US Universal Banks – The Strength of JPM 
The financial crisis hit many US full service banks profoundly uncovering weak balance 
sheets and the intense involvement with structured financial products caused by banks’ 
changed business model. As banks moved more and more towards an equity culture with fo-
cus on faster share price growth and earnings expansion, the previous model based on balance 
sheets and old-fashioned spreads on loans was not beneficial anymore. This switching strate-
gy more towards activity based on trading income and fees via securitization is key to drive 
revenue, Return on Capital (ROC) and share price higher, but simultaneously, forces banks 
taking higher risks and recognizing up-front revenue (Blundell-Wignall et al. (2008a)). At the 
time as the CDO market broke down, it became obvious that some banks, which are in the 
focus of this study, did not make sustainable business anymore but rather focusing on short-
term profits. Respective accounting data in the appendix enforce these propositions43 expos-
ing JPM as winner and in particular, BofA and Citi as crisis losers. 
Analyzing selected balance sheet figures of Appendix 10, JPM emphasizes its supe-
rior crisis performance as the numbers attest its strong equity base and a minor impact of the 
financial crisis. According to total assets, JPM is currently the largest US bank surpassing its 
fiercest competitors BofA and Citi for the first time in 2008, what is attributable to the two 
acquisitions of distressed banks. BofA also purchasing two major players in 2008, on the oth-
er hand, accounts only for a small increase of their total assets. Moreover, Citi even records a 
considerable decline in total assets of USD 249.2 bn. The other sample banks either denote a 
significant accession of their total assets by acquiring troubled banks also in 2008 like PNC 
and WF or indicate an adequate increase by internal growth such as Capital, Fifth Third, and 
Sun. In addition, distressed bank acquisitions also have implications on total customer loans 
as JPM, PNC and WF display the strongest increase in 2008 whereas Capital, Citi, Fifth 
Third, and Sun purchasing no troubled banks experience a minor increase or even a decline. 
Looking at the respective figures to BofA, the accretion is not satisfying at all bearing in mind 
                                                 
43  Since US universal bank are analyzed according to the selection criteria presented in Chapter 5.4.3, only the 
accounting data of Bank of America (BofA), Capital One Financial Corporation (Capital), Citigroup (Citi), 
Fifth Third Bancorp (Fifth Third), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), PNC Financial Services Group (PNC), 
SunTrust Banks (Sun), and Wells Fargo (WF) are displayed. 
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the two conducted acquisitions. Regarding banks’ equity, the majority of sample banks suffers 
from decreasing figures between 2007 and 2008 (BofA, Capital, Citi, Fifth Third, and Sun). 
Especially, Citi’s equity diminishes alarmingly by 35.4%. JPM, PNC, and WF, however, gen-
erate an increase in equity. On the other hand, all banks feel impelled to elevate extremely 
their loan loss provisions in 2008 as they expect more write-offs of mortgage loans and credit 
card debts in the upcoming future. Fifth Third, for example, allocates an amount in 2008 ex-
ceeding 2007 figures by more than 630%. However, in absolute figures, Citi accounts for the 
highest number of USD 33.7 bn directly followed by BofA with USD 26.8 bn in 2008. Taking 
into consideration the interrelation between equity and loan loss provision, JPM’s strength is 
highlighted: Despite of the rise in loan loss provision by USD 14.1 bn supplied by bank’s 
equity, it is able to increase its equity by 9.5%, simultaneously. 
Analyzing profit/loss statement figures, trading incomes in 2008 and partly in 2007 
are identified as significant loss makers symbolizing the impact of the financial crisis 
(Appendix 11). Already suffering from a loss of USD 12.1 bn in 2007, Citi displays the most 
negative result with USD 22.2 bn for 2008, which is twice as high as the negative result of 
JPM. Write-downs/credit losses, in addition, demonstrate the same outcome: Citi is concerned 
very badly with USD 23.8 bn and USD 64.3 bn in 2007 and 2008, respectively, reflecting its 
strong involvement in CDO investments. Although BofA, JPM, PNC, and WF also denote 
meaningful write-downs/credit losses in 2008, these figures need to be constrained as they are 
partially reflecting the aftermaths of the distressed bank acquisitions. Looking at 2007 figures, 
this statement is strengthened, as write write-downs/credit losses are of minor characters. 
Nevertheless, the figures stress the high risks incorporated with these acquisitions and bring 
up the question whether the respective transactions costs are justified. Since both negative 
trading incomes and write-downs/credit losses have a negative effect on banks’ overall per-
formance, they cause a huge loss of USD 27.7 bn to Citi despite of its positive net interest 
revenue and other operating income. The positive opposite, on the other hand, is JPM with the 
highest profit of all sample banks with USD 5.6 bn in the face of negative trading outcome 
and high write-downs. Bearing in mind that loss has a negative effect on banks’ equity, it is 
comprehensible that the majority of banks’ equity fuses between 2007 and 2008.  
Taking a closer look on performance indicators presented in Appendix 12, Citi as 
well as Fifth Third demonstrate the poorest results concerning ROAA and ROAE followed by 
Capital and BofA. Even though, JPM displays worse results in 2008 compared to prior years, 
both key ratios show a relatively stable performance. As measured by relative changes of 
ROAA and ROAE, only PNC and Sun signify a lower decline compared to JPM. Observing 
BofA, Citi and WF in particular, it can be observed that their high ROAE of around 20% in 
prior years are not substantial as they are now suffering from smaller or even negative ratios. 
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The numbers of banks’ tier 1 capital ratios need to be examined with caution as they are 
boosted by governmental aid, which banks received in the context of the Troubled Asset Re-
lief Program (TARP)44 presented by Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: Received Bailout Money to Analyzed US Universal Banks 
 
Source: Own illustration; Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Propublica. 
a 2009 comprises the first six months of this year. 
b  Returned money as by June, 2009. 
However, even without the aid of USD 25 bn, tier 1 capital ratio of JPM would be at 
8.9% in 2008 exceeding the 2007 ratio of 8.4% (JPM Annual Report 2008). BofA and WF 
obtaining the same or even higher amount as JPM present nevertheless a lower 2008 ratio. 
Moreover, JPM is the only approved bank in the sample besides Capital to pay back the re-
ceived bailout money as its strength is testified by a positive stress test. Concerning CIR, Citi 
presents once more the worst results compared to the other banks displaying no alarming but 
a quite satisfying CIR. 
Summarizing, it is adhered that the financial crisis has a minor impact on JPM’s bal-
ance sheet, profit/loss statement, and respective performance ratios, which underlines its 
strong capital base as well as its profitability and efficiency. Various factors cause JPM’s suc-
cess and strength and build up its good reputation, which is assumed to influence market’s 
perception to its M&A deals positively: Firstly, JPM stayed away from sponsoring SIV be-
cause they imposed plenty of risk and limited business purpose. Moreover, JPM substantially 
cut back on subprime and started reducing its exposure already in 2006. The bank never built 
up the structured finance business. In addition, the bank did not write option adjusted rate 
                                                 
44  The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is a program of the United States government to buy senior 
preferred stock and warrants in American financial institutions in order to strengthen the financial sector. The 
shares would qualify as Tier 1 capital and were non-voting shares. Table 5.2 displays the corresponding re-
ceived amounts of US full service banks analyzed in this study. 
Overview Banks 2008 2009
a ∑
Share of 
value (%)
Returned 
money (%)
b
Bank of America 15,00 37,50 52,50 30,5% 0%
Capital One Financial 3,60 - 3,60 2,1% 100%
Citigroup 45,00 5,00 50,00 29,1% 0%
Fifth Third Bancorp 3,40 - 3,40 2,0% 0%
JPMorgan Chase 25,00 - 25,00 14,5% 100%
PNC Financial Services 7,60 - 7,60 4,4% 0%
SunTrust Banks 4,90 - 4,90 2,8% 0%
Wells Fargo 25,00 - 25,00 14,5% 0%
Total 129,50 42,50 172,00 100,0% -
Bailout money in USD bn
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mortgage as they result often in debtors’ failure. Although it was a large player in the asset-
backed securities market, it avoided CDO, as the associated risk was too high. Moreover, JPM 
always targeted high tier 1 capital ratio of around 8% and maintained high level of liquidity to 
be prepared for unexpected draws. Finally, JPM avoided short-term funding and did not bor-
row short to invest long (JPM Annual Report 2008). 
5.4 Research Hypotheses, Methodology, and Data 
5.4.1 Hypotheses Generation – Role of Timing at M&A Transactions 
If bank managers act in the best interest of their owners, acquiring banks’ shareholders should 
get additional value from M&A transactions. In efficient capital markets, the abnormal stock 
returns reflect the value creation with respect to takeover premium, synergy potential as well 
as efficiency gains through economies of scale (Chehab (2002)). However, empirical research 
on the banking industry provides a different view. Most studies for the US banking industry 
find small negative abnormal returns for the group of bidders (e.g., Cornett et al. (2003); De-
Long & DeYoung (2005); Houston & Ryngaert (1994); Kane (2000); Madura & Wiant 
(1994); Siems (1996); Toyne & Tripp (1998)). 
However, these older studies do not explicitly focus on the role of timing at M&A 
transactions making no differentiation whether M&A deals take place during a boom phase or 
during a crisis. Since the latest financial crisis is harder than any other after World War II, this 
study addresses this research gap. It assumes that M&A transactions in financial crisis take 
place under very specific circumstances compared to M&A deals occurring in ‘normal’ time 
resulting in different capital market reactions as reported in former studies. At crisis time, for 
instance, acquisitions are rather opportunistically motivated as targets are less costly due to 
lower market values and fewer potential buyers. Moreover, markets overreact anxiously to 
any negative news whereas simultaneously, the entire economy experiences a downturn. 
Consequently, these suppositions are applied to JPM, which is affected far less by the 
financial crisis compared to its competitors and seems to be one of the crisis winners: 
H5.1a Transaction announcements of JPM during the latest M&A boom have negative ab-
normal effects on JPM’s share prices on average according to previous research. 
H5.1b Transaction announcements of JPM during the financial crisis lead to positive aver-
age abnormal returns to its shareholders as the bank does not suffer a loss of reputa-
tion and the market believes in value creating crisis transactions. 
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H5.1c Transaction announcements of JPM in general – before and during the financial cri-
sis – generate as a whole positive average abnormal returns to its investors as the 
positive abnormal crisis returns exceed the negative abnormal boom returns on av-
erage. 
Since competing universal banks of JPM are stroked more profoundly by the finan-
cial crisis, different hypotheses are necessary to derive: 
H5.2a Transaction announcements of competing universal banks during the latest M&A 
boom have negative abnormal effects on their share prices on average according to 
previous research. 
H5.2b Transaction announcements of competing universal banks during the financial crisis 
lead to negative average abnormal returns to their shareholders confirming previous 
research. However, they exceed the negative pre-crisis average abnormal return 
considerably as these banks suffer a loss of reputation due to the crisis and have to 
cope with tremendous internal problems. 
H5.2c Transaction announcements of competing universal banks in general – before and 
during the financial crisis – generate as a whole negative average abnormal returns 
to their investors according to previous research. 
Given that JPM’s crisis acquisitions incorporate exclusively troubled financial insti-
tutions, the study analyzes solely transactions of troubled financial institutions by competing 
universal banks leading to the next hypotheses: 
H5.3a Transaction announcements of competing universal banks purchasing troubled fi-
nancial institutions caused by the financial crisis lead to negative average abnormal 
returns compared to the positive average abnormal returns of JPM’s crisis transac-
tions. 
H5.3b The results to competing universal banks acquiring troubled financial institutions 
exceed the negative average abnormal returns to other competing universal banks 
acquiring non-troubled financial institutions during the crisis. Since former banks 
already have to cope with own tremendous internal problems, the market has even 
intensified doubts in successful integration of troubled targets and wealth creation. 
As M&A activities of single banks have not only an effect on themselves, but they 
also influence the industry as a whole, the study analyzes in addition the reactions on banks to 
M&A announcements of their respective rival banks. Previous empirical studies analyzing 
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share price reactions of competing firms to M&A deals within their industry identify positive 
wealth effect for rivals when a competitor is being acquired (e.g., Akhigbe & Madura (1999); 
Eckbo (1983, 1985, and 1992); Song & Walkling (2000); Stillman (1983)). 
The explanations behind the observed abnormal rival returns are subsumed under 
market power, efficiency and acquisition probability. Some acquisition strategies aim at in-
creasing market power permitting merging firms and the rivals to amplify their own wealth at 
the expense of customers and suppliers (Berger et al. (1999)). As the number of competitors 
diminishes and the market concentration increases through M&A deals within the same indus-
try, successful collusion among the remaining market participants is more easily feasible 
(Stigler (1964)). Therefore, M&A transactions result in a positive wealth effect for rivals as 
they benefit from increased industry concentration (Eckbo (1983)). 
Since only 50-60% of positive rival wealth effects are explained by the factor of in-
creased market power and its exploitation, a second factor named efficiency needs to be con-
sidered. This factor is two-folded having negative as well as positive wealth effects on rival 
firms. If M&A leads to efficiency enhancement of the larger combined entity, the business 
environment becomes more competitive and rivals get difficulties to maintain their perfor-
mance level resulting in a loss of market shares and negative abnormal returns (Bohl, Havryl-
chyk, & Schiereck (2004)). On the other side, the amelioration of efficiency caused by the 
mergers of two banks has a positive impact on rivals as their efficiency also increases (Eckbo 
(1983)). Rivals can benefit from efficiency spill-over effects from the more efficient peer 
company (Claessens et al. (2001)).  
The last factor describes the possibility that M&A announcement indicates that an 
industry-specific resource becomes more valuable increasing the acquisition probability of 
competitors of the target (Eckbo (1992)). Since premiums are paid for acquired firms not con-
sidering whether there is any synergy potential or bad target management, acquisitions cause 
an industry shock resulting in a probability assessment for potential acquisitions and abnormal 
positive returns of rivals (Akhigbe & Madura (1999); Song & Walkling (2000)). 
The rationale behind the three main factors is supposed leading to positive wealth ef-
fects for rivals in general. The study applies them to JPM analyzing its share price reactions 
according to M&A announcements of its competitive banks. As a result, the subsequent hypo-
theses are composed with the distinction in pre-crisis and crisis deals: 
H5.4a Transaction announcements of rival banks during the latest M&A boom have posi-
tive abnormal effects on JPM’s share price on average according to previous re-
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search. 
H5.4b Transaction announcements of rival banks during the financial crisis lead to positive 
average abnormal returns to JPM confirming previous research. However, they ex-
ceed the positive pre-crisis average abnormal returns as especially the two factors, 
market power and efficiency spill-over effect, are amplified by the crisis due to acqui-
sitions of important market players. The market believes that JPM is able to take 
great advantage of rivals’ acquisitions. 
H5.4c Transaction announcements of rival banks in general – before and during the finan-
cial crisis – generate as a whole positive abnormal returns to the investors of JPM on 
average according to previous research. 
Finally, the study also adopts the described factors to rival banks analyzing their 
share price reactions according to M&A announcements of JPM leading to the following hy-
potheses: 
H5.5a Transaction announcements of JPM during the latest M&A boom have positive aver-
age abnormal effects on rival banks’ share prices according to previous research. 
H5.5b Transaction announcements of JPM during the financial crisis lead to negative aver-
age abnormal returns to rival banks. Since JPM purchases two large and important 
market players at low transaction prices, it is assumed that the resulting efficiency 
gains to JPM have a negative effect on its competitors adumbrating the positive effects 
of market power and acquisition probability. 
H5.5c Transaction announcements of JPM in general – before and during the financial crisis 
– generate as a whole negative abnormal returns to bank rivals’ investors on average 
as the positive pre-crisis returns are beaten by the negative crisis returns. 
 
5.4.2 Research Methodology 
Following a standard research approach the event study methodology is applied to evaluate 
whether there are any abnormal wealth effects as a result of M&A transactions announced 
before and during the most recent financial crisis for selected US full service banks. This me-
thodology has been employed in a large body of scientific research as it results in a trustwor-
thy measure of the value creation or destruction by announcements of M&A transactions 
(Brown & Warner (1985); Dodd & Warner (1983); Kothari & Warner (2007)). Firstly, the 
study assesses the abnormal effects of acquisition announcements on bidder shareholder val-
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ue, which is similar to the chosen approach of most prior research. Secondly, the analysis is 
extended examining effects of the same M&A announcements on non-merging rival banks. 
The study pursues the event study methodology relying on the market model based 
approach according to Dodd & Warner (1983) and Brown & Warner (1985) following the 
form. Abnormal returns for firm  at date  U
V are estimated as 
 B 
    	
, 
where 
 is the return of the relevant country-specific Datastream industry index on day . 
Hereby, abnormal returns describe the difference between the expected returns and the actual 
returns observed in the market. The market model parameters are estimated over an observa-
tion period of 150 trading days starting at day t-180 to t-31 relative to the announcement date. 
Announcement dates are used as reported by Thomson Financial and crosscheck the date us-
ing press research via Factiva. The event window comprises 61 days: T = [-30;+30] days, 
where  = 0 determines the announcement day of a transaction. The abnormal returns are 
summed up over various event windows, e.g., [-1;+1], [-30;+30] etc. to attain the CAR for 
each stock in the sample. Finally, the CAR are aggregated over the stocks and divided by the 
number of stocks to yield the CAAR of the group. 
To test for statistical significance of the observed CAR and CAAR, the study follows 
the recommendation of Harrington and David (2007) and applies the test statistics of Boeh-
mer et al. (1991) with the respective standardization procedure suggested by Mikkelson and 
Partch (1988). The test statistic z is used to account for the likely difference in cross-sectional 
return variance between the estimation period from t-180 to t-31 and the event window follow-
ing a student t-distribution with T-2 degrees of freedom. The test results appear to be robust in 
the absence of event-induced variance increases (Serra (2004)).45 Test for difference in means 
is evaluated using the standard t-test statistic. 
5.4.3 Data Sample and M&A Activities of US Universal Banks 
Since this study analyzes M&A deals of the latest merger wave and the latest financial crisis 
comparing their assumed different market perceptions, relevant deals occur between 2003 and 
April 2009. These deals are identified using the Thompson Financial SDC database. To verify 
their M&A announcement dates, additional press research has been performed. Moreover, 
Datastream (also provided by Thomson Financial) is used to attain returns on individual equi-
                                                 
45  The applied research methods are described extensively in Chapters 2.3.1 and 2.3.3. 
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ties46, market index, and market caps. The respective transactions have been chosen according 
to the following criteria: 
 Transactions have been announced between January 1, 2003 and April 30, 2009. 
 Bidders have been classified as US universal banks with comparable business model 
and total assets of at least USD 100 bn in 2008 and as recipients of TARP money of 
at least USD 1 bn.47 
 Bidders performed at least four transactions in the defined period with at least one 
transaction during financial crisis. 
 Bidders were listed on US stock exchange for at least 180 days prior to the an-
nouncement and 30 days after the announcement of transaction. 
 Targets have been classified according to TF Mid Code either as “bank”, “credit in-
stitution”, “asset management”, or “brokerage”. 
 Transactions have been closed – the deal status hence is “completed”. 
 In all transactions, a true change of corporate control took place – bidders attain full 
control (>50%) over the targets after the transaction. 
72 M&A acquisitions are identified as basis of the analysis according to the selection 
criteria initiated by eight US universal banks.48 For these banks, the event as well as the rival 
study is performed. Appendix 13 lists the transactions, at which grey-highlighted deals incor-
porate troubled target banks.49 Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 demonstrate an overview of the M&A 
activity and transaction values of the sample banks, respectively, subdivided by the two pe-
riods pre-crisis and crisis. Pre-crisis describes the period of the sixth M&A wave (2003–
06/2007) and crisis illustrates the time started in July 2007 lasting until today (04/2009).50 
                                                 
46  For individual equities and market index, the study relies on the Return Index (RI) provided by Datastream as 
this index accounts inter alia for dividend payments and corporate actions. Therefore, it reflects the “total re-
turn” of investors.  
47  The bidders represent simultaneously the rival bank portfolio consisting of eight universal banks. 
48  Especially the second selection criterion is important to assure comparability of the banks and the expres-
siveness of the rival results. 
49  The Federal Reserve supports these acquisitions of troubled banks. 
50  For the purpose of this study, the sixth merger wave is extended to July 2007 as the study takes the declara-
tion of Bear Stearns that two of their hedge funds are worthless as starting point of the crisis terminating the 
latest merger wave. Market participants expected that the crash of the US housing market would leave the 
rest of the financial system and the real sector relatively unharmed. For this reason, the virulence of the sub-
prime contagion caught everybody by surprise though the signs of the trouble had been obvious from the 
second half of 2006. 
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Starting with the description of the latest merger wave, US universal banks show an 
intense M&A activity with 57 deals pushing the banking industry consolidation compared to 
the minor activity of 15 deals during crisis (Table 5.3). The annual average of 12.7 pre-crisis 
deals amplifies this high activity compared to the annual average of 8.2 deals within the fi-
nancial crisis. Citi prove to be the most aggressive bidding bank by far with 20 deals over the 
entire period, both on national and international level, followed by BofA, JPM and WF with 
“only” ten transactions each. Other sample banks are even less active with eight transactions 
of PNC down to four deals of Fifth Third. Citi’s aggressive M&A procedure may explain par-
tially its failure as the integration of 20 financial institutions demands high management atten-
tion and monitoring. Its pursued strategy providing all financial products of one hand sup-
ported by massive acquisitions around the globe did not pay off, as consumers were not ap-
pallingly interested in one-stop shopping. Moreover, a string of Citi’s executives failed to get 
their arms around the sprawling global company overseeing all of the pieces, people and sys-
tems professionally (Enrich (2009)). As a result, Citi suffers extremely from the crisis, as it 
has to cope with tremendous organizational and operational problems, still digests recent ac-
quisitions, and suffers from high losses caused by its involvement with structured financial 
products. 
Table 5.3: M&A Activity of US Universal Banks 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
a Pre-crisis data describe the period of the latest merger wave, which persisted from the beginning of 2003 to the 
end of June 2007. 
b Crisis data describe the period starting in July 2007 with the declaration of Bear Stearns that two of their hedge  
 funds are worthless (Creswell and Bajaj (2007)) till today (April 2009). 
Table 5.4 presenting the transactions values of the respective M&A deals is partially 
constrained as not all transaction values are fully disclosed. Especially, the spent dollar 
amounts of Citi are rather low as only nine of 20 transaction values are released. Neverthe-
less, the data show that the pre-crisis deal values amount to USD 229.3 bn and the respective 
crisis values only to USD 78.6 bn. The average deal value of all disclosed 47 transactions 
reach a level of USD 6.6 bn. Taking the different lengths of the two periods into account, 
Overview Banks N
Pre-
crisis
a Crisis
b Ø N p.a.
Ø N pre-
crisis p.a.
Ø N crisis 
p.a.
National
Cross-
border
Bank of America 10 8 2 1,58 1,78 1,09 10 -
Capital One Financial 5 4 1 0,79 0,89 0,55 4 1
Citigroup 20 17 3 3,16 3,78 1,64 10 10
Fifth Third Bancorp 4 2 2 0,63 0,44 1,09 4 -
JPMorgan Chase 10 8 2 1,58 1,78 1,09 9 1
PNC Financial Services 8 6 2 1,26 1,33 1,09 8 -
SunTrust Banks 5 4 1 0,79 0,89 0,55 5 -
Wells Fargo 10 8 2 1,58 1,78 1,09 10 -
72 57 15 11,37 12,67 8,18 60 12
100% 79,2% 20,8% - - - 83,3% 16,7%
Number of transactions
Total 
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however, the average crisis value p.a. is more as twice as high as the annual average pre-crisis 
value. Two institutions, which take no advantage of the crisis with its usually lower acquisi-
tions prices, cause this paradox: BofA and WF make expensive crisis acquisitions of USD 
52.9 bn and USD 15.1 bn, respectively. In particular, BofA’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch of 
USD 47.8 bn was very expensive, bearing in mind the highly involved risks, the pace of due 
diligence process and the actual diminished market value of the broker in relation to the paid 
acquisition price. In addition, BofA already invested the highest amount of USD 109.4 bn 
during the latest merger wave compared to all other sample banks sponsored by cheap and 
plentiful financing in the debt markets and a booming stock market. Normally, this bank has 
made one big deal and then taken time to merge carefully the two institutions, but in recent 
years, acquisitions have come at a furious pace purchasing big companies at high prices (cp. 
Appendix 13). At the time of the financial crisis, the defects of this assembled empire have 
been exposed. By taking risks in many different businesses and geographic areas, the compa-
ny exposed itself to misery when the US housing bubble burst and economy fell into reces-
sion. BofA still digesting its expensive pre-crisis acquisitions needs to integrate two distressed 
banks on top symbolizing even more management attention and higher incorporated risks 
(Karnitschnig, Mollenkamp, & Fitzpatrick (2008)). 
Table 5.4: Transaction Values of US Universal Banks 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
a Numbers in brackets indicate the total number of transactions over the respective time period. 
b Pre-crisis data describe the period of the latest merger wave, which persisted from the beginning of 2003 to the 
end of June 2007. 
c Crisis data describe the period starting in July 2007 with the declaration of Bear Stearns that two of their hedge 
funds are worthless (Creswell and Bajaj (2007)) till today (April 2009). 
JPM makes acquisitions at reasonable prices before crisis and acquires two important 
institutions at discounted costs during the crisis. Only Capital, Citi and Sun pay less on aver-
age within the crisis. However, their investments are not as significant as JPM’s ones involv-
ing Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual. Comparing their book values with the actual acqui-
sition price, both transactions were rather ‘gifts’ as true acquisitions. Therefore, JPM exploits 
Overview Banks N Total
Pre-
crisis
Crisis
Ø 
Value
Ø 
value 
p.a.
Ø value 
pre-crisis 
p.a.
Ø 
value 
crisis 
p.a.Bank of America 6 4 (8) 2 (2) 162,28 109,37 52,91 27,05 4,27 6,08 14,43
Capital One Financial 5 4 (4) 1 (1) 20,83 20,31 0,52 4,17 0,66 1,13 0,28
Citigroup 9 8 (17) 1 (3) 15,16 14,48 0,68 1,68 0,27 0,40 0,37
Fifth Third Bancorp 3 2 (2) 1 (2) 3,06 3,06 n.a. 1,02 0,16 0,34 n.a.
JPMorgan Chase 8 6 (8) 2 (2) 66,80 63,72 3,08 8,35 1,32 2,36 0,84
PNC Financial Services 6 4 (6) 2 (2) 13,87 7,69 6,18 2,31 0,36 0,43 1,69
SunTrust Banks 4 3 (4) 1 (1) 7,59 7,44 0,15 1,90 0,30 0,55 0,08
Wells Fargo 6 5 (8) 1 (2) 18,36 3,25 15,11 3,06 0,48 0,14 8,24
Total 47 36 (57) 11 (15) 307,95 229,32 78,63 6,55 1,03 1,42 3,90
Number of transactions with 
disclosed value
a Transaction values in USD bn
Disclosed 
value pre-
crisis
b
Disclosed 
value 
crisis
c
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the crisis for expansion and acquires opportunistically important competitors at very low pric-
es, especially compared to BofA and WF. Furthermore, JPM shows no abnormally aggressive 
M&A behavior during the boom phase. A statement of JPM’s CEO reflects its prudential 
M&A approach: “our goal is to be the best not necessarily the biggest […]. Ultimately, this is 
also the only real reason to do a merger – the client gets something better” (JPM Annual Re-
port 2008, p. 8). 
5.5 Empirical Results 
5.5.1 Short-term Valuation Effects to JPM and Rival Banks 
In order to derive a comprehensive picture of the wealth creation through M&A in the US 
banking industry during the latest merger wave and the most recent financial crisis, the first 
step in this analysis determines the average cumulative abnormal returns to JPM. The respec-
tive results to JPM purchasing financial institutions between 2003 and today are given in Ta-
ble 5.5. 
Starting with pre-crisis results of eight M&A transactions (Panel I), hypothesis H5.1a 
is partially confirmed as CAAR are significantly negative in three intervals at the 10% level  
([-5;+5]; [0;+3]; [0;+30]). However, CAAR to JPM also display two significantly positive 
values, +0.27% and +0.08% at the 5% and 10 % level, respectively, for the event windows  
[-20;+20] and [-1;+1]. These results can be explained using capital market expectations of 
significant cost-saving opportunities in the banking industry, which dominate the negative 
effects of paying a premium above fair value of the target company. Overall, these mixed re-
sults are consistent with earlier US banking event studies finding significant negative abnor-
mal returns for bidding banks on average reflecting shareholder wealth destruction (e.g., Kane 
(2000); Madura & Wiant (1994); Siems (1996)). The analysis perceives that both event win-
dows estimating significantly positive CAAR incorporate the period prior to and after deal 
announcement whereas two of the three event windows displaying significantly negative 
CAAR only take into consideration the time at and after deal announcement ([0;+3]; 
[0;+30]).This pattern can be interpreted that the market evaluates JPM’s pre-crisis transac-
tions positive before the official announcement outweighing the negative CAAR after an-
nouncement. As a result, the negative results to JPM at and after announcement date charac-
terize market’s perception of expensive target premiums actually paid dominating possible 
synergies effects. 
Panel II of Table 5.5 provides an overview of solely positive crisis CAAR across all 
event windows. Regardless of the throughout positive CAAR, hypothesis H5.1b cannot be 
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validated as they are statistically insignificant (which is not surprising with respect to a sam-
ple size of N = 2). Nevertheless, by displaying only positive and high CAAR the market 
seems to believe in JPM’s abilities to conduct valuable transactions and to extend its market 
power generating shareholder wealth even though in time of crisis. Due to its strong balance 
sheet and excellent performance during crisis, JPM’s management was requested twice by the 
Federal Reserve to buy troubled banks. Shareholders seem to account these actions as a seal 
of quality to JPM reacting consequently with positive CAAR despite of the rushed due dili-
gences and the conjoined risks. JPM meets shareholder interests in M&A as the bank is 
known for its strong focus on making acquisitions pay off as it relentlessly cuts costs and ob-
tains synergies in all areas (Sidel (2008); cp. positive CAAR of Panel I, Table 5.5). Moreover, 
the difference in means between the positive CAAR of Panel I and the negative CAAR of 
Panel II are highly significant at the 1% level for seven intervals supporting the derived hypo-
theses H5.1a and H5.1b. 
Table 5.5: CAAR to JPM 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to JPM. Abnormal returns were calculated using 
OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 150 trading days prior to the event window 
[-30;+30]. For the market return, the US bank index is applied. Statistical significance is tested using the cross-
sectional test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991). Panel I includes pre-crisis deals (N = 8), Panel II covers 
crisis deals (N = 2), and Panel III includes all JPM deals (N = 10). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
The average abnormal returns of all ten M&A deals, furthermore, display exclusively 
positive values exceeding the negative pre-crisis CAAR and suppose shareholder wealth crea-
tion in summary (Panel III, Table 5.5). However, due to the lack of statistical significance at 
any defined level, they are not meaningful leading to the rejection of hypothesis H5.1c. As an 
additional analysis of JPM’s transactions, the short-term chart developments of selected M&A 
deals are plotted (Appendix 14). Taking into account the two most significant transactions of 
JPM during the latest merger wave according to deal volume plus the two crisis deals, the 
 
Event 
window
z-score z-score z-score t-value
[-30;+30] 0,23 * 0,09 9,21 1,66 2,03 0,59 -8,97 -1,01
[-20;+20] 0,27 ** -0,04 9,02 4,26 2,02 0,58 -8,75 -1,19
[-5;+5] -0,09 * -0,09 11,09 5,11 2,15 1,10 -11,17 *** -3,92
[-3;+3] 0,26 0,53 9,70 6,55 2,15 1,62 -9,44 *** -6,74
[-1;+1] 0,08 * -0,12 9,69 35,03 2,00 1,42 -9,62 *** -9,10
[0] 0,05 0,35 6,91 1,80 1,42 1,33 -6,86 *** -6,85
[0;+1] -0,01 -0,20 9,21 12,85 1,84 1,31 -9,22 *** -9,39
[0;+3] 0,00 * 0,14 10,46 13,75 2,09 1,41 -10,47 *** -8,17
[0;+20] 0,05 0,14 12,36 23,27 2,51 1,25 -12,31 *** -3,52
[0;+30] -0,47 * -0,14 14,00 8,59 2,43 0,96 -14,47 ** -2,940
Panel I: Pre-Crisis 
deals (N=8)
Panel II: Crisis deals
(N=2)
Panel III: All deals
(N=10)
Difference in Means 
(Panel I vs. Panel II)
CAAR (%) CAAR (%) CAAR (%) ∆ CAAR (%)
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study observes positive daily stock reactions regarding the Bank of New York and the two 
crisis deals 30 days before and after the announcement date. These reactions are once again a 
demonstration of investors’ belief in the ability of JPM’s management to create value through 
conducted transactions. 
Analyzing CAAR to competing commercial banks, pre-crisis average abnormal re-
turns of 49 transactions exhibit negative results across all event windows (Panel I, Table 5.6). 
The negative returns range from -0.6% in the interval [-3;+3] to -1.4% in the event window  
[-30;+30] demonstrating higher negative pre-crisis CAAR as JPM’s ones. However, since 
they show no statistical significance according to the z-test, hypothesis H5.2a is not sup-
ported. There is no conclusive evidence that shareholders at acquiring banks experience value 
creation or destruction through these M&A deals; in other words whether premiums paid to 
targets above their fair values dominate cost-saving opportunities or vice versa. 
Table 5.6: CAAR to Rival Banks 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream.
 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to rival banks. Abnormal returns were calculated 
using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 150 trading days prior to the event 
window [-30;+30]. For the market return, the US bank index is applied. Statistical significance is tested using the 
cross-sectional test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991). Panel I includes pre-crisis deals (N = 49), Panel II 
covers crisis deals (N = 13), and Panel III includes all rival bank deals (N = 62). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Furthermore, hypothesis H5.2b does not hold true either as crisis CAAR of 13 M&A 
deals display both positive and negative values (Panel II, Table 5.6) without any statistical 
significance. Moreover, they exceed the negative abnormal returns of pre-crisis transactions 
(Panel I) only rarely. The market participants do not seem to punish bidding banks with nega-
tive CAAR acquiring financial institutions during the crisis in spite of high write-offs, minor 
profits or losses, management failures, and bad reputation. The positive results of Panel II 
even indicate that some banks generate positive crisis CAAR exceeding the negative average 
Event 
window
z-score z-score z-score t-value
[-30;+30] -1,40 -1,54 -3,82 -2,09 -1,92 -2,38 2,41 1,25
[-20;+20] -1,26 -1,59 -1,08 -1,13 -1,22 -1,97 -0,17 -0,10
[-5;+5] -0,70 -1,40 -1,40 -1,52 -0,85 -1,98 0,70 0,60
[-3;+3] -0,56 -1,58 -1,26 -1,02 -0,71 -1,90 0,70 0,63
[-1;+1] -0,84 -2,46 0,34 -0,38 -0,59 -2,31 -1,18 -1,35
[0] -0,75 -2,13 -0,50 -1,08 -0,70 -2,39 -0,25 -0,29
[0;+1] -0,78 -1,96 0,02 -0,61 -0,61 -2,03 -0,80 -0,87
[0;+3] -0,60 -1,54 0,29 -0,46 -0,41 -1,52 -0,90 -0,77
[0;+20] -0,92 -1,61 -1,05 -0,93 -0,95 -1,86 0,13 0,08
[0;+30] -0,94 -1,37 -1,48 -1,10 -1,06 -1,76 0,54 0,330
Difference in Means 
(Panel I vs. Panel II)
∆ CAAR (%)
Panel I: Pre-Crisis 
deals (N=49)
Panel II: Crisis deals
(N=13)
Panel III: All deals
(N=62)
CAAR (%) CAAR (%) CAAR (%)
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abnormal returns of other banks in the panel. Consequently, as H5.2a and H5.2b are not vali-
dated by the results, hypothesis H5.2c is not conformed either although CAAR of all 62 trans-
actions show negative values ranging from -0.4% to -1.9% (Panel III, Table 5.6). Since the z-
test does not attest statistical significance, there is no decisive evidence that acquisitions of 
rival banks destroy shareholder value in general. The difference in means between Panel I and 
Panel II are not statistically significant at any level affirming the rejection of the respective 
hypotheses. 
Table 5.7: Crisis CAAR to all Banks 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table shows the crisis results for M&A transactions of all banks in the sample between 07/2007 and 
04/2009. Abnormal returns were calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a 
period of 150 trading days prior to the event window [-30;+30]. For the market return, US bank index is applied. 
Test for significance is the z-test according to Boehmer et al. (1991). 
a Bank of America (2), Capital One Financial (1), PNC Financial Services (1), and Wells Fargo (1) acquired 
troubled banks during financial crisis. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of conducted deals. 
b Citigroup (3), Fifth Third Bancorp (2), PNC Financial Services (1), SunTrust Banks (1), and Wells Fargo (1) 
acquired ordinary banks during financial crisis. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of conducted deals. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 5.7 takes a closer look at crisis CAAR subdivided in acquisitions of troubled 
and non-troubled banks. Panel II provides an overview of the average abnormal returns accu-
mulative by rival banks purchasing troubled banks. In general, the CAAR to all rival banks 
acquiring troubled banks receive insignificant results. The negative sign of the entire sample 
is mainly attributable to BofA reflecting market’s doubts in value creating acquisitions due to 
high acquisitions prices, huge risks at target banks’ balance sheets, and rushed due diligences 
(Karnitschnig et al. (2008)). Since the positive CAAR is statistically significant at the 10% 
level in the event window [0;+1], hypothesis H5.3a is clearly rejected. The market appears to 
perceive rivals’ ability to acquire troubled banks as a sign of banks’ confidence in significant 
cost-saving opportunities and synergy effects leading to positive CAAR even if they are af-
Event 
window
z-score z-score z-score t-value
[-30;+30] 9,21 1,66 -1,79 -0,69 -5,08 -2,05 11,00 0,98
[-20;+20] 9,02 4,26 0,31 -0,20 -1,96 -1,17 8,71 1,00
[-5;+5] 11,09 5,11 -0,81 -0,23 -1,77 -1,74 11,89 * 1,79
[-3;+3] 9,70 6,55 -1,94 -0,40 -0,83 -0,93 11,64 1,74
[-1;+1] 9,69 35,03 1,18 0,17 -0,19 -0,70 8,51 * 1,78
[0] 6,91 1,80 0,05 -0,33 -0,83 -1,13 6,86 1,36
[0;+1] 9,21 12,85 1,05 * 0,13 -0,62 -0,99 8,16 1,72
[0;+3] 10,46 13,75 2,56 0,44 -1,12 -1,23 7,91 1,02
[0;+20] 12,36 184,03 1,41 0,17 -2,59 -1,36 10,95 1,15
[0;+30] 14,00 8,59 1,34 0,16 -3,24 -1,55 12,66 1,280
Difference in Means 
(Panel I vs. Panel II)
∆ CAAR (%)
Panel I: JPM crisis 
deals - Troubled 
banks (N=2)
Panel II: Rival banks 
crisis deals - Troubled 
banks (N=5)
a
Panel III: Rival banks 
crisis deals - Ordinary 
banks (N=8)
b
CAAR (%) CAAR (%) CAAR (%)
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fected intensely by the crisis demonstrated by corresponding accounting figures. Mean differ-
ence test between Panel I and Panel II is statistically significant at the 10% level for the event 
windows [-5;+5] and [-1;+1] indicating the crisis CAAR to JPM are significantly more posi-
tive than the ones to rivals banks.  
Moreover, taking JPM’s positive, but insignificant CAAR into account, the rejection 
of hypothesis H5.3a is even strengthened. Furthermore, results according to rival banks pur-
chasing non-distressed banks during crisis are solely negative spreading from -0.2% ([-1;+1]) 
to -5.1% ([-30;+30]) presented by Panel III. Given that their CAAR are not statistically signif-
icant and CAAR to banks bidding for troubled banks are (significantly) positive, hypothesis 
H5.3b does not hold true either. However, the results of Panel III confirms previous research 
like the ones of Cornett & De (1991), Hudgins & Seifert (1996), or Zhang (1995) as the re-
sults give neither room for interpretation of value creation nor value destruction. 
Turning the attention to the results of the rival bank event study, the study only ac-
counts for M&A deals within the US and not for cross-border transactions to assure compara-
bility of the study results and validation of the three defined rival factors market power, effi-
ciency, and acquisition probability for the US banking industry. As a result, the international 
transactions of Citi (10 deals), Capital (1 deal) and JPM (1 deal) are not considered at the rival 
bank event study. Panel I of Table 5.8 provides an overview of negative CAAR to JPM across 
all event windows instead of the predicted positive ones leading to rejection of hypothesis 
H5.4a. Hence, the results of 40 rival transactions to JPM do not confirm the previous research 
of Eckbo (1985), Song & Walkling (2000), and Stillman (1983), for instance. In recent years, 
however, researchers shifted their focus from averaging returns across different industries to a 
more detailed analysis of a single industry. In contrast to studies calculating an average across 
industries, the single-industry studies provide empirical evidence of negative abnormal re-
turns to rival companies being in line with outcomes of this study (e.g., Akdoğu (2003); Ak-
higbe & Martin (2002)). Their results imply that the negative effects of growing superior 
market player exceed the positive values of information on efficiency and cost-saving to ri-
vals. Since the mean of -0.03% in the three-day event window [-1;+1] and the mean of -
0.08% in the two-day event window [0;+1] exhibit statistical significance at the 10% and 5% 
level, respectively, their interpretation are confirmed making a clear assessment of value de-
struction to JPM’s shareholders through pre-crisis rivals’ M&A transactions. 
Assessing the reactions of JPM’s share price to rivals’ crisis M&A deals, some sig-
nificantly positive CAAR are shown for Panel II (Table 5.8) at a statistical significance level 
of 10% for the intervals [-3;+3] with +0.19%) and [0;+30] with +1.38%. These positive 
CAAR support hypothesis H5.4b. Since many important market players of the US were ob-
liged to put themselves up to sale due to the crisis (what was very unlikely to happen without 
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it), the resultant concentration within the US banking industry intensifies the market power of 
the remaining financial institutions and enhances efficiency of the whole industry justifying 
the significantly positive results to JPM. Hence, previous research like the studies by Eckbo 
(1983; 1985) is confirmed, for instance. The mean difference test between Panel I and Panel II 
indicate that the pre-crisis CAAR to JPM are significantly more negative than the respective 
crisis CAAR on many intervals. 
Regarding all 51 rival banks’ transactions during the sixth merger wave and latest fi-
nancial crisis, hypothesis H5.4c cannot be confirmed as respective CAAR to JPM demon-
strate negative values (Panel III, Table 5.8). Positive crisis results are overcompensated by the 
negative pre-crisis CAAR to JPM. This outcome gives room for interpretation that all transac-
tions of rival banks have negatively impacted JPM as their deals lead to efficiency enhance-
ment of the combined entity instead of efficiency spill-over effects benefiting JPM. The re-
sults of Panel III equal to Panel I confirm the negative findings of Akdoğu (2003) and Ak-
higbe & Martin (2002). 
Table 5.8: CAAR to JPM according to Rival Bank’ M&A Transactions 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table shows the results to JPM for M&A transactions of JPM’s rival banks. Abnormal returns were calcu-
lated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 150 trading days prior to the 
event window [-30;+30]. For the market return, US bank index is applied. Test for significance is the z-test ac-
cording to Boehmer et al. (1991). Panel I includes pre-crisis deals of rival banks to JPM (N = 40), Panel II covers 
crisis deals of rivals banks to JPM (N = 11), and Panel III includes all rival bank deals to JPM (N = 51). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Rivals’ CAAR as a reaction to M&A transactions conducted by JPM during the latest 
merger boom do not validate the hypothesis H5.5a as they demonstrate solely negative results 
across all event windows as shown by Panel I of Table 5.9. Equally to H5.4a, they do not 
support the outcome of Song & Walkling (2000) or Stillman (1983), but is consistent to the 
results of Akdoğu (2003) and Akhigbe & Martin (2002). However, due to the absence of sta-
Event 
window
z-score z-score z-score t-value
[-30;+30] -1,79 -1,27 3,31 0,87 -0,69 -0,36 -5,10 ** -2,10
[-20;+20] -1,54 -1,46 3,30 1,15 -0,50 -0,44 -4,84 ** -2,43
[-5;+5] -0,64 -1,09 1,84 0,67 -0,10 -0,41 -2,47 ** -2,01
[-3;+3] -0,48 -0,56 0,19 * 0,11 -0,33 -0,45 -0,67 -0,78
[-1;+1] -0,03 * 0,09 0,01 -0,65 -0,02 -0,17 -0,04 -0,09
[0] -0,05 -0,15 -0,74 -2,34 -0,20 -1,11 0,68 ** 2,45
[0;+1] -0,08 ** -0,02 -0,47 -1,03 -0,16 -0,56 0,39 0,81
[0;+3] -0,31 -0,39 -0,46 -0,46 -0,34 -0,58 0,15 0,21
[0;+20] -1,06 -1,37 0,35 * 0,10 -0,63 -0,80 -1,40 -1,20
[0;+30] -1,31 -1,61 1,38 0,67 -0,73 -0,80 -2,69 * -1,870
Panel I: Pre-Crisis 
deals (N=40)
Panel II: Crisis deals
(N=11)
Panel III: All deals
(N=51)
Difference in Means 
(Panel I vs. Panel II)
CAAR (%) CAAR (%) CAAR (%) ∆ CAAR (%)
138 5  Study 3: What Role does Timing play at M&A? – The Case 
 
tistical significance, explanatory power of the negative CAAR is limited and prevents a clear 
interpretation of the results. However, the negative CAAR give tendency that the market 
perceive the transaction of JPM as a potential threat to its rival banks. 
Considering specific crisis circumstance affecting the respective CAAR (Panel II, 
Table 5.9), hypothesis H5.5b is validated as negative values dominate pre-crisis values. Fur-
thermore, the event window [-3;+3] with CAAR of -1.5% is statically significant at the 5% 
level strengthening the validity of the hypothesis. The market seems to evaluate the two crisis 
transactions of JPM as a future threat to its competitors as it acquired two important market 
players at very low acquisition prices. Therefore, the negative values of growing superior 
market player with a highly possible predominance overlie the positive effects of market 
power for the whole banking industry, acquisition probability as well as information on effi-
ciency and cost-saving as proved by previous studies (e.g., Akdoğu (2003); Akhigbe & Mar-
tin (2002)). The difference test in means between Panel I and Panel II signifies that the pre-
crisis CAAR to rivals are significantly more negative than the respective crisis CAAR. 
The last hypothesis H5.5c is not proved as the CAAR to rival banks of all M&A 
transactions are not statistically significance even if they display only negative values (Panel 
III, Table 5.9). Although, CAAR of all deals are more negative than the ones of pre-crisis, 
their explanatory power is limited due to the missing statistical significance equivalent to the 
result of Panel I. 
Table 5.9: CAAR to Rival Banks according to JPM’s M&A Transactions 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
This table shows the results to rivals banks for M&A transactions of JPM. Abnormal returns were calculated 
using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 150 trading days prior to the event 
window [-30;+30]. For the market return, US bank index is applied. Test for significance is the z-test according 
to Boehmer et al. (1991). Panel I includes pre-crisis deals of JPM to rivals (N = 49), Panel II covers JPM’s crisis 
deals to rivals (N = 14), and Panel III includes all JPM’s deals to rivals (N = 63). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Event 
window
z-score z-score z-score t-value
[-30;+30] -0,93 -1,36 -0,38 -0,39 -0,81 -1,35 -0,55 -0,23
[-20;+20] -0,57 -1,57 -1,22 -0,65 -0,72 -1,65 0,65 0,26
[-5;+5] -0,75 -1,89 -2,92 -0,49 -1,24 -1,59 2,16 1,04
[-3;+3] -0,36 -1,43 -1,46 ** 0,02 -0,61 -0,99 1,10 0,68
[-1;+1] -0,35 -1,84 -1,78 -1,15 -0,67 -2,18 1,43 ** 2,27
[0] -0,19 -2,30 -2,18 -2,49 -0,63 -3,24 1,99 *** 4,55
[0;+1] -0,23 -1,57 -2,03 -1,52 -0,63 -2,18 1,81 *** 3,15
[0;+3] -0,06 -0,38 -3,33 -0,79 -0,79 -0,84 3,27 ** 2,21
[0;+20] 0,04 -0,83 -4,53 -1,62 -0,98 -1,69 4,57 *** 3,87
[0;+30] -0,02 -0,73 -4,31 -1,08 -0,97 -1,28 4,29 ** 2,070
CAAR (%) CAAR (%) CAAR (%)
Difference in Means 
(Panel I vs. Panel II)
∆ CAAR (%)
Panel I: Pre-Crisis 
deals (N=49)
Panel II: Crisis deals
(N=14)
Panel III: All deals
(N=63)
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5.5.2 Long-term Market Performance of JPM and Rival Banks 
Besides the short-term performance results of the event study, the study analyze the long-term 
market performance results of JPM and its rival banks. Figure 5.4 shows the long-term chart 
development perceiving that the monthly performance of JPM is far better than rivals’ per-
formance and as well as superior compared to all US banks in general and the Dow Jones In-
dustry Average, respectively. 
Taking into account the two most valuable transactions of JPM during the latest mer-
ger wave plus the two crisis deals, positive long-term reactions of JPM stocks are observable. 
After the acquisition of Washington Mutual, however, stock value decreases tremendously in 
a very short time similarly to all other displayed stocks. This decline is caused by agglomera-
tion of very terrible news in a very short time about different market players and their risky 
assets causing even bank bankruptcies (e.g., bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers; almost collapse 
of Washington Mutual and Merrill Lynch; banks’ exposure of troubled papers in their balance 
sheets, etc.). Consequently, the whole market was trembling as every day popped up bad news 
amplifying the uncertainty and anxiety in the market. Since nobody really knew how many 
toxic papers were in banks’ balance sheets, investors wanted to get rid off their papers causing 
falling share prices. Nevertheless, JPM’s stock recovers rapidly generating a value of 152 by 
end of April 2009 compared to the starting value of 100 in 2003. It is surprisingly, moreover, 
that the lowest value of JPM does not occur during crisis but in the beginning of 2003 with a 
low February value of 87.51 
Rivals, on the other hand, are far away from its starting value of 100. They seem to 
need more time for recovery. Furthermore, the reactions of rival banks to announcements of 
JPM’s crisis transactions seem to be negative. However, this observation needs to be con-
straint as rivals’ reactions might be diluted by the most recent market turbulences. Looking 
closer at the individual bank returns displayed by Appendix 15, the study examines that all 
banks apart from JPM have declining values. Fifth Third, Citi and BofA are front-runners 
with a negative CAGR over the entire period of -33.8%, -30.6% and -19.4%, respectively. 
Although JPM generates a negative crisis CAGR of -24.0%, nevertheless, the total CAGR is 
positive even though with a minor value. The two-digit compounded annual growth rate of a 
period of four and half years is more or less destroyed in less than two years reflecting the not 
existing sustainability of the business of US banks. 
 
                                                 
51  The bad performance of JPM resulted from its role in the Enron collapse. JPM was accused of helping Enron 
to disguise its debt. 
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Figure 5.4: Long-term RI Development of JPM and Rival Banks 
 
Source: Own illustration; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
Note: Monthly average data. Values are indexed with base year value of 100 in 2003. 
Examining monthly long-term market values, JPM is clearly identified again as the 
best performer (Figure 5.5). Although its market values decrease once again in fall of 2008, 
rapid recovery is noticeable by the end of April 2009 reflected by an increase of 230 points 
compared to the base value of 100 in 2003. Moreover, JPM’s M&A activities seem to streng-
then its market value performance as shown by four example transactions. In addition, JPM 
considerably outperforms its competitors as well as all listed US Banks and the US economy 
measured by Dow Jones Industry Average. Although, the market value performances of rival 
banks are worse than JPM’s, their market values do not decrease as much as the ones of all 
US banks and other companies, respectively. 
Appendix 16 highlights the even more precisely the market value development of the 
respective banks. Once being the largest bank according to its market value Citi loses more 
than 90% of its market value within only six years. This loss is underlined by the highly nega-
tive CAGR of 32.4%. Only two banks, JPM and PNC, generate positive CAGR over the ana-
lyzed period. The loss of market values within crisis is tremendous reflecting a huge destruc-
tion. JPM is now the largest US bank according to market value as well as to total assets as 
described beforehand. Moreover, it generated the highest profit of all sample banks emphasiz-
ing its winning role within the crisis. 
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Figure 5.5: Long-term Market Value Development of JPM and Rival Banks 
 
Source: Own illustration; Market Value data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
Note: Monthly average data. Values are indexed with base year value of 100 in 2003 
5.6 Conclusion 
The study builds up a sample of banking M&A transactions with change of corporate control 
among US universal bidding banks and (inter-)national target financial institutions covering 
in total 72 deals between the latest merger wave starting in 2003 and the latest financial crisis 
beginning by midyear 2007 lasting until today. The study contributes additional findings to 
the existing US bank M&A research. By analyzing the M&A announcements occurring dur-
ing the sixth merger boom and the most recent financial crisis, the study quantities the impact 
of timing on these M&A transactions. Since it identifies JPM as a winning bank of the crisis 
based on strong financial figures, respective working hypotheses are derived, which are ap-
plied to JPM and its rival banks. The pre-crisis findings to JPM show consistency with US 
evidence and confirm the hypothesis by receiving significantly negative abnormal returns or 
value destruction for its shareholders from M&A deals. The pre-crisis CAAR results to rival 
banks, however, experience no significant abnormal returns resulting rejection of hypothesis 
and no clear statement whether their M&A transactions are value creating or destructing. 
Moreover, although the returns to JPM’s shareholders during the crisis are highly positive, 
they do not validate the assumption due to the lack of statistical significance. The crisis 
CAAR to competitive banks present mixed results, without statistical significance. Taking 
even a closer look on crisis CAAR to banks acquiring distressed banks, this study reports sig-
nificantly positive results. 
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In terms of rival effects, the study measures negative pre-crisis CAAR to JPM and 
competitive banks according to rival banks’ and JPM’s M&A transactions, respectively. Con-
cerning CAAR to JPM according to rivals’ crisis acquisitions it finds support for the hypothe-
sis as they are statistically significant with positive values. Hence, transactions of rivals in 
time of crisis have a positive impact on value creation of JPM’s shareholders. The results to 
competitive banks in reference to JPM’s crisis transactions also confirm the assumption dis-
play significantly negative values. The interpretation of the results, however, is different as 
they symbolize value destruction to rival banks caused by crisis M&A transactions of JPM. 
The study quantifies the stock market perceptions regarding banking M&A transac-
tions in the time of boom phase and time of crisis from different perspectives of one bank 
benefiting from the crisis and banks suffering from it. The outcomes clarify the particular as-
sumed value creation to a bank like JPM with a strong performance rewarded by the stock 
market for its sustainable business and renunciation on focusing on short-term profit. Other 
banks can learn from JPM as a bank with strong strings to its core banking business and long-
term strategy generating profits. 
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of this study needs to be limited, as abnormal 
average returns are only short-term market assessment of expected average returns from 
M&A transactions. Moreover, the results may be distorted by the market turbulences caused 
by the crisis, the non-rational behavior of market participants, and small data samples where 
statistical significance is not deducible. Additional studies are needed to asses the long-term 
bank performance of winners and losers of the most recent financial crisis. Furthermore, ac-
counting for the role of timing at M&A as the distinction between pre-crisis and crisis M&A 
transactions can be assessed in further studies incorporating previous merger waves and cris-
es. 
 6 Conclusion 
This doctoral thesis analyzes the impacts on shareholder wealth creation and operating per-
formance through M&A transactions in the international financial services industry. A de-
tailed analysis of this topic is mainly interesting for two main reasons, namely the relevance 
of the global financial service industry as a research object and the measurement and evalua-
tion of short- and long-term M&A success within this industry. 
Due to increased costs, deregulation of markets, technological and financial innova-
tions reducing former market power, the competitive pressure within the financial service 
industry has steadily increased (Llewellyn (1999)). If the home financial services industry is 
already highly consolidated and future growth potentials are limited, a possible solution for 
these incidents might be external growth on foreign markets in order to regain former 
strengths. Hence, M&A became a common strategic response for many industry players. 
Moreover, considering the financial services industry as the backbone of every nation’s econ-
omy, it is regarded as a value-investing industry with steady returns on investments and con-
stant growth rates. As a result, this industry is very attractive for institutional investors which 
are needed to invest their capital gainfully provided by their respective shareholder and/or 
customers. Hence, the ownership structure of financial services companies are more and more 
influenced by these institutional investors exhibiting intensified active blockholder behavior. 
Nonetheless, despite of huge earnings and high growth rates, the financial services industry 
presented itself very vulnerable as the latest financial crisis detects serious weaknesses of this 
industry emptying into bankruptcy of several major players and the strongest world economic 
crisis after the Great Depression. 
In order to account for the different perspectives, three independent studies are con-
ducted pursuing three objectives: (1) determining and evaluating short-term M&A success of 
cross-border M&A in EME by answering the question whether these transactions differ from 
international M&A transactions between industrialized countries, (2) analyzing the impact of 
M&A deals to financial services industry companies in conjunction with particular kinds of 
institutional investors, and (3) examining the role of timing at M&A transactions. Conse-
quently, these perspectives serve as the basis for the upcoming empirical analysis. 
Addressing the first objective, the opening empirical study of this doctoral thesis ana-
lyzes the short-term post-merger capital market performance of acquirers and targets in 163 
horizontal takeover transactions involving acquirers from industrialized economies and tar-
gets in EME between 1994 and 2007. This capital market performance is compared to the 
performance of cross-border takeover deals occurred exclusively between acquirers and tar-
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gets from industrialized nations. The event study results indicate that cross-border M&A in 
EME do not yield significant abnormal returns on average, neither negative nor positive, for 
bidders targeting listed and non-listed banks similar to previous research results on cross-
border banking M&A. Some sub-samples of bidder banks, however, presume wealth creation 
to shareholders contradicting previous studies. Testing for several value drivers of M&A suc-
cess for bidder banks, the regression models indicate that drivers for successful M&A deals 
are primarily dependent on bidder M&A experience, purchase of non-listed, larger target 
banks, and low GDP growth in EME, which are different from the ones identified by previous 
studies only accounting for M&A transactions in industrialized countries.  
In a second step, the data sample of this study is limited to those transactions in 
which both targets and bidders are listed on the stock exchange getting an insight of the influ-
ences of public targets on the respective bidders. The study analyzes significantly positive 
abnormal returns for target bank shareholders whereas returns to acquiring bank shareholders 
and combined entities are significantly negative. The results to bidders and targets support the 
ones of previous analysis whereas the negative abnormal returns of combined entities on av-
erage do not support the assumption that international bank M&A deals generate wealth on a 
net and aggregate basis. The regression models applied to the sub-sample demonstrate that the 
returns to bidders are influenced positively by bidder M&A experience, larger asset size of 
targets, less liberalized economies with poor governance. Concerning target banks, the impact 
of institutional and economic environment as well as target bank profitability and smaller as-
set size are significant determinants of their abnormal returns similar to previous empirical 
results. The returns to combined entities are only affected positively by bidder M&A expe-
rience. Since more and more banks facing increasing competitive domestic markets, they be-
lieve in future shareholder value in EME offering potentials for expansion and diversification. 
Consequently, useful direction, in which countries to invest, is needed partly given by the 
respective findings of the first study. However, its explanatory power is limited, as abnormal 
returns are only short-term market assessments of expected returns from M&A transactions. 
Further studies are required to assure the market valuation of long-term bank performance 
following cross-border M&A transactions in EME.  
The next empirical study addresses the second objective by comparing and evaluat-
ing state and private equity fund minority investments in financial service targets and their 
associated valuation effects on directly affected intra-industry rivals both in the short and long 
run. Moreover, the analysis should identify whether both institutional investors are equally 
active blockholders. By using a detailed dataset of 46 SWF and 68 private equity fund in-
vestments as well as 336 intra-industry rivals between 1990 and 2009, the different invest-
ment patterns of SWF and private equity funds are compared: SWF targets are larger than 
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private equity fund targets with higher dividend payouts and yields, but with lower the mana-
gerial ownership suggesting shareholder activism potential of SWF. The results from an ex-
tensive matched sample of SWF targets and industry peers show that SWF targets are indeed 
much larger but not more profitable than their industry peers. However, since no improve-
ments in operating performance of SWF targets are depicted, shareholder activism could not 
be confirmed completely. Furthermore, the differences between private equity fund targets 
and their intra-industry rivals demonstrate that these investors purchase firms with sharehold-
er activism potential as they pay lower dividends and display poorer PE-Ratio and minor ma-
nagerial ownership. Similar to SWF managers, private equity fund managers do not reach 
improvements in operating performance two years after the transactions contradicting active 
monitoring.  
The short-term market reactions to announcements to SWF and private equity fund 
targets are significantly positive; surprisingly the abnormal returns to SWF targets are higher 
compared to private equity fund targets although private equity funds are known to be more 
active in the past. The cross-sectional regression to SWF investments, the study detects a 
positive relationship between the percentage of closely held shares and the market reaction 
supporting again the assessment of active shareholder strategy. Consistent with the perception 
and previous studies that private equity funds are active and long-term orientated investors, 
the analysis find various confirmations by the cross-sectional analysis: positive relation be-
tween PE-Ratio or the percentage of closely held shares and the market reaction and the nega-
tive relation between EPS or Market-to-Book-Ratio and valuation effects. The short-term 
post-merger capital market performance to rivals of both groups of institutional investors de-
monstrates two different results. Whereas the rivals of SWF targets react significantly positive 
to the announcements confirming the information signaling hypothesis, rivals of private equi-
ty fund target companies display negative CAAR proving the competitive hypothesis. SWF 
rival portfolio assesses that the transactions of SWF shed light on the quality and future po-
tential of the financial services industry. As private equity funds are already known as active 
shareholder amplifying the operating performance of targets, rivals fear the consequence of 
being not competitive anymore as they could not increase the efficiency. 
Finally, the long-horizon impact on the acquisitions of the different ownership 
claims, both on targets and on rivals, is examined. The results indicate that the long-lasting 
abnormal returns to SWF and private equity fund target firms are not different from zero for 
large holding periods consistent with the view of efficient markets, but contradicting the 
theory of active investing. The long-term abnormal returns to both rival portfolios, nonethe-
less, demonstrate positive values verifying the quality of the financial services industry in 
general. Regarding all results, SWF investments in the financial services industry are compa-
146 6  Conclusion 
 
rable to private equity fund investments to some extent and that markets evaluate them posi-
tively with a slight proof of active shareholder and monitoring potential, which is assumed to 
improve the operating performance of their targets. Since the short-term valuation effects both 
on SWF and private equity fund targets are not explained satisfyingly further studies on these 
institutional investors are necessary in order to give a full explanation about the abnormal 
positive short-term market reaction.  
The third empirical study accounts for the last objective examining the role of timing 
at M&A transactions and shareholder wealth creation by assuming that crisis M&A acquisi-
tions occur in a different light compared to acquisitions prior to crisis. Since the US universal 
bank JPM is identified as crisis winner, the study is conducted as a case study on this specific 
bank. 
Accounting for wealth implication of M&A transactions during the latest merger 
wave and the latest financial crisis, 72 M&A transactions of JPM and selected competitive 
banks are identified between January 2003 and April 2009. By applying the event study me-
thodology, the announcement effects of pre-crisis and crisis transactions are measured. Pre-
crisis transactions of JPM display mixed evidence affirming previous research on M&A in the 
banking industry. Crisis deals, however, yield overall very positive results to JPM even if 
statistically insignificant. Competitors, alternatively, generate negative average abnormal re-
turns prior to crisis and mixed results during it. Moreover, the reaction of JPM to competitors’ 
M&A announcements and the impact of JPM’s transactions on the results to rival banks, both 
prior to and during crisis, are studied. The impact of rivals’ pre-crisis acquisitions on JPM 
yields significantly negative results and significantly positive average abnormal returns during 
crisis. Moreover, pre-crisis results for JPM’s rivals are negative without statistical signific-
ance and demonstrate significantly negative average abnormal returns during crisis hence 
symbolizing value destruction to rival banks. Finally, analyzing the long-term market perfor-
mance according to total returns and market capitalizations of JPM and rival banks compared 
to all listed US banks and the US average market, the study approves again JPM’s predomi-
nant performance by presenting the highest values. 
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the last study needs to be limited, as abnor-
mal average returns are only short-term market assessment of expected average returns from 
M&A transactions. Moreover, the results may be distorted by the market turbulences caused 
by the crisis and rather small data samples in some observations where statistical significance 
is not deducible. Further research is requested to asses the long-term bank performance of 
winners and losers of the most recent financial crisis. Furthermore, accounting for the role of 
timing at M&A as the distinction between pre-crisis and crisis M&A transactions can be as-
sessed in further studies incorporating previous merger waves and crises. 
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To sum up, this thesis provides a comprehensive assessment of short- and long-term 
success of M&A in the international financial services industry from three different perspec-
tives. Across a number of different research approaches, it determines the capital market ex-
pectations of M&A transactions dependent of the type of acquirers, either some of the finan-
cial services industry or outside the industry and the time of acquisition. These findings may 
support future investors by finding their right strategy whether they decide to invest in the 
financial services industry or not. 
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Appendix 1: Geographical Distribution of all Cross-border M&A Transactions 
 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
Legend: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium; CA = Canada, CH = Switzerland, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, 
GER = Germany, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, NOR = Norway, PT = Portugal, 
SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States. 
 
 
Asia CEE Latin America
AT 10 10
BE 8 8
CA 1 7 8
CH 1 1
ES 1 18 19
FI 1 1
FR 1 14 3 18
GER 1 6 1 8
GR 18 18
IE 1 1
IT 21 21
NL 1 4 3 8
NOR 2 2
PT 1 1 2
SE 8 8
UK 4 1 8 13
US 7 3 7 17
Total 15 99 49 163
Bidding 
Country
Total
Target Region
Appendix 151 
 
Appendix 2: Geographical Distribution of Cross-border M&A Transactions of listed 
Bidders and Targets 
Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
Legend: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium; ES = Spain, FR = France, GER = Germany, GR = Greece, IT = Italy,  
NL = The Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Characteristics of Independent Variables to all Bidders 
 
Source: Own illustration; Accounting data – Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Freedom of Market – Heritage Foundation 
2009; GDP growth and inflation change – United Nations Statistics Divisions; Rule of law – Kaufmann et al. 
(2008). 
 
Asia CEE Latin America
AT 2 2
BE 3 3
ES 4 4
FR 3 3
GER 2 2
GR 1 1
IT 8 8
NL 1 1 2
PT 1 1
SE 1 1
UK 1 1 1 3
US 4 1 1 6
Total 6 24 6 36
Bidding 
Country
Target Region
Total
Var Description N Average Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Var1: Target ROE 162 7,43% 9,10% 37,04% -199,42% 267,60%
Var2: Target CIR 161 75,43% 67,83% 43,47% 12,87% 391,67%
Var3: Target CA-Ratio 163 6,67% 5,16% 5,26% 0,67% 32,80%
Var4: Relative ROE 162 0,62 0,60 2,86 -10,18 23,68
Var5: Relative CIR 160 1,23 1,07 0,75 0,17 6,92
Var6: Relative CA-Ratio 162 3,01 2,13 2,86 0,30 19,23
Var7: Relative asset size (logarithms) 163 0,72 0,73 0,09 0,49 0,93
Var8: Dummy: listed target 163 - - - - -
Var9: Dummy: bidder's Cross border M&A  experience 163 - - - - -
Var10: Dummy: minority stake 163 - - - - -
Var11: Freedom of target market 149 2,78 2,50 0,76 1,00 4,50
Var12: GDP growth in target country 162 3,76% 4,40% 3,60% -11,00% 10,70%
Var13: Rule of law 162 -0,03 -0,12 0,62 -1,03 1,22
Var14: Inflation change 162 8,93% 6,50% 12,26% -2,70% 99,90%
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Appendix 4: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns by Regions 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to bidders, targets, and combined entities according 
to target regions. Abnormal returns were calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated 
for a period of 120 trading days prior to the event window [-20;+20]. For the market returns of each country, 
respective market indices are applied. Statistical significance is tested using the standard t-test statistic and the 
test according to Dodd & Warner (1983). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Bidders
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-20;0] -0,23 -0,18 -1,89 * -1,53 -1,21 -1,91 * 2,78 1,66 2,28 *
[-10;0] -0,62 -0,32 -0,44 -1,13 -1,78 * -1,32 1,47 1,57 * 1,70 *
[-5;0] -1,09 -0,58 -0,91 -1,13 -2,22 ** -1,36 0,44 0,85 0,78
[-1;0] -0,48 -0,66 -0,77 -0,20 -0,66 -0,60 -0,10 -0,27 -0,20
[0] -0,64 -1,12 -1,82 * -0,19 -0,86 -0,62 -0,02 -0,08 0,04
[-1;+1] -0,57 -0,88 -0,90 -0,17 -0,44 -0,15 0,34 0,71 0,87
[-5;+1] -1,18 -0,75 -1,02 -1,09 -1,90 * -1,04 0,88 0,91 1,40
[-10;+1] -0,71 -0,43 -0,56 -1,10 -1,73 * -1,09 1,91 1,43 * 2,15 **
[-5;+5] -1,87 -1,71 * -1,49 -0,71 -1,17 -0,55 0,04 0,04 0,39
[-10;+10] -1,30 -0,98 -0,73 -0,61 -0,62 -0,59 0,60 0,59 0,72
[-20;+20] -0,62 -0,36 -1,58 -1,91 -1,10 -1,62 2,89 1,23 1,81 *
Targets
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-20;0] 4,36 0,65 3,47 *** 6,16 1,59 2,78 *** -2,99 -0,43 -0,07
[-10;0] 0,80 0,15 3,98 *** 7,48 3,06 *** 3,99 *** 0,53 0,10 0,74
[-5;0] 0,98 0,33 4,35 *** 4,22 2,69 ** 3,19 *** 0,50 0,11 1,22
[-1;0] 1,61 0,94 4,29 *** 1,42 1,70 1,41 -0,20 -0,09 1,00
[0] 1,36 1,12 5,19 *** 0,57 0,93 0,61 0,88 0,50 2,29 **
[-1;+1] 0,70 0,18 4,19 *** 1,04 0,78 1,29 -0,99 -0,42 0,27
[-5;+1] 0,06 0,01 4,48 *** 3,84 1,93 * 3,05 *** -0,28 -0,06 0,77
[-10;+1] 0,12 -0,02 4,15 *** 7,10 3,28 *** 3,89 *** -0,25 -0,05 0,43
[-5;+5] 3,65 0,48 5,98 *** 2,94 1,44 1,58 6,92 1,03 2,46 **
[-10;+10] 2,24 0,22 4,57 *** 7,06 2,56 ** 2,88 *** 7,07 1,34 1,69 *
[-20;+20] 6,91 0,51 3,94 *** 0,77 0,15 0,88 3,06 1,16 0,68
Combined
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-20;0] -0,85 -0,47 -0,30 -2,63 -3,05 *** -2,34 ** 2,56 1,69 * 1,26
[-10;0] -1,22 -0,59 0,05 -1,27 -2,05 * -1,32 1,99 2,83 ** 0,69
[-5;0] -0,91 -0,50 -0,87 -0,90 -1,75 * -0,86 0,60 1,52 -0,02
[-1;0] -0,56 -0,82 -0,79 0,00 0,00 -0,23 -0,12 -0,35 0,04
[0] -0,72 -1,34 -1,36 -0,15 -0,57 -0,62 -0,13 -0,55 0,03
[-1;+1] -0,75 -1,33 -0,24 -0,10 -0,26 -0,08 0,25 0,57 -0,06
[-5;+1] -1,10 -0,73 -0,54 -1,00 -1,75 * -0,73 0,97 1,22 -0,08
[-10;+1] -1,41 -0,75 0,25 -1,37 -2,22 ** -1,21 2,36 2,32 * 1,32 *
[-5;+5] -1,02 -0,86 -0,56 -1,05 -1,65 * -0,77 0,43 0,48 -0,26
[-10;+10] -1,90 -1,23 -0,07 -0,87 -0,94 -0,78 1,29 1,26 0,15
[-20;+20] -0,63 -0,32 -0,02 -3,60 -2,92 *** -2,32 ** 2,58 1,21 1,03
z-scoret-value
t-value z-score t-value
t-value
Asia (N=6)
z-score t-value z-score
z-score t-value z-score
z-score t-value z-score
CEE (N=24) LatAm (N=6)
Asia (N=6) CEE (N=24) LatAm (N=6)
Returns by regions
Asia (N=6) CEE (N=24) LatAm (N=6)
t-value z-score t-value
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Appendix 5: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns by Nationality of Bidders 
 
Source: Own calculations; Return Index data – DataStream. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns to bidders, targets, and combined entities according 
to nationality of bidders. Abnormal returns were calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been 
estimated for a period of 120 trading days prior to the event window [-20;+20]. For the market returns of each 
country, respective market indices are applied. Statistical significance is tested using the standard t-test statistic 
and the test according to Dodd & Warner (1983). 
a European excludes transactions involving Italian and Spanish bidders. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Bidders
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-20;0] -0,37 -0,28 -0,36 -1,74 -1,50 -1,76 * -0,18 -0,06 -0,34 3,41 1,33 2,41 **
[-10;0] -1,40 -0,76 -0,87 -0,87 -1,24 -0,50 -0,63 -0,48 -0,34 1,74 1,27 1,69 *
[-5;0] -1,20 -0,65 -1,18 -0,94 -1,92 * -0,95 -1,18 -1,01 -0,71 0,65 0,84 0,92
[-1;0] -0,28 -0,38 -0,80 -0,47 -1,59 -1,08 0,17 0,25 0,48 0,14 0,46 0,04
[0] -0,31 -0,52 -1,00 -0,50 -2,09 * -1,49 0,15 0,35 0,56 0,27 1,93 0,57
[-1;+1] -0,59 -1,32 -1,03 -0,18 -0,47 0,36 -0,18 -0,20 -0,02 0,70 1,32 1,20
[-5;+1] -1,51 -1,01 -1,34 -0,65 -1,16 -0,07 -1,52 -1,18 -0,93 1,22 0,81 1,62
[-10;+1] -1,71 -1,16 -1,02 -0,58 -0,78 0,14 -0,97 -0,82 -0,53 2,30 1,13 2,20 **
[-5;+5] -2,25 -2,36 * -1,63 * -0,68 -1,06 -0,32 -0,27 -0,23 0,13 -0,01 -0,01 0,44
[-10;+10] -3,87 -2,16 * -1,71 * -0,94 -1,04 -0,31 2,18 1,53 0,93 0,98 0,63 0,90
[-20;+20] -2,41 -1,72 -1,03 -2,08 -1,25 -0,93 0,94 0,24 -0,31 3,02 0,81 1,74 **
Targets
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-20;0] 0,25 0,10 0,72 10,32 2,12 ** 4,88 *** 0,42 0,08 0,79 -8,67 -1,01 -1,38
[-10;0] 0,10 0,07 1,72 * 9,96 2,99 *** 5,87 *** 3,43 0,98 1,76 * -4,93 -1,09 -1,49
[-5;0] 0,45 0,43 2,60 *** 5,50 2,46 ** 4,87 *** 3,39 1,38 1,97 ** -4,66 -1,91 -1,65 *
[-1;0] 0,88 1,43 2,18 ** 2,08 1,72 3,02 *** 1,22 1,15 1,31 -2,50 -1,32 -0,99
[0] 0,47 0,75 2,88 *** 1,17 1,24 2,66 *** 0,86 1,11 1,34 -0,90 -0,79 -0,42
[-1;+1] 0,71 0,65 1,54 0,82 0,39 2,69 *** 2,22 1,69 1,59 -3,42 -1,48 -1,22
[-5;+1] 0,28 0,19 2,26 ** 4,24 1,37 4,66 *** 4,38 1,94 * 2,16 ** -5,58 -1,88 -1,80 *
[-10;+1] -0,06 -0,04 0,07 8,70 2,50 ** 5,73 *** 4,43 1,33 1,95 * -5,85 -1,37 -1,63
[-5;+5] 0,15 0,09 1,88 * 4,68 1,34 4,24 *** 3,55 1,25 1,49 5,11 0,54 0,83
[-10;+10] -0,37 -0,16 0,97 10,72 2,42 ** 5,48 *** 1,74 0,42 0,98 5,17 0,79 0,54
[-20;+20] 3,06 0,84 0,49 4,81 0,65 3,23 *** -3,95 -0,53 0,10 1,25 0,69 0,24
Combined
Event 
window
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
CAAR 
(%)
[-20;0] -1,10 -0,62 -0,44 -1,86 -1,63 -1,51 -3,14 -3,58 ** -1,51 3,08 1,31 2,33 **
[-10;0] -2,04 -1,06 -1,03 -0,74 -0,95 -0,34 -1,25 -1,39 -0,67 2,49 2,93 * 1,54
[-5;0] -1,06 -0,59 -1,11 -0,77 -1,50 -0,09 -0,83 -0,75 -0,48 0,86 1,59 0,77
[-1;0] -0,38 -0,53 -0,95 -0,40 -1,36 -0,52 0,64 1,16 1,11 0,08 0,39 -0,03
[0] -0,41 -0,70 -1,13 -0,60 -2,40 ** -1,30 0,54 1,19 1,30 0,08 2,81 0,54
[-1;+1] -0,80 -2,13 * -1,24 -0,31 -0,72 0,39 0,36 0,51 0,60 0,55 1,15 1,11
[-5;+1] -1,48 -1,02 -1,33 -0,68 -1,18 0,45 -1,11 -0,91 -0,64 1,33 1,10 1,46
[-10;+1] -2,47 -1,53 -1,22 -0,66 -0,83 0,08 -1,53 -1,75 -0,79 2,96 2,08 2,04 **
[-5;+5] -1,51 -1,28 -1,30 -0,90 -1,50 0,10 -0,71 -0,50 -0,11 0,55 0,39 0,44
[-10;+10] -4,58 -2,67 * -1,85 * -0,68 -0,72 0,12 0,90 0,71 0,48 1,99 1,37 0,90
[-20;+20] -2,57 -1,74 -0,95 -2,50 -1,57 -1,23 -3,09 -1,58 -1,41 2,57 0,76 1,77 *
z-score t-value z-scoret-value z-score t-value z-score t-value
Returns by nationality of bidder banks
t-value z-score t-value z-score t-value z-score
U.S. (N=6) European
a
 (N=18) Italian (N=8)
U.S. (N=6) European
a
 (N=18) Italian (N=8)
U.S. (N=6) European
a
 (N=18) Italian (N=8)
t-value z-score t-value z-score t-value z-score
t-value z-score
Spanish (N=4)
Spanish (N=4)
Spanish (N=4)
t-value z-score
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Appendix 6: Characteristics of Independent Variables of Sub-Sample 
 
Source: Own illustration; Accounting data – Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Freedom of Market – Heritage Foundation 
2009; GDP growth and inflation change – United Nations Statistics Divisions; Rule of law – Kaufmann et al. 
(2008). 
 
Var Description N Average Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Var1: Target ROE 36 5,64% 13,60% 33,87% -121,17% 49,47%
Var2: Target CIR 35 65,29% 65,35% 16,31% 41,50% 106,48%
Var3: Target CA-Ratio 36 5,12% 4,59% 2,49% 1,74% 14,47%
Var4: Relative ROE 36 0,44% 0,88% 2,54% -10,11% 4,93%
Var5: Relative CIR 35 1,00% 0,97% 0,27% 0,59% 1,80%
Var6: Relative CA-Ratio 36 2,18% 1,80% 1,31% 0,62% 6,32%
Var7: Relative asset size (logarithms) 36 0,79% 0,79% 0,06% 0,64% 0,92%
Var8: Dummy: bidder's Cross border M&A  experience 36 - - - - -
Var9: Dummy: minority stake 36 - - - - -
Var10: Freedom of target market 36 2,88 3,00 0,64 2,00 4,00
Var11: GDP growth in target country 36 2,34% 3,75% 3,91% -10,50% 7,40%
Var12: Rule of law 36 0,35 0,47 0,46 -0,69 1,17
Var13: Inflation change 36 8,86% 5,25% 12,89% -0,30% 54,40%
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Appendix 10: Balance Sheet Positions of US Universal Banks, 2005-2008 
 
Source: Own illustration; Fitch IBCA Bankscope. 
 
 
  
Overview Banks 2005 2006 2007 2008 ∆ 05/06 ∆ 06/07 ∆ 07/08 
Bank of America
Total Assets 1291,80 1459,74 1715,75 1817,94 13,00 17,54 5,96
Total Equity 101,26 132,42 142,39 139,35 30,77 7,53 -2,14
Total Customer Loans 573,79 706,49 910,77 962,90 23,13 28,91 5,72
Loan Loss Provision 4,01 5,01 8,39 26,83 24,81 67,37 219,92
Capital One Financial
Total Assets 88,70 149,74 150,59 165,91 68,81 0,57 10,18
Total Equity 14,13 25,24 24,29 23,52 78,61 -3,73 -3,20
Total Customer Loans 59,85 106,95 102,12 101,09 78,70 -4,51 -1,01
Loan Loss Provision 1,49 1,48 2,64 5,10 -0,98 78,57 93,48
Citigroup
Total Assets 1494,04 1884,32 2187,63 1938,47 26,12 16,10 -11,39
Total Equity 111,41 118,78 113,60 73,36 6,62 -4,37 -35,42
Total Customer Loans 583,50 679,19 777,99 694,22 16,40 14,55 -10,77
Loan Loss Provision 7,93 6,74 17,42 33,67 -15,02 158,59 93,26
Fifth Third Bancorp
Total Assets 105,23 100,67 110,96 119,76 -4,33 10,22 7,93
Total Equity 9,44 10,01 9,15 7,84 6,10 -8,60 -14,38
Total Customer Loans 71,23 75,50 84,58 85,60 6,00 12,02 1,20
Loan Loss Provision 0,33 0,34 0,63 4,56 3,94 83,09 626,11
JPMorgan Chase
Total Assets 1198,94 1351,52 1562,15 2175,05 12,73 15,58 39,23
Total Equity 107,07 115,79 123,22 134,95 8,14 6,42 9,51
Total Customer Loans 419,15 483,13 519,37 744,90 15,26 7,50 43,42
Loan Loss Provision 3,48 3,27 6,86 20,98 -6,12 109,91 205,64
PNC Financial Services
Total Assets 91,95 101,82 138,92 291,08 10,73 36,44 109,53
Total Equity 9,15 11,67 16,51 19,73 27,53 41,42 19,52
Total Customer Loans 51,55 52,47 72,25 179,86 1,79 37,69 148,95
Loan Loss Provision 0,02 0,12 0,32 1,52 490,48 154,03 381,59
SunTrust Banks
Total Assets 179,71 182,16 179,57 189,14 1,36 -1,42 5,33
Total Equity 16,89 17,31 17,55 17,17 2,52 1,38 -2,20
Total Customer Loans 128,25 133,24 131,17 131,03 3,89 -1,56 -0,11
Loan Loss Provision 0,18 0,26 0,66 2,47 48,39 153,30 272,12
Wells Fargo
Total Assets 481,74 482,00 575,44 1309,64 0,05 19,39 127,59
Total Equity 40,68 45,90 47,66 71,54 12,83 3,83 50,10
Total Customer Loans 351,98 352,93 409,96 891,15 0,27 16,16 117,37
Loan Loss Provision 2,38 2,20 4,94 15,98 -7,51 124,09 223,53
Balance sheet positions in USD bn Annual changes in %
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Appendix 11: Profit/Loss statement Positions of US Universal Banks, 2005-2008 
 
Source: Own illustration; Fitch IBCA Bankscope; Bloomberg. 
a Write-downs/credit losses are less than USD 1.0 bn; therefore not detected by Bloomberg’s database. 
Overview Banks 2005 2006 2007 2008 ∆ 05/06 ∆ 06/07 ∆ 07/08 
Net Interest Revenue 30,72 34,57 34,25 44,09 12,53 -0,92 28,72
Net Trading Income 1,81 3,17 -5,13 -5,91 74,72 -262,07 15,20
Other operating Income 24,63 34,82 37,02 33,33 41,41 6,30 -9,95
Total operating expense 32,28 39,80 44,99 67,42 23,29 13,02 49,87
Write-downs/credit losses n.a. n.a. 9,70 33,00 - - 240,21
Profit/Loss 16,47 21,13 14,98 4,01 28,35 -29,11 -73,25
Net Interest Revenue 3,68 5,10 6,53 7,15 38,57 28,05 9,48
Net Trading Income n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - - -
Other operating Income 6,36 7,00 8,05 6,74 10,04 15,11 -16,27
Total operating expense 7,21 8,44 10,58 12,37 17,12 25,26 16,92
Write-downs/credit Losses n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - - -
Profit/Loss 1,81 2,41 1,57 -0,05 33,46 -34,96 -102,93
Net Interest Revenue 39,17 39,42 46,89 52,18 0,64 18,94 11,28
Net Trading Income n.a. n.a. -12,08 -22,19 - - 83,69
Other operating Income 44,40 50,13 45,91 19,89 12,89 -8,42 -56,68
Total operating expense 54,21 59,98 78,91 104,81 10,64 31,57 32,82
Write-downs/credit losses n.a. n.a. 23,80 64,30 - - 170,17
Profit/Loss 24,59 21,54 3,62 -27,68 -12,41 -83,21 -865,39
Net Interest Revenue 2,96 2,87 3,01 3,45 -3,10 4,74 14,59
Net Trading Income n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - - -
Other operating Income 2,50 2,15 2,47 2,95 -13,88 14,58 19,42
Total operating expense 3,26 3,40 3,94 9,12 4,36 15,89 131,63
Write-downs/credit losses n.a. n.a. 0,80 4,10 - - 412,50
Profit/Loss 1,55 1,19 1,10 -2,11 -23,31 -7,58 -292,53
Net Interest Revenue 19,82 21,24 26,41 38,11 7,19 24,31 44,30
Net Trading Income 5,86 10,35 9,02 -10,70 76,55 -12,86 -218,68
Other operating Income 28,84 29,85 35,95 39,17 3,49 20,44 8,96
Total operating expense 39,03 41,25 48,36 64,05 5,67 17,24 32,44
Write-downs/credit losses n.a. n.a. 5,80 27,80 - - 379,31
Profit/Loss 8,48 14,44 15,37 5,61 70,27 6,38 -63,52
Net Interest Revenue 2,15 2,24 2,92 3,80 4,23 29,90 30,43
Net Trading Income 0,16 0,18 0,10 0,00 16,56 -43,17 -100,00
Other operating Income 4,01 4,08 3,81 3,37 1,82 -6,50 -11,70
Total operating expense 4,35 4,57 4,61 5,95 4,89 0,96 28,97
Write-downs/credit losses n.a. n.a. 0,20 7,10 - - 3450,00
Profit/Loss 1,33 2,60 1,47 0,88 95,85 -43,47 -39,88
Net Interest Revenue 4,58 4,65 4,69 4,57 1,61 0,78 -2,52
Net Trading Income 0,15 0,11 -0,36 0,04 -22,12 -420,09 -110,56
Other operating Income 3,01 3,36 3,79 4,44 11,48 12,96 17,01
Total operating expense 4,87 5,14 5,90 8,36 5,65 14,71 41,80
Write-downs/credit losses n.a. n.a. 0,90 5,20 - - 477,78
Profit/Loss 1,99 2,12 1,63 0,80 6,55 -22,83 -51,30
Net Interest Revenue 18,50 19,95 20,97 24,86 7,82 5,13 18,51
Net Trading Income 0,57 0,54 0,54 0,28 -4,73 0,00 -49,45
Other operating Income 13,87 15,20 17,87 16,48 9,53 17,61 -7,79
Total operating expense 21,40 22,95 27,76 38,64 7,22 20,99 39,18
Write-downs/credit losses n.a. n.a. 2,60 20,80 - - 700,00
Profit/Loss 7,67 8,48 8,06 2,65 10,57 -5,01 -67,05
W
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Appendix 12: Performance Indicators of US Universal Banks, 2005-2008 
Source: Own illustration; Fitch IBCA Bankscope. 
Note: Italicized figures represent annual changes in %. 
 
 
  
Overview 
performance 
indicators
Return on average 
assets (ROAA) in 
2005 1,37 - 2,54 - 1,65 - 1,55 - 0,72 - 1,54 - 1,17 - 1,69 -
2006 1,53 12 2,03 -20 1,27 -23 1,15 -26 1,13 58 2,68 74 1,17 -1 1,76 4
2007 0,93 -39 1,05 -48 0,18 -86 1,02 -12 1,06 -7 1,22 -54 0,89 -24 1,52 -13
2008 0,16 -83 -0,03 -103 -1,63 -1031 -1,89 -286 0,26 -75 0,40 -67 0,41 -54 0,25 -84-100 - 0 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Return on average 
equity (ROAE) in %
2005 16,40 - 16,07 - 22,34 - 16,87 - 7,98 - 15,46 - 12,09 - 19,53 -
2006 18,07 10 12,27 -24 18,66 -16 12,21 -28 12,96 63 24,91 61 12,34 2 19,59 0
2007 10,77 -40 6,34 -48 3,07 -84 11,22 -8 12,86 -1 10,41 -58 9,20 -25 17,22 -12
2008 1,94 -82 -0,19 -103 -35,95 -1270 -25,67 -329 3,82 -70 4,75 -54 4,30 -53 3,98 -77-100 - 0 -10 -100 -10 -100 -100 -100
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
in %
2005 8,30 - 13,25 - 8,80 - 8,40 - 8,50 - 8,30 - 7,00 - 8,30 -
2006 8,60 4 10,22 -23 8,60 -2 8,40 0 8,70 2 10,40 25 7,70 10 9,00 8
2007 6,90 -20 10,13 -1 7,10 -17 7,70 -8 8,40 -3 6,80 -35 6,90 -10 7,60 -16
2008 9,20 33 13,76 36 11,90 68 10,60 38 10,90 30 9,70 43 10,90 58 7,80 3-100 -100 -100 -100 -10 -100 -100 -100
Cost-to-income ratio 
(CIR) in %
2005 49,46 - 56,96 - 55,38 - 53,57 - 65,20 - 68,61 - 60,65 - 57,72 -
2006 47,95 -3 57,60 1 59,45 7 60,82 14 61,81 -5 68,30 0 60,09 -1 58,12 1
2007 55,34 15 54,44 -5 76,18 28 60,48 -1 58,14 -6 62,88 -8 64,47 7 57,94 0
2008 56,77 3 52,29 -4 142,62 87 71,39 18 64,69 11 61,79 -2 65,13 1 54,46 -6
U.S. Universal Banks
Bank of 
America
Capital One 
Financial
Cititgroup
Fifth Third 
bankcorp
JP Morgan 
Chase
PNC 
Financial 
Services
SunTrust 
Banks
Wells Fargo
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Appendix 13: Overview of identified Transactions of. US Universal Banks 
 
 
# Year Target
Target 
country
Bidder
 % 
acquired
  % after 
deal
Tx.-Vol. in 
USD m
1 2003 Lighthouse Financial Savings U.S. SunTrust Banks Inc 100,0 100,0 130,0
2 2003 Citizens Financial Group U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 -
3 2003 Pacific Northwest Bancorp U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 622,4
4 2003 Sun America Mortgage U.S. SunTrust Banks Inc 100,0 100,0 -
5 2003 Ceska Sporitelna CZ JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 435,0
6 2003 Sears Roebuck & Co U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 7.100,0
7 2003 Bank One Corp U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 720,0
8 2003 United National Bancorp U.S. PNC Finl Svcs Grp Inc 100,0 100,0 637,9
9 2003 FleetBoston Financial Corp U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 49.260,6
10 2003 Forum Financial Group U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
11 2004 Bank One Corp U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 58.760,6
12 2004 Koram Bank ROK Citigroup Inc 60,9 97,5 1.637,4
13 2004 Seix Investment Advisors Inc U.S. SunTrust Banks Inc 100,0 100,0 280,0
14 2004 Natl Commerce Finl Corp U.S. SunTrust Banks Inc 100,0 100,0 7.025,1
15 2004 Principal Residential Mortgage Inc U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 1.260,0
16 2004 Strong Financial U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 -
17 2004 Riggs National Corp U.S. PNC Finl Svcs Grp Inc 100,0 100,0 670,2
18 2004 Tranaut Fund Administration U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 -
19 2004 First National Bankshares U.S. Fifth Third Bancorp 100,0 100,0 1.635,4
20 2004 Knight Trading Group U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 237,0
21 2004 First American Bank U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
22 2004 First Cmnty Capital Corp U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 123,7
23 2004 Onyx Acceptance Corp U.S. Capital One Financial Corp 100,0 100,0 198,9
24 2004 ABN-AMRO-Custody Business NL Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
25 2004 Hfs Group U.K. Capital One Financial Corp 100,0 100,0 117,0
26 2005 Hibernia Corp U.S. Capital One Financial Corp 100,0 100,0 4.861,7
27 2005 KeyCorp U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 -
28 2005 Federated&May - Credit Card U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 1.221,0
29 2005 MBNA Corp U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 35.810,3
30 2005 Wüstenrot Hypothekenbank GER Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
31 2005 Harris Williams & Co U.S. PNC Finl Svcs Grp Inc 100,0 100,0 -
32 2005 Works-Card Tech U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 -
33 2005 Collegiate Funding Svcs LLC U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 687,8
34 2006 Financial Labs LLC U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 -
35 2006 Kohls Corp U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 112,0
36 2006 North Fork Bancorp U.S. Capital One Financial Corp 100,0 100,0 15.132,9
37 2006 Bank of NY U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 3.000,0
38 2006 Washinton Mutual Inc-Mortgage U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 -
39 2006 TD Ameritrade U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
40 2006 Mercantile Bankshares Corp U.S. PNC Finl Svcs Grp Inc 100,0 100,0 5.981,8
41 2006 Grupo Financiero Uno SV Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
42 2006 US Trust Corp U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 3.300,0
43 2006 EFC Partners LP U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 -
44 2006 Grupo Cuscatlan SV Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 1.510,0
45 2006 Quilter Holdings Ltd U.K. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
46 2006 ABN AMRO Mortgage Group Inc U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
47 2007 Placer Sierra Bancshares U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 627,8
48 2007 Egg PLC U.K. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 1.091,3
49 2007 Bank of Overseas Chinese TW Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 426,5
50 2007 ACC Capital Holding U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
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Source: Own illustration; Thomson Financial SDC. 
Note: Transactions 1 to 57 are pre-crisis deals and transactions 58 to 72 are crisis deals. Transactions highlighted 
in grey symbolize deals involving troubled target banks. 
Legend: BR = Brazil, CZ = Czech Republic, GER = Germany, NL = The Netherlands, ROK = South Korea, SV 
= El Salvador, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States, TR = Turkey, TW = Taiwan 
 
  
# Year Target
Target 
country
Bidder
 % 
acquired
  % after 
deal
Tx.-Vol. in 
USD m
51 2007 ABN AMRO U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 21.000,0
52 2007 Reverse Mortgage of America U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 -
53 2007 Greater Bay Bancorp U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 1.656,9
54 2007 ARCS Commercial Mtg Co LP U.S. PNC Finl Svcs Grp Inc 100,0 100,0 -
55 2007 R-G Crown Bank U.S. Fifth Third Bancorp 100,0 100,0 338,0
56 2007 Yardville National Bancorp U.S. PNC Finl Svcs Grp Inc 100,0 100,0 400,4
57 2007 Pacific Capital U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 222,0
58 2007 Automated Trading Desk LLC U.S. Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 675,5
59 2007 Sterling Financial Corp U.S. PNC Finl Svcs Grp Inc 100,0 100,0 561,8
60 2007 First Charter Corp U.S. Fifth Third Bancorp 100,0 100,0 1.090,9
61 2007 Opus Menhul Degerler TR Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
62 2007 First Horizon National U.S. Fifth Third Bancorp 100,0 100,0 -
63 2007 GB&T Bancshares Inc U.S. SunTrust Banks Inc 100,0 100,0 154,7
64 2008 Countrywide Financial Corp U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 4.143,9
65 2008 Bear Stearns Cos Inc U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 1.180,9
66 2008 Flatiron Credit Co Inc U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 -
67 2008 Intra SA Corretora de Cambio BR Citigroup Inc 100,0 100,0 -
68 2008 Merrill Lynch & Co Inc U.S. Bank of America Corp 100,0 100,0 48.766,2
69 2008 Washington Mutual U.S. JPMorgan Chase & Co 100,0 100,0 1.900,0
70 2008 Wachovia Corp U.S. Wells Fargo 100,0 100,0 15.112,0
71 2008 National City Corp U.S. PNC Finl Svcs Grp Inc 100,0 100,0 5.617,7
72 2008 Chevy Chase Bank U.S. Capital One Financial Corp 100,0 100,0 520,0
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Appendix 14: Short-term RI Development of JPM for selected Transactions in USD 
 
Source: Own illustration; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
Note: Daily data display 30 days before and after the transaction announcement. 
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Appendix 15: US Universal Banks’ Performance according to Return Index 
 
Source: Own illustration; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
Note: Annual average data; Italic numbers demonstrate index values of the Return Index of respective banks. 
The base year value is 100 starting in 2003. 
a Pre-crisis CAGR describes the period of the latest merger wave, which persisted from the beginning of 2003 to 
June 2007. 
b Crisis CAGR describes the period starting in July 2007 with the declaration of Bear Stearns that two of their 
hedge funds are worthless (Creswell and Bajaj (2007)) till today (April 2009). 
 
 
 
 
  
Overview Banks 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 04/2009
CAGR 
Total
CAGR Pre-
Crisis
a
CAGR 
Crisis
b
2.734,7 3.214,9 3.524,5 4.066,5 4.236,0 2.781,4 697,4
100,0 117,6 128,9 148,7 154,9 101,7 25,5
921,7 1.409,2 1.545,0 1.597,9 1.389,1 867,6 341,0
100,0 152,9 167,6 173,4 150,7 94,1 37,0
3.221,1 3.734,7 3.833,5 4.189,8 4.254,2 1.777,6 318,6
100,0 115,9 119,0 130,1 132,1 55,2 9,9
48.833,1 47.113,2 38.877,3 37.329,2 36.887,2 17.480,2 3.570,5
100,0 96,5 79,6 76,4 75,5 35,8 7,3
5.224,5 6.142,8 6.605,1 8.454,3 9.008,9 8.260,2 4.501,2
100,0 117,6 126,4 161,8 172,4 158,1 86,2
1.076,8 1.258,0 1.355,0 1.485,5 1.599,6 980,4 310,8
100,0 116,8 125,8 138,0 148,6 91,0 28,9
6.453,7 7.717,6 8.254,5 9.580,0 10.076,3 8.850,8 5.349,6
100,0 119,6 127,9 148,4 156,1 137,1 82,9
9.780,8 10.084,3 9.142,1 9.529,0 9.635,9 5.856,9 2.155,6
100,0 103,1 93,5 97,4 98,5 59,9 22,0
2.258,5 2.900,9 2.806,3 3.538,3 3.958,8 3.412,8 2.294,4
100,0 128,4 124,3 156,7 175,3 151,1 101,6
-50,7%
Return Index in USD
Bank of America -19,4% 10,9% -62,1%
Capital One Financial -14,5% 11,9%
-70,6%
Citigroup -30,6% 8,7% -74,2%
Fifth Third Bancorp -33,8% -4,3%
PNC Financial Services -2,3% 13,3% -30,8%
-57,8%
Wells Fargo -2,9% 10,7% -28,7%
SunTrust Banks -17,8% 10,5%
-24,0%
All Rival Banks -21,2% 1,0% -54,2%
JPMorgan Chase 0,2% 14,3%
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Appendix 16: US Universal Banks’ Performance according to Market Value 
 
Source: Own illustration; Return Index data – Thomson Financial DataStream. 
Note: Annual average data; Italic numbers demonstrate index values of the Return Index of respective banks. 
The base year value is 100 starting in 2003. 
a Pre-crisis CAGR describes the period of the latest merger wave, which persisted from the beginning of 2003 to 
June 2007. 
b Crisis CAGR describes the period starting in July 2007 with the declaration of Bear Stearns that two of their 
hedge funds are worthless (Creswell and Bajaj (2007)) till today (April 2009). 
Overview Banks 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
04/200
9
CAGR 
Total
CAGR Pre-
Crisis
a
CAGR 
Crisis
b
112.860,2 161.963,6 180.935,1 221.020,7 220.674,4 139.346,7 46.904,4
100,0 143,5 160,3 195,8 195,5 123,5 41,6
10.686,7 17.206,3 20.423,4 24.538,4 28.542,7 16.487,3 6.454,6
100,0 161,0 191,1 229,6 267,1 154,3 60,4
215.893,6 243.819,8 240.520,0 242.781,0 236.648,1 99.830,5 18.125,5
100,0 112,9 111,4 112,5 109,6 46,2 8,4
31.898,6 29.653,7 23.468,7 21.651,4 20.161,2 9.080,3 1.899,7
100,0 93,0 73,6 67,9 63,2 28,5 6,0
13.418,1 15.253,6 16.089,7 20.449,7 23.955,5 21.779,7 14.613,5
100,0 113,7 119,9 152,4 178,5 162,3 108,9
17.124,8 21.008,9 26.165,6 27.759,7 28.265,0 16.486,1 5.066,1
100,0 122,7 152,8 162,1 165,1 96,3 29,6
85.107,3 99.044,3 102.319,0 114.451,5 116.697,2 97.073,6 70.024,1
100,0 116,4 120,2 134,5 137,1 114,1 82,3
69.569,9 83.992,9 87.131,6 96.093,2 96.420,6 57.154,9 23.298,3
100,0 120,7 125,2 138,1 138,6 82,2 33,5
63.209,0 108.765,2 127.238,3 152.684,5 163.221,3 139.402,7 97.733,7
100,0 172,1 201,3 241,6 258,2 220,5 154,6
-53,7%
Market Value in USD
Bank of America -12,9% 17,1% -56,0%
Capital One Financial -7,7% 26,4%
-70,6%
Citigroup -32,4% 4,4% -73,8%
Fifth Third Bancorp -35,9% -7,5%
PNC Financial Services 1,4% 13,9% -23,3%
-59,2%
Wells Fargo -3,0% 7,8% -23,4%
SunTrust Banks -17,5% 13,5%
-21,8%
All Rival Banks -15,9% 9,0% -52,2%
JPMorgan Chase 7,1% 25,1%
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